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This dissertation is based on the observation that Herman Melville’s “Bartleby, the 
Scrivener” has become a popular reference in contemporary culture. Not only in the field 
of literary scholarship but also in the realm of art, political theory and philosophy, it is 
employed as an example of authentic resistance to power, a counter-intuitive politics that 
finds its strength in withdrawal, inaction, and inscrutability. The thesis examines the 
reasons and motives that drive literary scholars, artists and philosophers to read, interpret 
and use the story in such a way. 
It does so by analyzing the nature of and reoccurring patterns in Bartleby Industry,
the enormous bulk of academic scholarship devoted to the story. It observes how the story
is made use of outside of literary scholarship by disciplines, such as art and philosophy, 
that are not primarily concerned with the literary complexity of the story but use it to 
work on their own problems of politics and ethics. It pays special attention to its 
popularity among influential Postmarxist philosophers, namely Slavoj Žižek, Giorgio 
Agamben and Gilles Deleuze. As the presence of “Bartleby” in the realm of philosophy 
has to do with a particular function literature performs in that field, in these chapters 
“Bartleby” becomes more of a guiding thread in order to examine that function. At stake 
is the legitimacy of philosophical readings of literature. A singularity of a literary text is 
neglected by violent reading for the sake of creating new political communities thus 
making literature newly relevant. On the other hand, the use of “Bartleby” brings to light 
debatable aspects of this particular politics put forward by art, philosophy or social 
activism in question as well as the uneasiness of co-existence of literature and philosophy
on the one hand and the realm of politics on the other. 
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Tato dizertace zkoumá povídku Hermana Melvilla “Písař Bartleby” jako populární
odkaz v současné kultuře. Nejen na poli literární kritiky, ale i v oblasti současné literatury
a umění, politické teorie a filozofie se setkáváme s „Bartlebym“ jako s příkladem 
autentického odporu vůči moci, politiky, jež poněkud nečekaně klade důraz na sílu 
netečnosti, pasivity a nesrozumitelnosti. Práce se zabývá důvody a motivy, jež vedou 
literární teoretiky, umělce a filozofy číst, interpretovat a používat tuto povídku právě 
tímto způsobem.
Dizertace analyzuje povahu a opakující se vzorce, jež se objevují v 
„Bartlebyovském průmyslu,“ obrovském množství literárně-kritických textů 
rozebírajících tuto povídku. Všímá si, jakým způsobem se k povídce staví umělci, 
spisovatelé a filozofové. V první řadě ji využívají k řešení etických a politických 
problémů a její literární komplexnost pro ně není zas tak důležitá. Práce se zabývá 
popularitou „Bartlebyho“ mezi postmarxistickými filozofy, jako jsou Slavoj Žižek, 
Giorgio Agamben a Gilles Deleuze. Četnost odkazů k tomuto literárnímu textu na poli 
filozofie souvisí s konkrétní funkcí, jíž literatura v této oblasti vykonává. Jde při tom o 
otázku legitimity filozofických čtení, jež odmítají přistupovat k literárnímu textu v jeho 
významové bohatosti a skrze své zjednodušující interpretace usilují o vytvoření nových 
politických komunit. Tím činí literaturu relevantní novým způsobem. Na druhé straně se 
tak „Bartleby“ stává prostorem, kde se zřetelněji ukazují problematické stránky této 
konkrétní „bartlebyovské“ politiky a komplikovaný vztah mezi literaturou a filozofií na 
jedné straně a politickou praxí na druhé. 
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When in the fall of 2011 encampments spread across America under the name of Occupy 
Wall Street (OWS), Bartleby, the Scrivener, a peculiar protagonist of the eponymous 
story by the nineteenth-century American novelist Herman Melville became its unofficial 
mascot. Activists protesting social and economic inequality, greed of the financial sector 
and government corruption wore T-shirts1 and used posters2 with the slogan “I would 
prefer not to,” organized public readings of the tale in the park,3 and wrote blog entries 
about parallels between the story and the movement.4 Michele Hardesty, a U.S. literature 
scholar who took part in the camp, celebrated “Bartleby” as “a powerful narrative for the 
moment” claiming that both Bartleby and OWS have challenged our assumptions about 
the naturalness of capitalism and have shown “how a refusal can open up new ways of 
seeing.”5 Others have argued that by refusing to articulate specific demands (something 
that greatly baffled the media), OWS was just as “inscrutable” as Bartleby and therein 
lied its greatest power.6 What activists saw as Bartleby’s unwillingness to accept the very 
1 Michele Hardesty, “I would prefer not to,” Occupy Wall Street Library, Oct 26, 2011, accessed Dec 14, 
2016, https://peopleslibrary.wordpress.com/2011/10/26/%E2%80%9Ci-would-prefer-not-to-
%E2%80%9D/.
2 Jonathan D. Greenberg, “Occupy Wall Street’s Debt to Melville,” The Atlantic, Apr 30, 2012, accessed 
December 14, 2016, http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/04/occupy-wall-streets-debt-to-
melville/256482/. 
3 Hardesty, “I would prefer not to;” Maryann Yin, “’Bartleby, The Scrivener' Reading at Occupy Wall 
Street,” Media Bistro, Nov 11, 2011, accessed Dec 14, 2016, 
http://www.adweek.com/galleycat/bartleby-the-scrivener-reading-at-occupy-wall-street/43056?red=as. 
4 Hannah Gersen, “Bartleby’s Occupation of Wall Street,” The Millions, Oct 11, 2011, accessed 
December 14, 2016, http://www.themillions.com/2011/10/bartleby%E2%80%99s-occupation-of-wall-
street.html; Hardesty, “I would prefer no to”; Lauren Klein, “What Bartleby Can Teach Us About 
Occupy Wall Street,” Arcade, Nov 21, 2011, accessed Dec 14, 2016, 
http://arcade.stanford.edu/blogs/what-bartleby-can-teach-us-about-occupy-wall-street.
5 Hardesty, “I would prefer not to.” 
6 Kaya Genç, “The standing man on Taksim Square: a latterday Bartleby,” The Guardian, June 20, 2013, 
accessed Dec 14, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/books/booksblog/2013/jun/20/standing-man-
istanbul-bartleby-melville.
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conditions of social interaction and his refusal to accept solutions proposed to him 
corresponded to their own fatigue of media manipulation and skepticism about solutions 
proposed by those in power. The occupiers, in short, saw themselves in the position of the
forlorn scrivener. The struggle for economic justice in the U.S. at the beginning of the 
twenty-first century thus found a face in a fictional character from a nineteenth-century 
tale.
When two years later the protests in Gezi Park in Istanbul, Turkey, erupted and 
temporary libraries – as a part of the occupation – were set up, the translations of 
“Bartleby” were not missing. The novelist and essayist Kaya Genç reported that “people 
read it as a way of protest, metres away from the riot police.”7 In his short article for The 
Guardian he describes the action by the performance artist Erdem Gunduz that went viral
on social media in Turkey and abroad. Gunduz stood still for many hours on Taksim 
Square not responding to any inquiry, an action which Genç praises as Bartlebian. 
How did it come about that radical protesters in the 21st century be they in the 
U.S. or Europe, have recognized themselves in the tale that was written in an entirely 
different social and political milieu? How do they actually read the tale? Pondering on the
relevance of popularity of “Bartleby” among activists for literary scholarship, Russ 
Castronovo meditates on the transtemporal unsettling of Melville's powerful story and the
differences between professional criticism and public reading practices. Castranovo 
considers the specifically “superficial” treatment the story has undergone in the hands of 
the activists:
Most invocations of Melville’s short story in this context were not what literary 
critics would recognize as original or incisive interpretation, nor did they exhibit 
7 Genç, “The standing man on Taksim Square: a latterday Bartleby.”
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any of the “mind- blowing” qualities (…) Discussions of “Bartleby” tended 
toward plot summary, paraphrase, and a cataloging of similarities.8
The protesters did not examine the tale in detail; they merely selected whatever seemed 
suitable - in order to provide what they saw as an analogy for their own situation. Such 
analogy created equivalences between phenomena that were completely different (i.e., a 
nineteenth-century tale and a twenty-first century political movement) and thus negated 
their complexity in favor of setting up correspondences. It is this imperfect comparison 
that for Castranovo characterizes how protesters and bloggers approached the story in the 
public arena.9 Castranovo shows that a peculiar pragmatic use of a literary text beyond 
the realm of literary scholarship deserves close attention. He highlights the direct political
effectiveness a literary text can gain given particular circumstances of “a world in crisis” 
which is introduced both as a challenge and validation of the political potential of literary 
criticism. It is a challenge because such non-literary readings have become more 
influential than the more scholarly ones. It is a validation as such readings seemed to have
affirmed what certain schools of literary criticism has always claimed – that the act of 
reading is a political act. However, Castranovo does not explain why this story in 
particular should be chosen as analogical to political resistance in the twenty-first century.
For a companion under the broad branches of an old elm in the hot summer days, 
when the light breeze ripples the dank hair, and just flutters the end of the white 
handkerchief hanging over the knee, or for an after-dinner hour, keeping company 
with us to the borders of dream-land, and soothing the senses in repose, as with 
the sighings of distant music, or for any other odd corner of time into which a 
8 Russ Castranovo, “Occupy Bartleby,” The Journal of Nineteenth-Century Americanists, no.2 (2014): 
261-262.
9 Castranovo, “Occupy Bartleby,” 254.
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book, but only a first-rate one, will exactly fit, we recommend Mr. Melville’s 
collection of Piazza Tales,10 
writes an enthusiastic reviewer on the occasion of publication of Melville’s collection of 
prose in 1856. Reading short fiction by Melville, suggests another contemporary critic, is 
a great way to spend free time during summer vacations.11 Another claims that Piazza 
Tales is “as desirable an afternoon book as one may meet,” and still another agrees it 
“must have wide circulation in cultivated circles, and be a favorite book at the watering 
places and in the rural district this season.”12 The 19th century reviewers of the tale were 
in agreement that “Bartleby” was, first of all, entertaining and fantastic in the vein of 
Edgar Allan Poe,13 “a quaint tale,”14 a curious study of human nature.”15 The juxtaposition
of a 21th century activist reading of “Bartleby” as a form of protest and the 19th century 
“cultivated” lady’s interest in the tale as a way to “soothe her senses” during the 
presumably debilitating summer heat is telling. It suggests the not-so-self-evident nature 
of the politicized reading of the tale. One can imagine that the 19th century readers would 
be quite confused as to why “Bartleby” is understood as the ultimate example of a 
revolutionary praxis. This begs a question: How did a text that was originally perceived 
mainly as entertainment become an avatar of radical leftist resistance to late capitalism in 
the beginning of the 21th century? 
10 Review of „The Piazza Tales“, Criterion [New York], 31 May 1986, in Herman Melville. The 
Contemporary Reviews, ed. Brian Higgins, Hershel Parker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1995), 472.
11 Review of „The Piazza Tales“, New York Churchman, 5 June 1856, in Herman Melville. The 
Contemporary Reviews, ed. Brian Higgins, Hershel Parker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1995), 475.
12 Review of „The Piazza Tales“, Boston Transcript, 6 June 1856, in Herman Melville. The 
Contemporary Reviews, ed. Brian Higgins, Hershel Parker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1995), 476.
13 Review of „The Piazza Tales“, Knickerbocker [New York], September, 1956, in Herman Melville. The 
Contemporary Reviews, ed. Brian Higgins, Hershel Parker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1995), 482.
14 Review of „The Piazza Tales“, Criterion [New York], 31 May 1986, in Herman Melville. The 
Contemporary Reviews, ed. Brian Higgins, Hershel Parker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1995), 472.
15 Review of „The Piazza Tales,“ Tribune [New York], 23 June, 1856, in Herman Melville. The 




On May 28, 2016 a Government of Times had a session. It was a symposium-
performance that took place in Leipzig,16 in one of the spacious halls of an industrial 
complex formerly used as a spinning factory; now a contemporary art venue. The 
organizers and curators of the symposium were a Paris-based curatorial collective Le 
peuple qui manque (“A people is missing”); the participants included writers, historians, 
philosophers, artists, literary critics. The session focused on a problem of “presentism”, a 
concept introduced by the “head of the parliament”, the French historian François Hartog.
He suggested we live in “perpetual present,” a regime of historicity that privileges the 
present over the past and future (unlike e.g. the regime of modernism that was oriented 
towards the future). The question was posed as to how it is possible to reopen the 
possibility of the future. In a passionate speech, Maurizio Lazzarato, an Italian 
philosopher, called upon the audience to refuse capitalist temporality and governmentality
that ascribes identities to subjects (nationalities, gender) and to open up another space-
time that would create new potentialities. A figure of Bartleby was evoked as a symbol of 
“human strike”, one which does not involve only the work place but also the whole 
variety of activities and relationships that support the current framework of temporality. 
In the debate which took place at an inter-space between art, theory and politics, 
“Bartleby” acted as a trope standing for a complex radical political perspective on “what 
is to be done” question.
The concept of “human strike” was coined by the artist collective Claire Fontaine,
a duo of the English artist James Thornhill and the Italian philosopher Fulvia Carnevale 
producing art objects and theoretically informed essays. Indebted to Michel Foucault's 
and Giorgio Agamben's philosophy as well as the legacy of Italian radical feminism of 
16 A Government of Times, Halle 14, Center for Contemporary Arts, Leipzig, May 28, 2016.
12
1970s and 1980s, they evoke human strike as “the most generic movement of revolt,” that
“attacks the economic, affective, sexual and emotional conditions that oppress people.”17 
Human strike names a movement of desubjectification, it is a strike against oneself, an 
exit from one's identity (of a good mother, diligent worker, loving wife, active citizen) 
and all that sustains it. Bartleby is its chief personification:
The radical character of this type of revolt lies in its ignorance of any kind of 
reformist result with which it might have to satisfy itself. By its light, the 
rationality of the behaviors we adopt in our everyday life would appear to be 
entirely dictated by the acceptance of the economic relationships that regulate 
them. (…) Human strike proposes no brilliant solution to the problem produced by
those who govern us if it is not Bartleby's maxim: I would prefer not to.18
The corresponding art work by Claire Fontaine exhibited in galleries is a brick bat, an 
allusion to brick bats thrown by radicals, enclosed in a book cover with the story's title 
and author as if to further emphasize the revolutionary power dormant in the literary text.
Unlike the activists from OWS, Claire Fontaine do not even bother to elaborate why 
“Bartleby” in particular should serve as an example of such revolt. It seems that there is a 
certain understanding of the political radicalness of this literary text that the artists deem 
self-evident.
The two examples demonstrate a specific treatment of the tale; one that is non-
literary insofar as it cares little or not at all about the complexity of the meaning of the 
tale. Both understand the story politically; they read it as a tale of powerful resistance 
against the status quo which – as the case of 19th century reviewers reveals - may not be 
so obvious. The following thesis explores the reasons for the immense popularity of the 
17 Claire Fontaine, Human Strike Has Already Begun & Other Writings (London and Lüneburg: Mute 
Books and Post-Media Lab Books, 2013), 55.
18 Claire Fontaine, “Ready-Made Artist and Human Strike: A few Clarifications,” accessed Dec 14, 2016, 
https://jacoblawrencegallery.hotglue.me/?downloads.head.14412313868.
13
tale as a story of subversion. It revolves around the following problems: the non-literary 
treatment of the tale once it has migrated beyond the realm of literary scholarship and the 
14
Claire Fontaine: "Bartleby le scribe brickbat," 2006, brick and archival digital print, 
178 x 107 x 54 mm, exhibition view - New Ways of Doing Nothing, Kunsthalle Wien, 
2014.
ethical and political lesson it actually seems to deliver when appropriated by 
contemporary artists, writers and philosophers. 
That Bartleby has become a symbol of resistance for artists and activists is a result
of long and complicated development involving the boom of literary scholarship and 
academic study of literature, the arrival of “theory” with its vexed relationship to 
literature and art and the political deadlock that has been acutely felt by leftist intellectual
circles for the past couple of decades. A political understanding of the story which feels 
not obliged to explain itself (as manifested by Claire Fontaine) relies on a long tradition 
of literary criticism devoted to the tale and, more importantly, to its popularity among 
contemporary left-oriented philosophers such as Gilles Deleuze, Giorgio Agamben or 
Slavoj Žižek. Both Occupy Wall Street activists and Claire Fontaine focus on “I would 
prefer not to,” as the subversive “formula” which was first introduced by Deleuze and 
further elaborated on by others. It is the post-Marxist theorists reading of it as a politically
radical act subversive of the status quo that allows someone like Occupy Wall Street 
activists to see precisely in Bartleby’s enigmatic response analogy of their own situation. 
In the same way, it allows Claire Fontaine and the participants of the Leipzig symposium 
to use it as a household image, a trope to describe a particular radical way of dealing with
the present crisis. 
How do non-literary readings make literary history newly relevant? How do they 
challenge the singularity of a literary text? How do refusals of literary interpretation 
create new, political communities? These are the questions that this thesis evolves around.
The tension between the literary and non-literary treatment is examined through 
excursions into three interconnected cultural disciplines – literary scholarship, art and 
literature, and philosophy. In the first chapter, the gravitational pull of “Bartleby” as a tale
of resistance to power is explored via study of Bartleby Industry, i.e., the overwhelming 
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production of commentaries of the story by literary scholars. Indebted to Shoshana 
Felman’s psychoanalytical approach, it explores the ultimate focus and the source of 
critical investment in the story and the unfortunate destiny of the “Bartleby” critic. While 
for the literary scholar the story’s enigmatic qualities that solicit interpretation play a 
crucial role, something else is at stake when the story is explored in other cultural realms. 
The second chapter introduces “Bartleby” as a popular reference in contemporary 
literature and art. It maps out the way in which literature and art appropriate the story and 
examines what those cultural events tell us regarding what it is about the story that so 
resonates with us today. The last three chapters examine in detail why “Bartleby” has 
become a frequent reference in the works of post-Marxist theory, namely of Gilles 
Deleuze, Giorgio Agamben, and Slavoj Žižek, whose readings are the most influential of 
“Bartleby” interpretations by philosophers, at least in activist circles. As its presence in 
the realm of philosophy has to do with a particular function literature performs in that 
field, in these chapters “Bartleby” becomes more of a guiding thread in order to examine 
that function. At stake is the relevance and legitimacy of philosophical readings of 
literature exemplified by the treatment of “Bartleby”. 
It is noteworthy that neither OWS activists nor Claire Fontaine are blind to the 
problems that the use of “Bartleby” poses to actual politics. After all, as every reader of 
the tale will admit, the incomprehensible, passive and lonely scrivener is an unlikely 
revolutionary. The occupiers themselves concede that the analogy has its limits19 to which
one Occupy Wall Street commentator adds: 
Bartleby, to put it mildly, is not a “joiner.” He’s not part of the 1% or the 99% but 
part of that baffling, exasperating minority who refuse to show up and be counted.
Outwardly at least, he remains a blank, a zero. (...) Yes, Bartleby “would prefer 
not to” work on Wall Street if he were alive today, but he’d unquestionably prefer 
19 Hardesty, “I would prefer not to.”
16
not to occupy Wall Street, either. If he’s a model for anything, it’s individual, not 
collective, resistance.20
Also, Claire Fontaine hint at the self-destructive and self-damaging aspects of the act 
Bartleby exemplifies: 
Human strike, therefore always strikes partially against itself, and this is why 
when the historical toll is taken of its manifestations, (...)it is hard to separate the 
constructive aspects from the destructive ones. It is difficult to bring out the 
positive sides, because the achievements of this kind of strike are inseparable from
the lives of people, they cannot be measured in terms of numbers, wage increases 
or material transformations, but only in different ways of living and thinking. To 
the distracted gaze of a superficial spectator, a landscape crossed by human strike 
might even seem more damaged than radically revolutionised.21
Indeed, it will turn out that the self-destructiveness and utter solitariness of Bartleby will 
trouble any reading of “Bartleby” that makes use of it as a paradigm of a collective 
political strategy.
20 Austin Allen, “Melville, Irony, and Occupy Wall Street,” Big Think, accessed Dec 14, 2016, 
http://bigthink.com/book-think/melville-irony-and-occupy-wall-street.
21 Claire Fontaine, Human Strike Has Already Begun & Other Writings, 56.
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1. The Troubled Critic of “Bartleby”
I
To research criticism of “Bartleby the Scrivener” is frustrating. The first reason is the overwhelming
number of critical writings on the tale. “Bartleby” has been the subject matter of hundreds of 
journal articles, book chapters and several volumes.22 John Evelev writes that
the story has received more consistent critical attention than any of Melville's work other 
than Moby-Dick since the “Melville Revival” of the 1920's.23
The tale's popularity in academia is, however, a recent phenomenon. It was only one hundred years 
after it was first published in 1853 that it began to be of interest to literary critics. In 1945 Melville 
scholar Egbert Oliver still complains that “Bartleby” has received little attention from Melville 
experts.24 This situation changed radically throughout much of the 1960s and 1970s. A conference 
focused exclusively on the story was organized25 and the number of articles and chapters in 
monographs rose exponentially. Today, anyone willing to contribute a new critical insight on 
“Bartleby” is confronted by a number of writings, which it is literally impossible to digest and, as a 
consequence, troubling questions on the relevance of much criticism emerge. Already in 1981 one 
desperate critic asks:
Fortunately or no, the articles will continue to appear in great numbers, and the 
bibliographers will faithfully record the entries. Who, one wonders, reads or evaluates all of 
these commentaries? Truly, a vast Shining Sea of information invites the student with 
promises of marvelous ports of call; an unwary navigator will find himself in a Sargasso Sea
of redundancy, though, bogged down in masses of repetitive rhetoric, contrived scholarship, 
and general stagnation. More than 175 articles have appeared on "Bartleby" since 1922. 
22 Matthew Guillen, Reading America: Text as a Cultural Force (Betsheda, MD: Academica Press, 2007), 172.
23 John Evelev, The Tolerable Entertainment. Herman Melville and Professionalism in Antebellum New York 
(Minneapolis: University of Massachusetts Press, 2006), 181.
24 Egbert Oliver, “A Second Look at Bartleby”, College English, no. 6 (1945): 421.
25 Bartleby the Scrivener: A Symposium. Ohio, Oberlin: Oberlin College, 1965. 
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Certainly many express worthy points of view; almost as certainly, except to review 
scholarship or to signal a point of departure, no one need repeat any of those views again.26
In his book-length treatment of “Bartleby” criticism The Silence of Bartleby (1989), Dan McCall 
coins the phrase “Bartleby Industry” indicating that “Bartleby” scholarship is a thriving discipline 
on its own, but also pointing out its rather mechanical character. The notion of “industry” implies a 
commercial enterprise where what is at stake is quantity rather than quality or “use value.” 
Nevertheless, another perspective can also be taken. The bulk of repetitive criticism that 
makes apparent the urge of contemporary academia to publish a lot for self-advancement also points
out the power of “Bartleby”, i.e., whatever makes the critic choose precisely this story for an 
interpretive act. Perhaps the rise of the critical literature on “Bartleby” allows us to make the same 
claim about the story as Shoshana Felman makes about Henry James's The Turn of the Screw:
If the strength of literature could be defined by the intensity of its impact on the reader, by 
the vital energy and power of its effect, The Turn of the Screw would doubtless qualify as 
one of the strongest – i.e., most effective – texts of all time, judging by the quantity and 
intensity of the echoes it has produced, of the critical literature to which it has given rise.27 
This naturally poses a question of the (poetic) source of such an effect. What creates the “'Bartleby' 
effect”? What, after all, drives so many people to write about it, in particular?
The second reason why it may be discouraging to research “Bartleby” criticism is that there 
seems to be no critical consensus on what the story is about. The many interpretations often differ 
radically if they do not directly contradict each other. Already in 1962, George Bluestone felt the 
need to “classify” the different readings. Till then, he claims, “Bartleby” was perceived mainly as 
(1) a tale of exorcism, in which Bartleby figures as surrogate for Melville, the artist 
protesting the killing demands of hack work; (2) of psychosis, a classic case of depression, 
or catatonic schizophrenia, with overtones of homosexuality; (3) of the alter ego, Bartleby as
26 William J. Burling, “Commentary on ‘Bartleby’: 1968-1979,” Arizona Quarterly, no. 37 (1981): 354.
27 Shoshana Felman, Writing and Madness (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 143.
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a projection of the death-urge in the Lawyer, a kind of early ‘Secret Sharer’; (4) of social 
criticism, a critique of industrial America symbolized by an implacable Wall Street.28 
To which Milton Stern in 1979 adds:
the Gestalt in which the tale is seen as a metaphysical treatise in which man is a homeless 
wanderer in a universe of indifference, meaninglessness, and absence of moral point or 
purpose.29 
The diversity of mutually conflicting interpretations makes visible the story's “protean shape” (to 
use Stern's term) which absorbs seemingly any value or thought system. Branka Arsić, in her 
“Bartleby” monograph, even writes that in the case of “Bartleby” “any interpretation will apply, it is
a matter of giving form to the unformed.”30 
 II
So what of the indeterminacy of “Bartleby?” What makes it such a Rorschach blot? The most 
evident reason for the absorptive capacity of the story is its hollow and ghostly chief character. 
Bartleby cannot be said to express himself in any meaningful and intelligible way and, thus, lacks 
the dimension of an inner dimension or sphere to his existence. The questions Who? What? Why? 
remain unanswered; his motivations remain opaque. As a mysteriously stubborn, and ultimately 
self-destructive character, he remains a disturbing enigma, a blind spot at the heart of the text. The 
consequence of this is, as John Evelev writes, that “no critical reading of the story can offer any 
insight into Bartleby's condition that isn't highly speculative.”31 This indeterminacy at the core of 
the tale is further intensified in how we do not witness Bartleby's presence directly, the only access 
is granted by the witness account of the narrator-lawyer. It is the question of his reliability that 
determines in a decisive way our reading of “Bartleby.” 
28 George Bluestone quoted in Milton R. Stern, “Towards Bartleby the Scrivener,” in Bloom's Modern Critical Views: 
Herman Melville (New York: Infobase Publishing, 2008), 15.
29 Milton R. Stern, “Towards Bartleby the Scrivener,” in Bloom's Modern Critical Views: Herman Melville, ed. 
Harold Bloom (New York: Infobase Publishing, 2008), 15.
30 Branka Arsić, Passive constitutions, or, 7 1/2 times Bartleby (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 10.
31 Evelev, The Tolerable Entertainment, 184.
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According to James Machor, contemporary reviewers of the story uniformly regarded the 
lawyer's view as an authoritative and a trustworthy one. Machor explains this in how they equated 
authorial and narrative perspectives, i.e. they identified the lawyer's voice with Melville's.32 The 
majority of twentieth-century readings of the story, however, tend to identify with Bartleby against 
the lawyer.33 Let us take, for instance, a collection of papers from the first conference of the 
Melville Society of America that focused precisely on “Bartleby”, which was published in 1966. 
The papers follow different interpretive and critical strategies that reflect critical fashions of the 
time – more conservative trends of historical research but also those of a more experimental kind, 
tearing “Bartleby” from its immediate context. Some critics understand the story in terms of 
Melville's artistic development (A.W. Plumstead, “Melville's Venture into a New Genre”34) or of 
Melville's philosophical interests (Mario L. D'Avanzo, “Melville's 'Bartleby' and Carlyle”35). Others 
derive their interpretation from Melville's other works, read it as an important precursor to 
modernist aesthetics and the Zeitgeist (Maurice Friedman, “Bartleby and the Modern Exile,”36 
Marjorie Dew, “The Attorney and the Scrivener”37) or see it as an attack on shallow and 
conventional Christianity (William Bysshe Stein, “Bartleby: The Christian Conscience”38). What is 
most striking, however, is that despite the diversity of approaches, the basic reading pattern remains
the same. For all of these critics, the lawyer is understood critically – as a pretentious character, a 
representative of a narrow world view and mistaken values. In contrast to that, Bartleby is seen in 
heroic terms, his uncompromising conduct is a challenge to the superficial lawyer's perspective, and
simultaneously embodies a more sinister and disturbing, yet truer and more authentic 
32 James L. Machor, “The American Reception of Melville's Short Fiction,” in New Direction in American Reception 
Study, ed. By Philip Goldstein, James L. Machor (Oxford: Oxford University University Press, 2008), 91-92.
33 Dan McCall, The Silence of Bartleby (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), 99.
34 A. W. Plumstead, “Bartleby: Melville's Venture into a New Genre,” in Bartleby the Scrivener. The Melville 
Annual/A Symposium, ed. Howard P. Vincent (Kent, OH: The Kent State University Press, 1966), 82-93.
35 Mario L. D'Avanzo, “Melville's 'Bartleby' and Carlyle,” in Bartleby the Scrivener. The Melville Annual/A 
Symposium, ed. Howard P. Vincent (Kent, OH: The Kent State University Press, 1966), 113-139.
36 Maurice Friedman, “Bartleby and the Modern Exile,” Bartleby the Scrivener. The Melville Annual/A Symposium, 
ed. Howard P. Vincent (Kent, OH: The Kent State University Press, 1966), 64-81.
37 Marjorie Dew, “The Attorney and the Scrivener: Quoth the Raven, 'Nevermore,'” in Bartleby the Scrivener. The 
Melville Annual/A Symposium, ed. Howard P. Vincent (Kent, OH: The Kent State University Press, 1966), 94-103.
38 William Bysshe Stein, “Bartleby: the Christian Conscience,” in Bartleby the Scrivener. The Melville Annual/A 
Symposium, ed. Howard P. Vincent (Kent, OH: The Kent State University Press, 1966), 104-112.
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understanding. Why does Bartleby become the preferred object of identification for these critics 
while the lawyer is seen in the role of an antagonist, “an embodiment of bad faith?”39
McCall draws attention to the peculiar one-sidedness of critical attitudes towards the tale. 
His The Silence of Bartleby constitutes an attempt to challenge this trend, to reveal the supposed 
prejudice underlying it, and to defend the lawyer. He persuasively argues that the lawyer is a far 
more complex character than the critics take him to be; the latter ignore that he speaks with many 
voices. Most of the interpreters of the tale adopt a condescending attitude as if they stood above or 
outside of the narrative voice, when in fact what they turn against the lawyer is his own self-
critique.40 They ignore his self-irony.41 They judge the lawyer fiercely when it is doubtful that 
anyone in his position would and even could do more.42
Thus, it seems that many readings of the story are determined by a bias, of which the critics 
themselves are unaware. To paraphrase McCall: where does the grudge come from?43 Stern argues 
that the nature of our judgment on the narrator depends on whether we discern the variants of his 
tone.44 Yet, what makes us (in)sensitive to its oscillations? McCall attributes the general inclination 
to how today's readers automatically assume that the first person narrative is unreliable.45 Yet, as 
Machor indicates, the concept of unreliable narration was not unknown to 19th century reviewers 
who, nonetheless, identified with the lawyer (who in their view represented the author).46
Interestingly, McCall mentions a class-based antipathy towards the narrator as another possible 
explanation.47 What is at stake is some kind of class hostility, which McCall himself evidently does 
not share, through which the lawyer, by profession, is seen as a representative of exploitative forces 
in the society. “[T]he Lawyer seems to be wrong because he is a lawyer.”48 Another of McCall's 
39 Evelev, The Tolerable Entertainment, 185.
40 McCall, The Silence of Bartleby, 121.
41 McCall, The Silence of Bartleby, 125.
42 McCall, The Silence of Bartleby, 110.
43 McCall, The Silence of Bartleby, 109.
44 Stern, “Towards Bartleby the Scrivener,” 22.
45 McCall, The Silence of Bartleby, 106.




remarks concerning the bias against the narrator refers to the uneasy relationship to authority figures
in general: 
Pervasive anxiety about Authority can find a sitting duck in a Master of Chancery whose 
employees address him “With submission, sir.”49
 The “Bartleby” critic emerges as a rebel - a priori suspicious of and opposed to power. The self-
doubt of the lawyer generated by the arrival of the scrivener becomes a convenient vehicle to 
dethrone authority by emphasizing its incompleteness or its instability. Through the supposedly 
errant behavior of the lawyer, and the tragic stance of Bartleby, authority is questioned, and the 
imperfection of the Master persuasively articulated. This hypothesis is further supported by that the 
lawyer is often perceived as a representative of whatever is seen as a ruling ideology (conventional 
religiosity, capitalism, pragmatism, utilitarianism, rationalism, etc.). 
McCall shows that it is possible to read the lawyer in ways that are more just to his 
individual character: to see him more favorably and sympathetically. It is peculiar, however, that his
final interpretative conclusions, still repeat the reading pattern in which Bartleby disturbs the lawyer
(and presumably also the reader) into a truer understanding of life (in McCall's case this moment is 
characterized as religious reawakening). Even here, then, the lawyer represents a limited world-
view. For the vast majority of the critics, observes Stern, Bartleby represents a point where the 
lawyer's self-perception disintegrates (forever or only temporarily), a point opening up to a more 
comprehensive apprehension that, however, always merely translates into the critic's world view.50 
When browsing through the Bartleby Industry, the story seems more and more like a projection 
screen that ultimately only reflects back the reader's deepest theoretical, philosophical, or religious 
convictions. Stern warns that
[t]he critical literature concerning “Bartleby” exposes the process of interpretative criticism 
as very often a narcissistic operation in which each reader sees the tale as a mirror of the 
Gestalt within his own mind.”51 
49 McCall, The Silence of Bartleby, 112.
50 Stern, “Towards Bartleby the Scrivener,”16.
51 Stern, “Towards Bartleby the Scrivener,”13.
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And he adds, the story is “one of the weird pieces in which readers find whatever they came to 
seek.”52 Perhaps such exposure of criticism of “Bartleby” as “a narcissistic operation” is 
unavoidable. For it is the void of Bartleby which emerges as the ultimate focus and the source of the
gravitational pull of critical investment. This is also evidenced by the fact that it is always the most 
crucial and most important terms of the various belief systems, which Bartleby eventually 
materializes.53 
III
McCall’s observation regarding the bias against the lawyer is based on a close-reading of 
“Bartleby” and Bartleby Industry. He suggests that this prejudice might be due to the class 
antagonism of the scholars or their unconscious grudge against authority in general but he does not 
elaborate on these findings any further. 
In comparison, the Melville Scholar John Evelev, who references the McCall’s book as a 
point of departure,54 delves deeper into the class twist of much of the hostility. Like McCall, Evelev 
sees the critical tendency as a result of an unconsciously operating prejudice but approaches the 
“Bartleby” phenomenon from a more theoretical perspective: from a sociological point of view. In 
his Pierre Bourdieu-inspired analysis of the more recent criticism, Evelev notes that the status of a 
lawyer is antithetical to that of a humanities professor. While the former enjoys greater economic 
reward and a low autonomy (from the market forces), the professor's situation is completely 
reversed (low economic reward, great autonomy). The criticism of the story thus offers an 
52 Stern, “Towards Bartleby the Scrivener,”14.
53 For psychoanalytic critics Bartleby usually stands for the unconscious, for religiously oriented criticism Bartleby 
represents central figures such as Christ or Buddha. For deconstructionist criticism Bartleby is an agent of 
différance. For an example of psychoanalytical criticism of “Bartleby” see Nancy Blake, “Mourning and 
Melancholia in ‘Bartleby’,” Delta, no. 7 (1978): 155-68; Ted Billy, “Eros and Thanatos in ‘Bartleby’,” Arizona 
Quarterly, no. 31 (1975): 21-32. For Buddhist readings see Sabura Yamaya, "The Stone Image in Melville's 
Pierre," Studies in English Literature, no. 24 (September, 1957): 31-58; Walter Sutton, “Melville and the Great 
Stone Budd,” Prairie Schooner, no. 34 (Summer, 1960): 128-133. For Bartleby as Christ see H. Bruce Franklin, 
The Wake of the Gods: Melville's Mythology (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963), 126-133, 151; Donald M. 
Fiene, “Bartleby the Christ,” in Studies in the Minor and Later Works of Melville, ed. Raymona E. Hull (Hartford: 
Transcendental Books, 1970), 18-23. For a deconstruction-inspired reading see John Carlos Rowe, Through the 
Custom-House: Nineteenth-Century American Fiction and Modern Theory (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 
1982), 137.
54 Evelev, The Tolerable Entertainment,185.
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opportunity to assert the moral superiority of the humanities professor over the lawyer.55 Bartleby, 
in turn, is celebrated as a hero of individual autonomy and resistance towards market values. What 
lurks behind, writes Evelev, is the insecurity of American humanities scholars over their own 
vocational choice. In their readings praising Bartleby, the critics repeat and anxiously confirm what 
has led them to pursue their academic careers devoid of social and economic recognition.56 The 
general patterns, whereby the tale is understood, then result from unspoken and disavowed 
assumptions defined by the socially determined ethos and habitus. Evelev thus positions himself 
within the field of sociology of art in which aesthetic judgments are more likely to be seen to reflect
social status rather than to respond to qualities of the works.
It may seem problematic to see in literary interpretations merely the results of the social 
dynamics that operate outside the text in question. Such an approach can rightly be accused of 
sociological reductionism that, moreover, problematically places one in the superior position of an 
outsider stressing her own distance from the field (of literary studies). It may seem crude and in 
many cases inaccurate to reduce critics’ understanding of the story to their social background. Yet, 
how does one account for the reoccurring patterns of reading the tale, i.e., affinity with the scrivener
and antagonism toward the lawyer, that seem contingent, irrational and are not reflected by the 
majority of the critics who pursue such readings? Given there is a logic to this pattern, it is 
inevitable that these must stem from disavowed motives and urges. 
A sociological approach may, indeed, cast light on some of the reasons why the story is 
appreciated the way it is. It is quite another thing, however, to claim that it provides us with a total 
explanation of the logic of the interaction between the tale and its readers. Consequently, the 
appreciation of a work of art is nothing more than an effect of the cultural field. This is, 
unfortunately, what lurks behind Evelev’s explication. Granted that class bias may play a role in 
tendencies in the tale’s reception, it should not diminish the particular critical insights and 
55 Evelev, The Tolerable Entertainment, 187-188.
56 Evelev, The Tolerable Entertainment, 183.
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understandings that some of the scholars derive from the text and which cannot be explained by 
class prejudice.
 Bourdieu-inspired sociological approach may be one way for accounting for these 
seemingly contingent impulses. Psychoanalysis is certainly another. More, it may theoretically 
anchor McCall’s correct, yet somewhat vague observation concerning the uneasy attitude of many 
critics towards the lawyer as the authority figure. The work of the Lacan-influenced literary 
theoretician, Shoshana Felman, is, relevant in this respect. She is one of the few critics who have 
attempted to treat the history of critical responses to a literary work as an object of analysis in its 
own right. In her essay on the criticism of Edgar Allan Poe's oeuvre, she proposes
an analytically informed reading of literary history itself, inasmuch as its treatment of Poe 
obviously constitutes a (literary) case history. Such a reading has never, to my knowledge, 
been undertaken with respect to any writer; never has literary history itself been viewed as 
an analytical object, as a subject for psychoanalytical interpretation. And yet it is 
overwhelmingly obvious, in a case like Poe's, that the discourse of literary history itself 
points to some unconscious determinations that structure it but of which it is not aware. 
What is the unconscious of literary history?57
While examining the critical reception of James's novella The Turn of the Screw, Felman describes a
phenomenon of “the reading effect” in which critics often reproduce, formally or thematically, the 
structures, language, or concerns of the writers they write about. Much of the tale's criticism, 
Felman claims, employs the story's vocabulary of possession and salvation. It actually incorporates 
the thematic concerns of the story it analyzes. She writes, 
The scene of the critical debate is thus a repetition of the scene dramatized in the text. The 
critical interpretation, in other words, not only elucidates the text but also reproduces it 
dramatically, unwittingly participates in it. Through its very reading, the text so to speak, 
acts itself out. As a reading effect, this inadvertent “acting out” is indeed uncanny: 
57 Shoshana Felman, “On Reading Poetry: Reflections on the Limits and Possibilities of Psychoanalytical 
Approaches,” in Edgar Allan Poe: Modern Critical Views, ed. Harold Bloom (New York: Chelsea House, 1985), 
153-154.
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whichever way the reader turns, he can but be turned by the text, he can but perform it by 
repeating it.”58 
Not only does the critical text explicate the literary work in question, but it also unintentionally 
partakes in it; it is implicated in it. As critics, we re-enact what we think we are merely describing 
while our readings remain literally trapped within the text. Our readings keep reproducing 
themselves with regard to major images, themes, and contradictions. Later on in her essay Felman 
says that, “[f]or Lacan, indeed, the unconscious is not only that which must be read, but also, and 
primarily, that which reads.”59 It is in the uncanny repetitions found in critical writings that what we
might call the literary unconscious manifests itself. 
What does this mean in terms of “Bartleby” criticism? The basic structure of the story is 
hysterical, as has been already suggested. Bartleby drives the lawyer into self-doubt; the famously 
“prudent” and “safe” elderly man turns into one suffering from a great variety of exalted emotions 
while his own assumptions are being questioned. Repeatedly, he tries to account for the stubborn 
incomprehensibility of Bartleby's behavior using his common sense or the different ideologies of 
the day - more or less in vain - “Bartleby was one of those beings of whom nothing is 
ascertainable.”60 The scrivener baffles the attempts to read him made by the narrator and “Bartleby” 
scholarship unavoidably repeats the lawyer's futile meaning-making efforts. It is likewise driven 
into obsessively producing hypotheses on what or who Bartleby represents – theses that are 
religious, philosophical, political, theoretical. Bartleby's silence and inaction provokes an outburst 
of (hysterical) activity on the part of the lawyer as well as on the part of critics, a reaction that 
seems somewhat uncanny. As a result, exalted emotions occur – see William J. Burling’s 
desperation cited in the very beginning of the essay. Another critic helplessly cries “Ah, Bartleby! 
Ah, scholarship!”61 Bartleby's “I would prefer not to” in its different versions proliferates not only 
the story but it also “ties the tongue” of the critics. Not few of them worry their heads over the 
58 Felman, Writing and Madness, 148.
59 Felman, Writing and Madness, 164.
60 Herman Melville, “Bartleby the Scrivener, A Story of Wall Street,” in Melville’s Short Novels. Authoritative Texts, 
Contexts, Criticism, ed. Dan McCall (New York & London: Norton & Company, 2002), 4.
61 Andre Furlani, “Bartleby the Socratic”, Studies in Short Fiction, no. 34/3 (1997): 335.
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obstinate yet simultaneously polite utterance. As is the case of James' novella, also in “Bartleby” the
critical response is already inscribed in the story.
IV
What makes Felman’s approach and her explication of the critics’ disavowed motives more nuanced
and persuasive than Evelev’s is her closer attention to the ways in which the aesthetic qualities of 
the literary text play an important role in the intensity of the deep affection between certain works 
of literature on the one hand, and critics and readers on the other hand. She is more considerate of 
what it is about the literary text that directs the critics’ attention to some of its aspects (resulting in 
the given interpretation patterns). Unlike in the case of Evelev, her perspective can by no means be 
accused of reducing the appreciation of art to mere effect of forces outside of literature itself. 
Felman - when she writes about Poe - ponders on the power of what she calls the Poe-tic 
effect materialized by the overwhelming bulk of criticism on Poe's oeuvre. What irresistible power 
drives so many critics to comment on his work? What is the specific poetic force of Poe? Her 
approach is psychoanalytical; therefore, she suggests locating
what seems to be unreadable or incomprehensible in this effect; by situating the most 
prominent discrepancies or discontinuities in the overall critical discourse concerning Poe, 
the most puzzling critical contradictions, and by trying to interpret those contradictions as 
symptomatic of the unsettling specificity of the Poe-tic effect.62 
In the example of “Bartleby”, the central contradiction that must have something to do with the 
story's irresistible power is the following: the enigma of the self-destructive Bartleby evokes desire 
to articulate what is happening in the story – after all, it is a matter of (the scrivener's) life and 
death. Yet every explanation, every interpretation necessarily falls short of it (if otherwise, the 
enigma would simply fail to fuel new response and interest). The blankness of Bartleby is what is 
most irresistible about the tale, a receptacle to receive and betray the critic's deepest beliefs at once. 
62 Felman, “On Reading Poetry,“ 153-154.
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Felman is right when she speaks of the “specificity of the poetic effect” as that which is ultimately 
unreadable. 
Many critics are very well aware of Bartleby's impenetrability. In their desire to remain 
faithful to the text, they at once affirm the mystery and violate it. When looking at such readings, 
one feels an unresolvable tension between the urge to fill this void with meaning, which somehow 
cannot be left empty without criticism losing its reason for existence (this is the critical “horror 
vacui”), and the respect for its inviolable nature. The tension is then reproduced in the self-
reflective spectralness of the explication as such. The critic affirms the mystery and in her 
construction of meaning, she takes it into account – as a result, the meaning becomes elusive, and 
perhaps even eerie. This is a move repeated by many analyses. Kingsley Widmer writes in 1969, 
once the reader attempts to construct a pattern of character beyond these sparse facts, the 
interpretation becomes forced. […] Bartleby should remain enigmatic to the reader.63 
Later on in his essay, he nevertheless argues:
The answer to the enigma of Bartleby, then, must be found in reading the story in a 
sufficiently "abstract" or philosophical sense.64 
Bartleby then becomes “the incomprehensible, perverse, irrational demon of denial, and of his own 
denied humanity.”65 Similarly, Charles Hoffman's reading from 1953 emphasizes that Bartleby is 
inscrutable; the scrivener is then pointed out as the force of irrationality.66 In Norman Springer's 
reading, Bartleby represents the awareness of death,“a kind of wall without reason, 
incomprehensible and blank”67 and in Maurice Friedman's essay Bartleby stands for the “Modern 
exile”, i.e., the modern experience of the lack of meaning and tradition.68 
Studying “Bartleby” criticism, one can notice that with time it grows more and more 
sophisticated, more theoretical, more subtle, and more refined. As a rule, the more recent criticism, 
63 Kingsley Widmer, "Melville's Radical Resistance: The Method and Meaning of 'Bartleby'," in Studies in the Novel, 
no. 1 (1969): 444. 
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 Charles G. Hoffmann, “The Shorter Fiction of Herman Melville,” South Atlantic Quarterly, no. 52 (1953): 414-30.
67 Norman Springer, "Bartleby and the Terror of Limitation," PMLA, no. 80 (1965): 415. 
68 Friedman, “Bartleby and the Modern Exile,” 64-81.
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the more intricate treatment of the tension, the more spectral the interpretation. For instance, Naomi 
Reed, in her Marxist reading of the tale, focuses on Bartleby's elusive and ghostly character and 
relates it to the eeriness of abstraction that lies at the heart of the capitalist circulation of goods. 
Bartleby's unintelligibility then becomes his “resistance to relations of equivalence.”69 Todd Davis 
calls Bartleby a figure of the Kantian transcendent, meaning our understanding of Bartleby lies 
outside “the limits of possible experience, beyond the immanent, in the realm of that which we do 
not know.”70 One of the most vertiginously self-reflective interpretations comes from the pen of 
Dieter Meindl, who explains that Bartleby represents the significational void of death that cannot be
penetrated and that manifests itself precisely through the obstinate effort by critics to inscribe 
meaning into it, which however, only “serves but to diversify the contours of the void as which he 
[Bartleby] figures in the tale.”71 The void is indeed assigned a meaning: it is defined as the 
impenetrable space of death becoming perceptible through the obstinate effort of critics to assign it 
a meaning. In order to escape one's own interpretive violence and to respect the enigma at the heart 
of the story, the critic, cornered by the text in his interpretive crusade, starts to revolve around the 
emptiness in circles that threaten to end in a mise-en-abyme. This is the fate of the troubled critic of 
Bartleby, hunted by the void: she becomes a witness to his own interpretive violence as her beliefs 
are either enacted on the Bartlebian screen or gets caught up in a vortex of self-reflection.
V
A peculiar combination of high abstraction and interpretive violence is very much present in a 
landslide of theoretical appropriation of Bartleby that resulted out of Gilles Deleuze's influential 
essay “Bartleby; or, The Formula.”72 We have seen some of today's most prolific theorists – 
including Slavoj Žižek, Giorgio Agamben, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri as well as their many 
69 Naomi C. Reed, “The Specter of Wall Street: ‘Bartleby, the Scrivener’ and the Language of Commodities,” 
American Literature, no. 76 (2004): 265.
70 Todd F. Davis, "The Narrator's Dilemma in 'Bartleby, the Scrivner': The Excellently Illustrated Re-Statement of a 
Problem," Studies in Short Fiction 34, no. 2 (Spring 1997): 183. 
71  Dieter Meindl, „Bartleby and Death,“ in American Fiction and the Metaphysics of the Grotesque (Columbia: 
University of Missouri Press, 1996), 64.
72 Gilles Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, trans. Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco (New York: Verso, 
1998), 68-91.
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commentators – to form yet another branch on the massive, ever blossoming tree of reception of 
Melville's story. For these post-Marxist thinkers “Bartleby” stands as a relevant figure on which to 
model a new, radical politics for the new era. 
When writing about earlier Marxist approaches, Naomi C. Reed divides them into two main 
trends. First, there are the earlier, more thematic readings, often treating the text as a simple 
allegory of the inhumanity of life under capitalism, with Bartleby as a synecdoche for an exploited 
working class. The second more historicist line, treats the story as a critical commentary on the state
of the proletariat and class struggle in New York during the 1840s and 1850s. What these two main 
currents have in common, their important differences notwithstanding, is a marked tendency 
towards ignoring the complexity of the text in favor of extrapolating a clear political message. To 
Reed, what is thus inevitably lost is a “sense of the story's weirdness.”73 
The post-Marxist readings manifest much greater sophisticatedness as they are immersed in 
highly abstract reasoning circulating precisely around the apparent incomprehensibility of the 
story’s main character. At the same time, like their predecessors, they are highly reductive for the 
sake of delivering an ethical and political lesson. What sets them apart as a tradition in its own right,
however, is their focus on Bartleby’s utterance “I would prefer not to” in particular and their 
insistence on its positive, emancipatory aspects. Bartleby is no longer a victim of the exploitative 
system, on the contrary, Bartleby's generic reply is here treated as an active, revolutionary force. 
This has led to some viewing his stance as a possible ideal for a liberatory politics of today, either as
part of a larger strategy or in itself.
73 Reed, “The Specter of Wall Street: ‘Bartleby, the Scrivener’ and the Language of Commodities,” 247.
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2. Traces of “Bartleby the Scrivener” in Contemporary Culture
I
Herman Melville's “Bartleby the Scrivener” is undoubtedly a classic, a productively 
ambiguous text, reinvented and understood in new ways by each generation. Recently, however, it 
has become an overdetermined cultural sign. Not only did the text give rise to the Bartleby Industry 
in the field of literary scholarship, but it has also become a common allusion in contemporary 
cultural productions and, importantly, has come to exemplify ethical and political agency in theory 
and philosophy. As the title of this chapter suggests, we wish to confine ourselves to the realm of 
literature and art, more precisely, the way the story is present as an explicit allusion, one of the 
strategies through which other works intentionally manifest themselves as inter-textual constructs, 
consciously and deliberately indebted to other texts. At the same time, however, “Bartleby the 
Scrivener” also exists in these artistic productions in less evident ways that seem to emerge only 
when we examine our material exclusively from the point of view of the original narrative. Its 
various aspects, be they thematic or formal, then appear in variously thwarted shapes. In this 
chapter, we shall examine the inter-textual relations between the story and the inspired works, the 
explicit allusions, the more implicit processes and the way they naturally interact. Also, we shall 
focus on what reading of the original thus emerges, the kind of pattern this canonical story is 
transformed into, and ways in which it survives in contemporary culture.
All of the works that are going to be analyzed here share a sense that all forms have been 
already used up, and what remains for the artist is merely to manipulate previous creations. Such a 
sensibility of exhausted possibilities has been described as characteristic for a certain tendency in 
contemporary literature, for instance, by John Barth who calls it the “literature of exhaustion.”74 To 
describe more precisely what he means, Barth points to an impressive picture drawn by Jorge L. 
Borges in a short story entitled “The Library of Babel”. The latter portrays a vertiginous and 
74 John Barth, “Literature of Exhaustion,” in Postmodern literary theory: an anthology, ed. Lucy Niall (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers, 2000), 310.
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labyrinthine space, an infinitely great library of all possible books written in all possible languages. 
It thus contains all that is sayable about the world as well as every possible falsehood or nonsense. 
More, we are introduced to a collection, the totality of which is impossible to know. What remains 
is only frustration over how whatever one might write or say has already been written.
In the 1980's, Frederic Jameson discussed such a sense of exhaustion as a symptom of a 
cultural paradigm of “postmodernism”, a phenomenon that, according to Jameson, has emerged in 
and is complicit with the era of late capitalism, the consumerism of the post-WWII society, a 
somewhat impotent reaction against the modernist tradition, in particular, its rise to a canonical 
status in academia. In an essay called “Postmodernism and Consumer Society” he writes the 
following:
This is yet another sense in which the writers and artists of the present day will no longer be 
able to invent new styles and worlds – they've already been invented; only a limited number 
of combinations are possible; the unique ones have been thought of already. So the weight of
the whole modernist aesthetic tradition – now dead – also 'weighs like a nightmare on the 
brain of the living,' as Marx said in another context.75
Jameson insists that the postmodern artist no longer believes in a unique subjectivity that creates 
unmistakable styles (owing to, among others, the postructuralist critique of subjectivity). To be 
innovative or seek anything original seems impossible.76
The creative impotence of postmodern cultural practice manifests itself as a specific cultural 
pattern, benign “pastiche” as opposed to subversive parody. Parody parasites on the unique and 
peculiar style and language of an art work, which, despite some necessary covert sympathy, is 
mocked and ridiculed in relation to what is considered as the norm of language or style.77 However, 
since the postmodern artist no longer assumes that there is anything like a linguistic norm to which 
we could have a recourse while mocking the tradition, parody has been replaced by pastiche. 
75 Frederic Jameson, “Postmodernism and Consumer Society,” in The Continental Aesthetics Reader, ed. Clive 
Cazeaux (New York: Routledge, 2000), 285.
76 Jameson, “Postmodernism and Consumer Society, 286.
77 Jameson, “Postmodernism and Consumer Society, 284.
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Pastiche is, like parody, the imitation of a particular or unique style, the wearing of a stylistic
mask, speech in a dead language; but it is a neutral practice of such mimicry, without 
parody’s ulterior motive, without the satirical impulse, without laughter, without that still 
latent feeling that there exists something normal compared to which what is being imitated 
is rather comic.78
To introduce the overall atmosphere out of which such practices have emerged, Jameson, in 
the very same essay, portrays the disorienting architecture of the Bonaventure hotel in Los Angeles 
as a figure of the postmodern hyperspace. Some of the features he discusses immediately bring to 
mind the Borgesian library, in particular, its decenteredness, the chaos and confusion of those who 
happen to inhabit it. In both, the actual living space seems insignificant and does not reflect the 
physical and emotional needs of the dwellers. The librarians actually live in two small closets, one 
serves as a bathroom while the other functions as a bedroom in which one must sleep standing up.79 
The hotel rooms, on the other hand, are, in Jameson's own words 
visibly marginalized: the corridors in the residential sections are low-ceilinged and dark, 
most depressingly functional indeed, while one understands that the rooms – frequently 
redecorated – are in the worst taste.80 
In both of these structures, it seems impossible to seize the volume of the space or actively 
appropriate it according to one's needs, both overwhelm and intimidate its human dweller who lacks
the capacities to grasp her own position.81 And, as the architecture of the hotel is for Jameson 
analogous to the global communicational chaos that disorients us, Gene Bell-Villada reads in the 
“Library of Babel” 
[a] sense of things long overripe and of a culture weary with itself, a feeling that everything 
has been tried and that nothing will ever work – all of it bringing a steady increase in 
78 Ibid.
79 Jorge Luis Borges, “The Library of Babel,” trans. James E. Irby, in Labyrinths. Selected Stories & Other Writings 
(New York: New Directions Publishing Corporation, 1964), 52.
80 Jameson, “Postmodernism and Consumer Society, 290.
81 Jameson, “Postmodernism and Consumer Society, 291.
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madness, suicides, and physical violence among librarians, a social landscape somewhat 
resembling the contemporary Western world.82
As critics have pointed out, Jameson's account, while indeed insightful, seems 
controversial.83 One problematic aspect is that it is difficult to deny certain recent works of art and 
literature a unique and unmistakable language (one could think, for instance, of Thomas Pynchon, 
Vladimir Nabokov, Winfried G. Sebald, George Perec). While Jameson's analyses of contemporary 
architecture, literature and art undoubtedly imply that cultural productions give us an important 
insight into the contemporary socio-historical reality, the real stake is his claim that their neutral 
recycling of past forms simultaneously marks an absolute abdication from relevant critique of this 
reality.84 What interests us is precisely the question of critical potential of the cultural productions 
we shall analyze and the role of Bartlebian allusions in it. 
In contrast to Jameson's doubt over the unique voice of postmodern literature, John Barth, in
his above mentioned essay, celebrates Borges' victory for the latter was able to confront 
„ultimacies“ and employ them in his writing in such a way, that he, indeed, gave birth to a unique 
work of literature. Consequently, a true genius is for Barth 
an artist [who] may paradoxically turn the felt ultimacies of our time into material and 
means for his work – paradoxically because by doing so he transcends what had appeared to 
be his refutation.85
82 Gene H. Bell-Villada, Borges and his fiction. A guide to his mind and art (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1999),
121.
83 See, e.g., Linda Hutcheon. The Politics of Postmodernism. New York: Routledge, 1989. 
84 According to Jameson, the whole culture is complicit with the dominant ideology, its loss of historicity and 
confusion of the hyperspace. It, however, remains unclear what makes possible the crucial insight into the status 
quo offered by postmodern architecture, literature or art. As Lambert Zuidervaart rightly argues: “The problem here
is that Jameson's location within postmodern culture is ill-defined. His desire to give “a genuinely historical and 
dialectical analysis” is not a postmodern impulse. According to his own analysis, postmodern culture displays sheer
discontinuity and a loss of historical depth. If Jameson's analysis is correct, then are there any sources or tendencies
within postmodern culture that make such an analysis possible? Perhaps the analysis is living on borrowed time, so 
to speak, drawing upon a Marxist tradition amid the death of all traditions. If so, then the political prospects for 
such an analysis seem bleak. Or perhaps the analysis is made possible by certain oppositional forces alive within 
postmodern culture. If this were so, however, one would expect Jameson to show more sympathy for the traditional 
Marxist project of specifically evaluating the relative political merits of existing cultural phenomena.“ See Lambert 
Zuidervaart, Adorno's Aesthetic Theory. The Redemption of Illusion (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991), 262.
85 John Barth, “Literature of Exhaustion,” 317.
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Writing out of and about the impossibility of creativity and innovation might be a somewhat ghostly
task, the work is constantly emptied (hunted) by the void of its source or its themes. Precisely such 
vacuity and hollowness will decisively mark the works we shall analyze. Theodor W. Adorno, 
unlike Jameson, believed that such works – exemplified for him particularly by Beckett's writing – 
occupy a privileged position in terms of critique and provide us with a “precise, wordless polemic” 
against “a nonsensical world.”86 In the labyrinthine and weary world of missed possibilities and 
neglected human needs to be a true artist means to create phantomatic texts in accordance with 
Borges' narrator who claims, “[t]he certitude that everything has been written negates us or turns us 
into phantoms.”87 Adorno insists that only such art, “a negative imprint of administered world,“88 
allows us to recognize the actual extent of our alienation while at the same time offering a glimpse 
of fundamental transformation: “...only by virtue of the absolute negativity of collapse does art 
enunciate the unspeakable: utopia.”89
II
“Bartleby the Scrivener” is one of the texts that – like Shakespeare's Hamlet - hide an insoluble 
mystery, which is precisely what continues to irritate reader after reader. Bartleby is “always there” 
but – both for the readers and the other characters of the narrative - never fully there. He remains 
radically withdrawn into a world that remains inaccessible to us, leaving little of the positive one 
could get hold of. What is actually there seems somewhat residual – incoherent in speech and rather
elusive in appearance. 
Indeed, the lawyer-narrator describes Bartleby as the “specter,” “the ghost,” “the 
apparition,” “the incubus” whose movements are “gliding”; who is, however, most of the time, 
motionless. Bartleby cannot be said to express himself and, thus, lacks the dimension of an “inside.”
His character is fixed and static. While the other figures who appear in the story are more or less 
86 Theodor W. Adorno, “Reconciliation under Duress,” in Aesthetics and Politics. The Key Texts of the Classic Debate
Within German Marxism, ed. Frederic Jameson (London: Verso, 2002), 161.
87 Borges, “The Library of Babel,” 58.
88 Theodor W. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor (New York: Continuum, 2002), 31.
89 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 33.
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classifiable in terms of class, age, education or motives, Bartleby is free of such versimilitude; he no
longer quite belongs to the world shared by the other Charles Dickensian characters. The picture we
are given ignores many of the self-evident features of the nineteenth-century (realist) fiction, the 
questions - Who? What? Why? - that usually constitute the structure of the narrative become, in this
tale, difficult if not impossible to answer. 
 All this is further intensified by how we do not witness Bartleby's presence directly, the only
access is granted by the thoroughly unreliable witness account of the narrator-lawyer. Melville's 
“Bartleby the Scrivener” thus becomes akin to some of the most recalcitrant modernist writing such 
as Kafka's fragmentary short tales,90 which, in a corresponding manner, allow for various, mutually 
conflicting interpretations. For instance, the style and structure of Melville's narrative mirrors that 
of “The Neighbor,”91 where we find the inaccessible Harras (too fast to catch, observe or talk to, 
unlike Bartleby who is always there) and follow his elusive traces in the supposedly sound 
judgment of the narrator, which, however, rapidly slides into extravagantly paranoid visions. Here, 
as in “Bartleby the Scrivener”, we feel we must come to terms with a likelihood of 
misrepresentation and a thwarted image of the out-of-reach character. In truth, Bartleby seems most 
present in the effect produced by his existence in the narrator's world, the way it marks the shift of 
the narrator's tone, mood, the thought process, and the dynamics of his narrative style. Thus, Andre 
Furlani goes as far as to claim that:
[t]he only real character here is the attorney himself. Bartleby is an affect rather than 
personality – he is a force, almost talismanic, exerting an influence on a character.92 
The literary works and the art we are about to introduce obviously do not attempt to arrive at
a convincing interpretation of the story or an explanation of its productive ambiguity; they are free 
of such efforts and it is nothing we expect of them. What thus becomes foregrounded is their 
evident selective misreading; there are only a very limited number of aspects of “Bartleby the 
90 The work by Kafka and Melville's tale are often compared. See, for instance, Gilles Deleuze,”Bartleby; or the 
Formula,” in Essays Critical and Clinical, trans. David W. Smith and Michael A. Greco (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1997), 68-90.
91 Franz Kafka, „My Neighbor“, trans. Will and Edwin Muir, in Franz Kafka. The Complete Stories (New York: 
Shocken Books, 1971), 267-268.
92 Andre Furlani, “Bartleby the Socratic,” Studies in Short Fiction, no. 34 (1997): 335.
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Scrivener” that seem essential and convenient for their form and themes. Thus these productions 
become a privileged space to explore what it is about the story that is specifically relevant today. 
III
Our first Bartlebian text will be Georges Perec's Life: A User's Manual, originally published in 
1978, a vast and complex assemblage of literary quotations and borrowings. To trace the way 
Melville's short story is incorporated into this narrative, we shall have recourse to a few categories 
of the structuralist taxonomy established by Gérard Genette that provides tools to determine 
changes from text to text. We shall see that, symptomatically for Perec's accumulative text, the 
transformation from Melville's narrative can be classified as a form of augmentation, i.e., 
contamination and amplification. The former of the two terms describes the situation when 
[t]he two stories intertwine, or rather alternate and cross each other.[ . . .] The contamination 
here is well balanced enough to make it impossible to decide which of the two actions serves
to amplify the other.[ . . .] Those are contaminations between texts, or between texts and 
borrowings from “reality.”93
Such a technique may be demonstrated precisely if we follow the direction indicated by the explicit 
Bartlebian allusion lurking behind the central character's name - Percival Bartlebooth. The character
of Bartlebooth, like his name, is a combination of Bartleby,94 the protagonist of Valery Larbaud's 
novel The Diary of A. O. Barnabooth: A Novel95 and Percival, one of King Arthur's legendary 
Knights of the Round Table, famously involved in the quest of the holy grail. The unmistakably 
Bartlebian features emerge as soon as we are introduced to Bartlebooth as a solitary, isolated and 
awkward bachelor-figure who rarely leaves his office room (sleeping in an armchair not bothering 
to undress), mostly living on nothing but biscuits and ginger cakes. Like Bartleby, Bartlebooth is an 
93 Gerard Genette, Palimpsests: literature in the second degree, trans. Channa Newman and Claude Doubinsky 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997), 259.
94 “Bartleby the Scrivener” is a crucial text for Perec not only as regards La vie mode d'emploi. When commenting on 
his own work, Perec talks about novel-writing as an act of filling in the void inbetween different puzzle pieces - 
literary works. His Un Homme qui dort would be thus a link between Melville's Bartleby and Kafka's diaries, the 
writing of this novel followed his own incessant reading of the short story. See Chris Andrews, “Puzzles and Lists: 
Georges Perec's Un Homme qui dort,” MLN French Issue, no. 11 (1996): 775-796.
95 Valery Larbaud. The Diary of A. O. Barnabooth: A Novel. Trans. Gilbert Cannan. New York: McPherson, 1991. 
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eccentric reluctant to see anyone, know anyone or speak to anyone for being maniacally focused on 
some enigmatic and awkward goal. For the reader not to be mistaken, the writer locates a picture 
with the old Nantucket whale pier in Bartlebooth's hallway.96 The ironically appropriated features of
the other two characters then provide the information that is missing in Melville's narrative and this 
is also where the process of amplification intervenes, an operation that attempts to provide the 
answer to the why and how of the original story.97 “Culture hates a vacuum,”98 writes Gérard 
Genette and his statement is rendered true by the numerous pieces of criticism on Bartleby that 
desperately attempt to fill in the missing motive and information on the identity of the character that
in the tale accounts for much of the scrivener's ambiguity. So does Perec in a manner that does not 
remove but instead displaces the disturbing and irritating void. Bartlebooth is known to have 
pursued a “quest” the nature of which is defined after the character of Barnabooth, a young, wealthy
South American who spends his inheritance by going on a grand tour of Europe to achieve self-
realization. Like Barnabooth, Bartlebooth also commands a great fortune and, in a similar manner, 
resolves to make use of it in order to achieve full understanding. He strives to depict and exhaust 
some aspect of the world in such a way “that his whole life would be organised around a single 
project, an arbitrarily constrained programmme with no purpose outside its own completion.”99 
Without any attachment or interest, Bartlebooth tries hard to make the void of his life the very 
ultimate life-goal, the aim of his quite randomly chosen life-project. This fifty-year plan, 
Bartlebooth insists, must be absolutely futile and must leave no trace after it is completed. It must 
remain “discreet” and not “heroic.” Everything must follow the carefully predetermined program, 
so that “all recourse to chance would be ruled out.”100
The plan is as follows: the painter, Serge Valène, would teach Bartlebooth the art of 
watercolors for ten years, the latter would then paint five hundred paintings at five hundred different
seaports. After finishing each painting, he would send it back to France, where the craftsman 
96 George Perec, Life: A User's Manual, trans. David Bellos. (London: Vintage, 2003), 155.
97 Genette, Palimpsests: literature in the second degree, 267.
98 Genette, Palimpsests: literature in the second degree, 330.
99 Perec, Life: A User's Manual, 162.
100 Ibid.
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Gaspard Winckler would cut it into a jigsaw puzzle. Upon his return, Bartlebooth is supposed to 
spend his time solving each jigsaw in a chronological order. Exactly twenty years to the day after 
the painting has been painted, it should be placed in the sea water until the colors dissolve, and 
nothing is to remain but a blank sheet of paper that is then going to be returned to Bartlebooth. 
Thus the absence of motives for Bartleby's withdrawal is here replaced by a narrative that is,
nevertheless, dominated by the void, which Bartlebooth, at first, tries to fill mechanically and 
randomly with a strenuous effort and material production (not unlike Bartleby who, first, „gorges 
himself” on the attorney's documents) that leads to nothingness, its own obliteration. This strategy 
marks also the structure of the whole novel that, paradoxically, points to its own underlying void by 
obsessively and excessively accumulating (according to pre-defined formulas) bizarre narratives, 
hundreds of characters, catalogues of objects, lists of descriptions but also pieces of some thirty 
canonical texts - slightly modified.101 Indeed, the words that populate Life: A User's Manual appear 
somewhat uncanny; the more descriptive the narrative, the more filled with objects and people it 
appears, the more it betrays its own “horror vacui.” The novel apparently shares the ambition of 
Valéne's to depict and express life in one Parisian building in the greatest possible detail, yet when, 
clogged with discourse, it approaches its ending, Valéne's canvas, symbolically, remains blank. 
Bartlebooth's utterly meaningless but extremely ambitious plan, ultimately fails. The reason 
of its failure lies precisely in Bartlebooth's absolute self-absorption and extreme narcissism. He fails
to take account of others and, more particularly, their incalculability proves fatal to his carefully 
devised plan. Both stories, in fact, tell us that a radical withdrawal from the commonly shared 
practices and conventions is dearly paid for, and that others do not hesitate to take revenge. Indeed, 
Bartleby's fellow citizens do not tolerate his awkward behavior; as a result, he is violently removed 
to prison on charges of vagrancy where he ultimately “falls into eternal sleep“. Bartlebooth's plan 
directly relies on other people and it is Gaspar Winckler, who deliberately prevents his plan to be 
101 In the postscript of the novel one finds thirty different names of writers introduced with the following comment: 
„This book contains quotations, some of them slightly adapted, from works by.“. See Perec, Life:A User's Manual, 
579.
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successfully completed. He purposefully cuts puzzles so that they are extremely difficult if not 
impossible to reconstruct and, thus, Bartlebooth dies amidst an unresolved puzzle.
If both stories teach us that such ultimate withdrawal from social expectations leads to 
tragedy and self-destruction, they also reveal the power that lies hidden in it. Such disregard for the 
social context and social convention demonstrated by both of the characters, the reluctance to assert 
oneself in any way in the common space eventually manages to disturb, as if unwittingly, the lives 
of those who come to witness it. Not to mention the mass of readers and critics obsessed with the 
two characters, the lives of the painter Valène and Winckler, like that of the attorney-narrator seem 
suddenly out of joint. True, we do not have such an access to Valène or Winckler's emotions and 
thoughts as in the case of the narrator of “Bartleby, the Scrivener”; still, their stories seem to 
suggest that the encounter with Bartlebooth has left their lives torn apart. Interestingly, as a result, 
both of these characters gradually slide into apathy with distinctly Bartlebian features. Thus, for 
instance, Winckler, after spending twenty years in Bartlebooth's service, cutting jigsaw puzzles, 
becomes rather stationary - merely sitting in a chair by the window, motionless. He looks out but 
not to see or observe anything in particular, he stares out into nothing. He stops seeing anyone and 
remains tongue-tied when addressed. Valéne, clearly devastated by Bartlebooth's death, becomes 
also absolutely torpid. He lies in bed, stops taking meals and, peculiarly, forgets words and does not 
finish his sentences.102 The transformation from “Bartleby the Scrivener” to Life: A User's Manual 
is thus also marked by dissemination where the defining features of a single character in the original
story (self-sacrificial apathy, unwillingness or inability to communicate) are shared by a number of 
figures.
The reason why Bartleby and Bartlebooth exert such a power on their surroundings is 
naturally open to interpretation. By subtracting themselves thus from the social milieu, these 
102 Not only characters whose fates are directly tied with that of Bartlebooth acquire Bartlebian features. There is also 
Grégoire Simpson, a student of art who, after a period of working at strange jobs, starts receiving a stipend and 
spends his time by taking long strolls. In the end, he locks himself up in his apartment, stops speaking altogether 
(when he goes to a shop for a baguette, he merely gesticulates, when spoken to, he answers with incoherent 
murmur). Apparently, he spends his days lying in his bed, dressed up, smoking a cigarette and wants to be left 
alone. Eventually, he simply disappears. The character, in fact, originally occupies a central place in another work 
by Perec - Un Homme qui dort, also inspired by Melville's “Bartleby the Scrivener”. Perec, Life:A User's Manual, 
302-308.
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characters seem to reveal and expose an aspect of the social space that awakes pathological 
reactions in others. Slavoj Žižek, in his exploration of what he calls „Bartleby politics“ talks 
precisely about the disturbing power of Bartleby's withdrawal. He argues that what is exposed is 
merely the nakedness of the very place, the usually hidden inconsistency of the social order, the 
void of the real based on which our social world is structured becomes stripped of its ideological 
veil.103 Everything appears suddenly meaningless and arbitrary and what emerges is anxiety in the 
case of the lawyer, or apathy in the case of Perec's characters.
As above mentioned, Perec's text is reluctant to explore the characters' interior, the emphasis
remains on the exterior.104 The novel engages in rather sketchy portrayals of people, who seem 
stereotypical and caricature-like, which reminds one of Bartleby's insufficient characterization. 
More peculiarly, the numerous characters are encountered as if frozen-in-time, resembling people 
photographed amidst a situation. We rarely hear them speak - the excessively loquacious 581-pages 
long text is frustratingly silent. Like „Bartleby, the Scrivener,“ Perec's text maintains the radical 
disproportion between narrative eloquence and the characters' reticence. Like the grandiloquent 
narrator in “Bartleby the Scrivener”, the anonymous narrative voice of Life: A User's Manual is also
quite extravagant in his treatment of language: the numerous descriptions of objects and spaces 
suffocate the characters, whose actions we never witness in the present tense, who almost never 
engage in a dialogue and who are thus never fully present in the narrative. Instead, they seem to 
occupy it like wax figures in a museum stuffed with useless objects and adventurous yet hardly 
believable stories, from which they remain strangely distanced. Their frozen aspect and silence 
corresponds to Bartleby's tongue-tiedness and his ghostly presence, as if the single apparition of 
Bartleby was dispersed into shadowy multitudes, the phantomatical nature of all of the characters 
who emerge in Life: A User's Manual, Bartlebooth included. 
103 See Slavoj Žižek, Parallax View (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2009), 375-385.
104 Perec was known for his aversion for psychology in fiction: “Je deteste ce qu'on appelle la 'psychologie' surtout 
dans le roman.” [I detest what is called 'psychology' especially in the novel.] Perec quoted in Gerald Prince, 
“Preliminary Discussion of Women in La vie mode d'emploi”, Yale French Studies. Pereckonings: Reading George 
Perec, no. 10 (2004): 96.
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IV
Another Bartlebian text, likewise composed largely of allusions, references to authors and 
their literary works, is Enrique Vila Matas' novel, Bartleby & Co, published in 2001. As the title 
suggests, and in contrast to Perec's text, allusions to Bartleby in Bartleby & Co are more explicit 
and noticeable. The text itself reflects on the allusion, explains the reasons for using it and the way 
it is incorporated. 
The story takes the shape of a diary-novel the narrator decides to begin precisely after he 
happens to mistake his boss' surname for the very name “Bartleby”. The narrator, a hunchbacked 
failed writer involved with a dull routine work, forever self-deprecating and self-mocking (“I never 
had much luck with women. I have a pitiful hump, which I am resigned to. All my closest relatives 
are dead. I am a poor recluse working in a ghastly office. Apart from that, I am happy.”105 ) 
identifies himself with Melville's character or even, we suspect, desperately strives to resemble him.
The novel begins as the narrator, feigning a depression, takes extended sick leave to write a 
text composed merely of footnotes to a non-existing work of literature. The form of footnotes well 
serves the narrator's poor self-image as footnotes are assumed to be marginal and subordinate to the 
main discourse and no one feels obliged to read them. These notes elaborate on those modern 
writers (existing as well as fictional) who suffer from what the narrator calls the “Bartleby 
syndrome,”
the illness, the disease, endemic to contemporary letter, the negative impulse or attraction 
towards nothingness that means that certain creators, while possessing a very demanding 
literary conscience (or perhaps precisely because of this), never manage to write: either they 
write one or two books and then stop altogether or, working on a project, seemingly without 
problems, one day they become literally paralysed for good.106
Bartleby's enigmatic passive resistance is here understood as a “profound denial of the world,”107 
which as in Perec's Life: A User's Manual, crystalizes an unwillingness to positively assert oneself 
105 Enrique Vila-Matas, Bartleby & Co, trans. Jonathan Dunne. (New York: New Direction Books, 2000), 1.
106 Vila-Matas, Bartleby & Co, 2.
107 Vila-Matas, Bartleby & Co, 1.
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in it. Yet here, in this text by a man totally obsessed with literature, in whose life the world of 
literature seems to have replaced the everyday world itself, it is mainly understood as reluctance to 
produce literature, to affirm the world by literature and to affirm literature itself. Hence, Bartleby's 
situation becomes the ultimate symbol for creative crisis, and represents the doubt over the very 
possibility of creative production. 
Again, the process of Genettian amplification and that of dissemination take place and 
define the incorporation of the original text into that of Bartleby & Co. The narrator continually 
looks for and collects various motives that lead to such an unwillingness to express oneself,108 
typical of Bartleby, which is taken to characterize almost all of the characters of this book 
(including the narrator). All are designated as “Bartlebies”; the name stands for a category, a type, 
genus. Included are real historical figures, writers who simply one day stopped writing (e.g., Arthur 
Rimbaud, Robert Walser) but also those who merely suffered from periods of crisis (Franz Kafka). 
Strikingly, we also encounter fictional or real individuals who exist outside of the history of 
literature or on its margins, or, on the contrary, dominate it without having produced anything that 
would be recognized as literature (e.g. Pepin Bello). Their status is questionable, we often remain 
insecure as to whether they are actual historical individuals or not, and, more importantly, whether 
we can call them writers at all. Not unlike Beckett, who believed, according to Ulysse Dutoit and 
Leo Bersani, that
[i]mpotence, incompetence, and failure, as well as the lack of subject material, do not lead to
the end of art; they are instead the necessary conditions for […] a break with the 
compromises of art in the past,109
and in accordance with Barth's understanding of Borges' short fiction, the narrator of Bartleby & Co
seems to claim that only a research of the very space where writing seems impossible and utterly 
108 “Because it seems to me that the public have the ultimate in bad taste and a desire for denigration. Because we are 
encouraged to work for the same absurd reasons as when we look out of the window and hope to see monkeys and 
bear-tamers in the street. Because I am afraid to die without having lived. Because the more my literary status 
declines, the happier I feel. Because I do not want to imitate lettered people, who are like donkeys kicking and 
fighting in front of an empty manger. Because the public are only interested in successes they do not appreciate.” 
Vila-Matas, Bartleby & Co, 72.
109 Leo Bersani, Ulysse Dutoit, Acts of Impoverishment. Beckett, Rothko, Resnais (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1993), 17.
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meaningless, the very grave of literature, can lead to the very possibility of genuine literary 
production, becoming a catalyst of new artistic forms: 
I am convinced that only by tracking down the labyrinth of the No can the paths still open to
the writing of the future appear. I wonder if I can evoke them.110 
What we encounter as the supposed result of the narrator's effort, is, indeed, not a novel in 
the usual sense of the word but a chain of allusions. The book has little of its own plot or drama; 
instead, it literally draws its substance out of other works – both fiction and non-fiction. This 
parasite further oscillates among various genres (literary essay, fictionalized autobiography, a 
research paper) and deliberately attempts to blur the borderline between what is generally assumed 
as literary or non-literary.
The notes, we are told, are supposed to be attached to a literary work (one that does not yet 
exist) and, apparently, as such are not bound to obey the rules generally followed by footnotes to 
critical texts. Literary footnotes have their own history and have appeared in such works as 
Lawrence Stern's Tristram Shandy or James Joyce's Finnegans Wake. It is not unusual for such 
notes to take over the space where we expect to find the chief narrative. Yet, even in the tradition of 
literary footnotes, the status of Vila Matas' notes remains peculiar. While they actually replace the 
principal narrative (i.e., they become the primary narrative), they still insist on being subordinate to 
something that is moreover absent. Their main reference thus appears entirely ambiguous. 
Footnotes are usually expected to provide the text with a link towards both, past and future. 
The past tradition is connected to the present discourse precisely in the form of a footnote, while the
text itself anticipates itself to be similarly appropriated by future writing. In the case of Vila Matas' 
notes, the present remains empty, it consists of nothing but a relationship towards the past and 
anticipation of the future. It remains purely as something transitional, a specter claiming to lack 
positive presence, and reluctant to assert its own authority. Linked to a tradition that has become 
Bartlebian, it merely points toward what is yet to come.
110 Vila-Matas, Bartleby & Co, 3.
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V
Etienne Chambaud, “Disclaimer,” 2007, empty neon, 180 x 15 cm, 
exhibition view – Lyon Biennale, MOCA, Lyon, 2007.
An art piece by Etienne Chambaud Disclaimer, from 2007, is yet another compilation of 
allusions. It refers to Bartleby, of course, but this reference is “contaminated” by an ironic 
appropriation of the late 1960's neon art and the tradition of tautology and self-referentiality as it 
appeared in conceptual practice. In 1967, Bruce Nauman decided to exchange the traditional artistic
media for the theatricality and seductive nature of the neon sign, traditionally employed in 
advertising. Inspired by a beer sign, Nauman's first neon “The True Artist Helps the World by 
Revealing Mystic Truth” was initially displayed in the artist's storefront studio, just like an 
advertisement on the street.111 While Nauman's gesture was quite revolutionary at that time, since 
then many artists have worked with neons so that today there seems nothing more commonplace 
than neon art.
This overuse of neon in art becomes reflected in Chambaud's art work. We see a white neon 
sign that remains unlit although plugged in, a sarcastic commentary on the once so powerful ability 
of neon art to attract attention. By being dysfunctional and in contrast to other neon signs, the work 
seems, rather conspicuously reluctant to draw attention to itself. Yet, in another sense, it indicates 
111 The power of this art piece lies in the apparent irony of the statement that glorifies the artist as the exceptional and 
omniscient individual by a pretentious cliché that is, moreover, communicated by the mainstream, highly purpose-
built medium associated with consumerist culture. The form of the statement and also the context in which it had 
appeared undermines the message, the latter, however, in an uncanny manner, still remains to hover in the air. The 
artist himself could not decisively claim whether it was meant seriously or not. Joan Gibbons, Art and Advertising 
(New York: I.B.Tauris & Co, 2005), 17.
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that in a(n) (art) world where a neon is a commonplace medium, only the neon (art) that gives up its
noticeability may, in fact, engage one's interest. 
Secondly, Chambaud's neon seems to reference the tautological neons by the “father” of 
conceptual art Joseph Kosuth. In neons such as Three Adjectives Described, the artist forwards a 
tautological statement and thus lets the work be exactly what it purports. Chambaud's piece, in a 
very post-conceptual manner, problematizes this process of self-reference by his choice of the 
meaning to be denoted and enacted (“Disclaimer”) and by the allegiance to Bartleby's “formula.” It 
is symptomatic that the work chooses to affirm the most ambiguous feature of the story. 
The title of the piece, “Disclaimer”, is defined by a dictionary by two different meanings, 
one legal as “a denial or disavowal of legal claim, relinquishment of or formal refusal to accept an 
interest or estate” and also in more neutral sense as a „denial, disavowal, repudiation.“112 It remains 
unclear whether the title disclaims the work or whether it refers to what the work does (i.e., it's act 
of disclaiming) or both. 
Apparently, we are exposed to three dimensions of the message: the form (dysfunction), the 
sign itself („I would prefer not to, too) and the title (disavowal, denial). If we understand it as 
tautological in the tradition of Kosuth's neons, the dysfunction and the Bartlebian utterance would 
correspond to the title and become a sign of disavowal. The work would then simultaneously denote
and enact its denial of its own being. That is naturally always undermined by the work's 
indisputable existence in the gallery space. The various aspects of the work might, however, also 
communicate with each other, producing a complex open-ended dialectical interaction among the 
different levels, negations being undermined so as to be undermined again. We then become 
simultaneously exposed to a negative claim and its disavowal (“I would prefer not to, too” is 
disclaimed, such a disclaimer is undermined by being deliberately dysfunctional and ineffective). 
The work does seem to contest its own existence, but to complicate matters further, it negates that 
contestation and that negation itself is to be undermined. The only positive claim, the affirmation of 
the Bartlebian utterance, is naturally disabled as well as the allusion, which like the work itself, 
112 „Disclaimer,“ Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, 11th ed. 2003.
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positively exists, yet is prevented from asserting itself. On the other hand, we might also preserve 
the ambiguity of the Bartlebian utterance and refuse the other aspects of the work to delimit its 
meaning. Then everything gets even more complicated. Each negation is rendered indeterminate by 
the indistinctness of the utterance.113 The work presents itself either as the dynamic play of 
disclaimers and denials or becomes frozen by the utterance of indistinction that neither affirms nor 
negates. In the latter case, we come across a piece of art that seems to match Jameson's definition of
a postmodern work that resists any thematical, hermeneutic interpretation, a work that arouses 
expectations of an event but fails to materialize it.114 Such apparent meaninglessness, however, 
Adorno maintains in relation to Beckett's Endgame, still remains in the realm of meaning.
In general, Aesthetic Theory argues that negation of meaning becomes aesthetically 
meaningful when it is realized in the material with which the artist works. Because such a 
realization requires form, authentic negation requires formal emancipation, not emancipation
from form... Beckett's absurdist plays are still plays. They do not lack all meaning. They put 
meaning on trial.115
In any case, it shares in the heritage of art works that are difficult to read for as Bersani and Dutoit 
write in a book on Beckett, Rothko and Resnais that remains relevant for us here,
they so seldom address us; they appear to „associate“ not with the real or with their audience
but only with themselves.116
VI.
Bartleby is utterly invisible before he comes to exist in other characters. He is materialized 
only via the reactions and narratives of others. Similarly, the works discussed are in themselves of 
spectral nature; they heavily depend on other resources to give them concrete existence. If we were 
113 Both Deleuze and Derrida agree that the utterance is neither an affirmation nor a negation but, instead, it creates a 
zone of indistinction. See Gilles Deleuze,”Bartleby; or the Formula,” 68-90; Jacques Derrida, The Gift of Death 
and Literature in Secret, trans. David Wills (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2008) 76.
114 “Whatever a good, let alone a great, videotext might be, it will be bad or flawed whenever such interpretation 
proves possible, whenever the text slackly opens up such places and areas of thematization itself.” Frederic 
Jameson, Postmodernism, or, The cultural logic of late capitalism (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), 92. 
115 Zuidervaart, Adorno's Aesthetic Theory, 175.
116 Bersani and Dutoit, Acts of Impoverishment, 6. 
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to articulate their essence, it would be a force that does not positively exist in itself but must be 
located via its imprints in other materials. If, according to poststructuralist theories (e.g. by Roland 
Barthes117), this is an implicit feature of any textuality, these works make it more than evident and 
do not entertain any illusions of originality.
What further unites all these very diverse Bartlebian works is the fact that the very allusion 
is translated into a certain distance these productions place between themselves (or an aspect of 
themselves) and their audience. In Perec's Life: A User's Manual Bartlebian narrative unavailability 
is shared by all characters of the novel whose action or language we never experience in the present 
tense. Bartleby's reluctance to express himself, similarly, becomes a decisive aspect to characterize 
all of the figures in Vila Matas' Bartleby & Co who decide not to express themselves by means of 
literature. This applies to the narrator himself and thus problematizes the text's own status; the work
refuses to assume its own authority (of a literary text). Thus, similarly, Chambaud's Disclaimer 
seems to employ the ambiguity of Bartleby's “I would prefer not to” to enhance the work's impotent
circle of claims and disclaims, its own narcissism. These cultural events thus manipulate the story in
such a way that it assists the work in its self-crippling strategies, attempts to withdraw from or 
complicate the process of its communication with the outside world.
It seems no accident that contemporary theory, in order to find new models for political and 
ethical agency that might successfully undermine or go beyond the late-capitalist system and its 
ideologies, also turns to Bartleby, precisely his passivity and distance. In works by Žižek or 
Agamben, the theoretical conclusions derived from the readings of the story are controversial and 
much debated, in particular, as regards the consequences for political praxis. Nevertheless, the 
interest in Bartleby suggests that there are signs in contemporary theory as well as cultural 
productions that seem to accentuate the potential and importance that lies in inaction and 
withdrawal in contrast to today's emphasis on values of production, activity, self-assertion.
117 Roland Barthes. S/Z. Trans. Richard Miller. New York: Hill and Wang, 1974.
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3. Žižek’s Act and the Literary Example
I
The literary and artistic works explored in the previous chapter, in particular Villa Matas’ Bartleby 
& Co and Chambaud’s Disclaimer, base their own understanding of “Bartleby” on readings of the 
story by philosophers. Villa Matas quite explicitly alludes to Deleuze’s reading of the tale when he 
argues that Franz Kafka was among the writers who also suffered from “Bartleby syndrome.”118 It is
no accident that Chambaud’s piece is focused exclusively on Bartleby’s formula. After all, it is the 
philosophical endeavors which focalize on this particular Bartleby’s phrase making the formula the 
story’s defining characteristic, a reference encompassing its meaning and message. It is especially 
true of Slavoj Žižek’s reading of the tale. In fact, the philosopher cares only about the formula while
the rest of the narrative deserves, on his part, no mention.
It is self-evident that literature, art and philosophy treat “Bartleby” differently than it is usual
in literary criticism. These readings of “Bartleby” naturally do not conform to the common criteria 
of scholarly interpretation of a literary text, if only because the literary text is torn from its literary 
context. In case of philosophy, “Bartleby’s” presence has to do with a certain function literature 
performs in that field. In the realm of philosophy, it is employed to work on a problem important to 
that respective philosophy. In the following three chapters we will see “Bartleby” to stand for a 
more general model in which literature serves to exemplify and dramatize central concepts in 
philosophy to show the latter’s practical, political importance. Consequently, “Bartleby” will 
become our guide to examine this particular role literature plays in contemporary philosophy. 
Slavoj Žižek’s use of “Bartleby” is one of the most reductive, as we have mentioned. It is 
probably also the most political, radical and controversial one. “Bartleby” plays a specific role in 
Žižek’s oeuvre as his (in)action comes to exemplify the controversial model of “politics of 
withdrawal” that is introduced as a solution to what the philosopher perceives as the current 
118 Enrique Vila-Matas, Bartleby & Co, trans. Jonathan Dunne. (New York: New Direction Books, 2000), 64.
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political deadlock. “Bartleby” is, however, not the only literary example in Žižek’s oeuvre to 
perform this function. In fact, Žižek likes to turn to literary characters whenever he theorizes 
political agency. Along with Antigone and Sygne de Coûfontaine, the figure of Bartleby becomes 
one of the several key literary examples that Žižek keeps returning to.
Cultural digressions occur frequently in Žižek’s work, and some claim that the exemplary 
character of Žižek’s theory is its defining characteristic. Scott Stephens and Rex Butler, for instance,
see in such a propensity for digressions a way in which Žižek’s writing manifests itself as “endless 
enquiry into its own discursive conditions.” Cultural examples, from Stephens’s and Butler’s 
perspective, index the fact that there is no philosophical concept that is free from its necessarily 
twisting enunciative conditions, i.e., its exemplification. Like the mediators in the psychoanalytical 
procedure of the pass, cultural examples can be said to deform Žižek’s thought system, but this is 
precisely where to look for the truth of this system.119
In particular, the foregoing must apply to the acts of the fictional characters who stage 
Žižek’s concept of the ethico-political act proper (the ethical and political dimensions remain 
inseparable in his work). Some cultural examples, allegedly, serve didactic purposes in order to 
illustrate abstruse theoretical concepts (e.g., the Lacanian Real), while others are explored in more 
detail to arrive at controversial interpretations. The fictional figures in question, however, are 
privileged among all others, for they articulate the ultimate wager of Žižek’s whole theoretical 
project—his concept of political agency—which they dramatize, translating concept into action, 
theory into praxis.
In his early publication For They Know Not What They Do, Žižek shows that exemplarity, 
truth and action/praxis are all closely interrelated. He targets the problem of examplarity when 
drawing an analogy between hysteria and Hegel’s figures of consciousness in The Phenomenology 
119 Butler and Stephens draw a parallel between Žižek’s discourse and the institution of passe in Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, by which the analysand becomes an analyst by giving an account of his analysis to a committee of 
analysts through two witnesses who are still in analysis. The two, moved by unconscious impulses, are expected to 
distort the message. Yet the decision depends precisely on whether such distortions still manage to communicate a 
certain truth of the analyst-to-be, in fact: “These distortions are the truth.” See Rex Butler and Scott Stephens, 
“Editors’ Introduction,” in Interrogating the Real, by Slavoj Žižek, edited by Rex Butler and Scott Stephens 
(London: Continuum, 2005), 3–4. Italics in the original.
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of Spirit. These figures, writes Žižek, represent examples which “subvert the very Idea they 
exemplify,”120 revealing the implicit presuppositions or unspoken impasses inherent in the idea 
itself. The ascetic’s asserted denial of his body, when put into practice, is nothing but a constant 
preoccupation with it and with the ways of mortifying it. The notion that such examples represent 
the (subversive, unconscious) truth of a theoretical attitude is a perspective that can also be traced in
Žižek’s view of philosophy itself. From his discussion of other philosophers such as Heidegger, 
Derrida, Habermas, or Butler, it becomes clear that the truth of philosophy, for Žižek, lies in the 
actual praxis the particular “system” leads to; the political failures, whether collaboration with 
Nazism or ultimate conformity in regard to the status quo, reveal a disavowed impasse in the 
theoretical work. Such a political failure need not concern the thinker himself/herself (e.g., 
Habermas as a state philosopher, Heidegger as a Nazi sympathizer); those who follow this 
philosophy are also likely, as a consequence, to make serious political mistakes (e.g., Heideggerians
in Communist Yugoslavia121). In other words, the truth of a philosophical notion is the political 
drama of those who profess it, which leads one to the conclusion that the ultimate success of 
philosophy is workable politics. The political motivation is also what lurks behind Žižek’s Lacanian
revival of German idealism, as he himself attests in a 2007 interview with Michael Hauser:
So I think that I’m very traditional, basically, that German idealism, the metaphysics of 
German idealism, still offers the best conceptual tools to deal with the crisis we are 
approaching. Because, as Hegel knew, philosophy and crisis are always connected. All 
philosophy, it’s clear, Hegel, Heidegger, Marx, even Plato—you cannot imagine Plato 
without the political crisis of Greece. No wonder that Plato’s representative book is The 
120 Slavoj Žižek, For They Know Not What They Do: Enjoyment As a Political Factor (London: Verso, 2008), 143.
121 “When, in my youth, I was bombarded by the official Communist philosophers’ stories of Heidegger’s Nazi 
engagement, they left me rather cold; I was definitely more on the side of the Yugoslav Heideggerians. All of a 
sudden, however, I became aware of how these Yugoslav Heideggerians were doing exactly the same thing with 
respect to the Yugoslav ideology of self-management as Heidegger himself did with respect to Nazism: 
Heideggerians entertained the same ambiguously assertive relationship toward Social self-management, the official 
ideology of the Communist regime—in their eyes, the essence of self-management was the very essence of modern 
man, which is why the philosophical notion of self-management suits the ontological essence of our epoch, while 
the standard political ideology of the regime misses this ‘inner greatness’ of self-management . . . Heideggerians are
thus eternally in search of a positive, ontic political system that would come closest to the epochal ontological truth,
a strategy which inevitably leads to error (which, of course, is always acknowledged only retroactively, post 
factum, after the disastrous outcome of one’s engagement).” Slavoj Žižek, The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre 
of Political Ontology (London: Verso, 1999), 13.
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Republic, which, typically, although you have all of Plato’s ontology there, the metaphor of 
the cave and so on, but nonetheless all this emerges to answer which kind of political order 
we need. So, that would be the point.122
Earlier, in The Ticklish Subject, Žižek writes unequivocally:
While this book is philosophical in its basic tenor, it is first and foremost an engaged 
political intervention, addressing the burning question of how we are to reformulate a leftist,
anti-capitalist political project in our era of global capitalism and its ideological supplement,
liberal-democratic multiculturalism.123
Žižek’s philosophical project is therefore driven by a deeply political interest. Naturally, all this 
immediately poses a question about both Žižek’s own political interventions and the success or 
failure of Žižek’s politics as it emerges from his heterodox re-reading of German idealism through 
Lacanian psychoanalysis. The latter is registered by literary examples.
Literary characters often appear at the end of Žižek’s books, precisely where abstract issues 
(interlaced with discussions of culture) elaborated on in the text are to be led to a desired 
conclusion, i.e., a proposal for alternative forms of political agency. While they embody a decisive 
move from abstract concepts to concrete models of behavior, they can literally be said to test 
Žižek’s theory in actu, staging its deadlocks or implicit presuppositions, its politics, and its truth. 
This is also attested by the fact that they have become frequent sites of debates over Žižek’s politics.
Unlike other cultural works that Žižek likes to explore in detail, in his use of literary 
characters as exemplary agents he does not engage in lengthy interpretation and is not actually 
interested in the details of the plot. In fact, the texts are usually condensed into a single, 
aesthetically charged gesture which is employed to animate the point of the whole theoretical 
project. Thus we are presented with Antigone’s monstrous insistence or Sygne de Coûfontaine’s 
repulsive tic combined with Bartleby’s inert “I would prefer not to.”124 In what follows I will 
122 Michael Hauser, “Humanism Is Not Enough: Interview with Slavoj Žižek,” International Journal of Žižek Studies 
3, no. 3 (2009): http://zizekstudies.org/index.php/ijzs/article/view/211/310.
123 Žižek, The Ticklish Subject, 4.
124 Slavoj Žižek, The Parallax View (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006), 381; Herman Melville, Bartleby, The 
Scrivener: A Story of Wall-Street, in Pierre; or, The Ambiguities, Israel Potter: His Fifty Years of Exile, The Piazza 
Tales, The Confidence-Man: His Masquerade, Uncollected Prose, Billy Budd, Sailor (An Inside Narrative), ed. 
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examine these figures as crucial points of convergence of Žižek’s philosophy, politics and 
aesthetics. In the first part of the chapter, I will examine their peculiar role of “impossible 
examples” that register the failure of Žižek’s attempt at prescriptive politics. Later on, I will shift 
my focus and examine fictional characters as specific rhetorical tools that make possible a more 
intimate relationship between readers and Žižek’s theory, and that play a role in Žižek’s attempt to 
unite theory and practice.
II
As Žižek’s literary examples occupy a central position in the structure of his thought and are 
employed to cast the light on the key concepts of his ontology, i.e., the way the latter are to be put in
practice, it becomes necessary to grasp the basic contours of that ontology. Therein lies the 
difficulty of the analysis of the critical function literary examples, such as “Bartleby,” assume in 
philosophy: one cannot deal only with particular cases. It is necessary to study them in the context 
of the complicated philosophical background. The importance of the literary examples in the 
theoretical edifice can be appreciated only if one understands the crucial import of the concepts 
these examples clarify. 
The political stakes of Žižek’s philosophy lie in his revival of Cartesian subjectivity, namely 
its subversive hidden core, which was first registered and further developed by Kant (who, 
according to Žižek, ultimately shrank from the radical implications of his own conclusions) and 
later Hegel. This radical core of German idealism has been left unnoticed by post-structuralist 
theories that, however, claim to be the inheritors of this particular tradition.125 The post-structuralist 
achievement (of, for example, Althusser or Foucault) is represented by the detailed and intricate 
exploration of the ways in which human subjects are always already determined by factors beyond 
their control (power, ideology, etc.), which offers little hope for political agency. Žižek’s rise to 
Harrison Hayford, Hershel Parker, and G. Thomas Tanselle (New York: Library of America, 1984), 635–72; 
Sophocles, Antigone, trans. J. E. Thomas (Clayton, DE: Prestwick House, 2005); Paul Claudel, The Hostage, trans. 
Pierre Chavannes (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1917).
125 Matthew Sharpe and Geoff Boucher, Žižek and Politics: A Critical Introduction (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2010), 65.
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popularity in Western academia can also be attributed to the fact that, at least at first sight, he seems 
to overcome what some perceive as the political deadlocks of post-structuralism.126 On account of 
his Lacanian tools, Žižek manages to extract a notion of an absolutely autonomous, if unconscious 
and non-substantial, subject that remains irreducible to socio-historic conditions.
From Žižek’s complex discussions of subjectivity, two moments seem especially relevant for
the discussion of the ethico-political act, namely, the subject as a void and the subject as a negative-
contractive force, the “vanishing mediator” between nature and culture, both notions having 
profound political ramifications.
The implicit radicality of Descartes’s inaugural attempt to think purely formal subjectivity 
devoid of any content apart from “I think” is taken into account, according to Žižek, by Kant’s 
objection that the subject is not self-transparent.127 It is the “X that thinks,” the formal “unity of 
apperception” that itself makes experience possible and thus must be logically presupposed, but its 
notion can never be filled with intuited experiential reality.128 Adrian Johnston explains: “The 
(presupposed) being of the Kantian noumenal subject can only ever appear, within the frame of 
phenomenal (self-) experience, as a void.”129 In other words, the subject, as an inaccessible locus 
that sustains what we perceive as reality, can be registered only indirectly, in the way the reality we 
encounter is never consistent, never a harmonized totality. This is, however, always obfuscated, in 
Lacanian terms, by unconscious fantasy on the level of an individual, or ideological fantasy on the 
level of a society. As Fabio Vighi explains,
126 In their introduction to a collection of critical responses to Žižek’s work, Traversing the Fantasy, Matthew Sharpe 
and Geoff Boucher note: “Positions that wholly ‘write away’ the subject in the play of some other more profound 
ontological instance—whether arch-writing, power, or the body without organs—tend infamously to be left 
wondering about their own position of enunciation and to what agency they might be addressing their ‘radical’ 
appeals. By contrast, Žižek’s (Kantian-Hegelian) ‘critique of metaphysics’ aligns itself directly and from the start 
with the reflexive (or ‘apperceptive’) potential of individuals—precisely as subjects—not only to ‘stand out’ from, 
but also to actively intervene in and change, the historical orders into which they have been ‘thrown.’” Geoff 
Boucher and Matthew Sharpe, “Introduction: Traversing the Fantasy,” in Traversing the Fantasy: Critical 
Responses to Slavoj Žižek, ed. Geoff Boucher, Jason Glynos, and Matthew Sharpe (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), xiii.
127 See Slavoj Žižek, Tarrying with the Negative: Kant, Hegel, and the Critique of Ideology (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 1993), 13.
128 Žižek, Tarrying with the Negative, 14.
129 Adrian Johnston, Žižek’s Ontology: A Transcendental Materialist Theory of Subjectivity (Evanston, IL: 
Northwestern University Press, 2008), 62.
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we are the very impossibility that we ascribe to external reality, and that [reality] we must 
constantly disavow or displace if we are to connect with it. The very surplus generated by 
our attempt to grasp the meaning of the world is both what prevents us from fully grasping it
and what allows us to engage with it in its material guise.130
Thus the subject-as-void corresponds to the basic incompleteness of reality (both epistemological 
and ontological); in Lacan’s conceptual edifice, the barred subject is correlative to the barred Other.
Žižek draws an analogy between this Kantian transcendental subject and Lacan’s subject of 
the empty signifier without a signified (which has been primordially repressed). The latter is distinct
from ego—a sense of identity, inner richness. There is a connection, however, between the subject 
and the ego. The subject, as a formal structure lacking “any positive-substantial determinations,”131 
underlies man’s potentiality to assume an infinite number of identities, roles, and mandates, without
being reducible to any of them. It manifests itself only in the form of a failure of every self, man’s 
ultimate non-coincidence with himself. This deficiency, however, is what drives identity formation; 
the urge to embrace identities and roles is but a defensive strategy to avoid the abysmal negativity 
that disavowed truth about our being. Nothing attests to the Žižekian subject better, Adrian Johnston
claims with regard to the postmodern celebration of multiple and diffused subject-positions:
[T]he more one insists upon subjectivity as a dispersed multitude of shifting and unstable 
identity-constructs, the more one is confronted with the necessity of positing a universal, 
empty, and contentless frame, a formal void, as the backdrop against which the “mad dance 
of identifications” takes place.132
The ultimate point, however, is that the ruling social order can never capture the subject by its 
“ideological interpellation”; there is always a negative dimension that escapes it. 
The subject is sometimes also described as a dynamic gesture, a contractive force, and a 
kind of madness. Descartes’s withdrawal into radical doubt, Kant’s transcendental imagination, and 
130 Fabio Vighi, On Žižek’s Dialectics: Surplus, Subtraction, Sublimation (London: Continuum, 2010), 133.
131 Žižek, The Parallax View, 44.
132 Johnston, Žižek’s Ontology, 11–12.
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the Hegelian “night of the world”133 are coupled with the Lacanian death drive to introduce the 
freedom of subjectivity as “the violent gesture of contraction that negates every being outside 
itself,”134 man’s capacity to cut his ties to his immediate environment. This impulse is sometimes 
theorized by Žižek in terms of a disruptive withdrawal from immersion in the so-called natural 
cycle, man’s “denaturalization.” Already not nature, but not yet culture, this move is one of the 
basic dislocations in which humanity is thrown out of joint with its object, on account of which man
never fits his environment, which remains in a state of radical contingency and as such open to 
change. The subject names an imbalance introduced in the self-sufficient functioning of the natural 
world, the process of satisfying one’s biological instincts. It is presented as the drive that persists 
beyond mere biological life, as “beyond the pleasure principle.”135 Culture is then merely an attempt
to control and discipline this excess which makes culture possible, yet in itself remains ultimately 
indifferent to and incompatible with its laws and its norms. It is this basic-level indifference towards
social conventions and rules, as well as towards one’s self-interest, which constitutes the basic 
ethical dimension of the death drive, the abyss of freedom as subjectivity.
The drive then manifests itself as a “wild, unconstrained propensity to insist stubbornly on 
one’s own will, cost what it may,”136 on account of nothing but the excess that defines the subject. 
Such explosive occasions, when the drive at the heart of human beings rises to the surface, 
correspond to moments when subjects “traverse their fundamental fantasy” insofar as they 
acknowledge the disavowed beliefs that tie them to a particular social organization and perceive the 
latter’s contingency, its very inconsistency on account of the excess (of the death-drive, of the 
jouissance—the pleasure in pain beyond the pleasure principle) around which the social-symbolic 
fabric is structured.
133 “The human being is this night, this empty nothing, that contains everything in its simplicity—an unending wealth 
of many representations, images, of which none belongs to him—or which are not present. This night, the interior 
of nature, that exists here—pure self—in phantasmagorical representations, is night all around it, in which here 
shoots a bloody head—there another white ghastly apparition, suddenly here before it, and just so disappears. One 
catches sight of this night when one looks human beings in the eye—into a night that becomes awful.” Hegel 
quoted in Donald Phillip Verene, Hegel’s Recollection: A Study of Images in the Phenomenology of Spirit (Albany: 
SUNY Press, 1985), 7–8, quoted in Žižek, The Ticklish Subject, 29–30.
134 Žižek, The Ticklish Subject, 34.
135 Žižek, The Ticklish Subject, 37.
136 Žižek, The Ticklish Subject, 36.
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By virtue of its negative restlessness, the subject is capable of rejecting all of its symbolic 
mandates, of cutting itself off from the social fabric (undergoing a so-called symbolic death), and 
withdrawing into the abyss of autonomous subjectivity from which any reality can be radically 
questioned while new possibilities emerge. It is this unconscious and unruly dimension which 
escapes socialization that forms the basic structure of the act, the paradigm of the ethico-political 
agency. Such a negative cut of “wiping the slate clean,” of a violent subtraction from the socio-
symbolic field, is a necessary pre-requisite for a truly new beginning (a new individual identity, a 
new symbolic order). The events that exemplify the act in its collective dimension are revolutions, 
such as the French revolution of 1789 or the Russian revolution of 1917. It is certainly peculiar, 
however, that individual examples of the act by far outnumber Žižek’s examples of collective 
revolts. Moreover, it is precisely in the case of individual examples of the act that Žižek prefers to 
have recourse to fiction137 – films, opera and literature. The question is then the following: Why 
does the philosopher prefer fictional accounts to the historical ones?138
III
Žižek’s literary examples of the act are often adapted from Lacan’s commentaries on literary texts 
as they appear in the latter’s seminars The Ethics of Psychoanalysis and Transference. Oedipus 
Colonus, Antigone, and Sygne de Coûfontaine are figures driven precisely by the excessive drive, 
137 The exceptions include Žižek’s account of the case of the American teacher Mary Kay Letourneau, who had a love 
affair with her underage student. See Žižek, The Ticklish Subject, 382–88.
138 One possible answer as to why Žižek turns to gestures by literary heroes when theorizing the act can be found 
within certain strands of literary theory that find the specificity of literature precisely in its staging of agency. 
Theorists such as Steven Knapp or Martha Nussbaum believe that literature is “a practice that instructs in exercise 
of agency.” Jonathan Culler, The Literary in Theory (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 31. For Knapp this
is related to the specific nature of literature as defined by the formalists – it being a “concrete universal,” at once a 
particular and universal experience. It is this oscillation between particular and universal that for him defines 
agency as such: “For part of what being an agent is (always) like, apparently, is being caught up in an irreducible 
oscillation between typicality and particularity: between (on one side) the forms of action that an agent must 
understand in order to make sense of herself as the possible performer of certain actions, and (on the other side) the 
concrete history without which the agent could not distinguish herself from those who might, otherwise, just as well
replace her. And this, once again, resembles the structure of mutual implication that characterizes the relation 
between the typicality of literary object-types and the particularity of the complex scenarios in which the literary 
work inserts them.” Literature thus replicates the dynamics of human agency where what is at stake are typical 
roles that literature particularizes suggesting they can be realized in practice and the reader can be identified with 
them. Steven Knapp, Literary Interest: The Limits of Anti-formalism (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1993), 
139. What is at stake is then consciousness of possibilities and choices that wouldn’t otherwise be so evident. 
Despite the very different theoretical and political interests, this is precisely what Žižek is concerned with. 
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“unyielding right to the end, demanding everything, giving up nothing, absolutely unreconciled.”139 
As Žižek himself comments:
In all his [Lacan’s] great literary interpretations, from Oedipus and Antigone through Sade’s 
Juliette to Claudel’s Hostage, he is in search of a point at which we enter the dimension of 
the “inhuman,” a point at which “humanity” disintegrates so that all that remains is a pure 
subject. Sophocles’s Antigone, Sade’s Juliette, Claudel’s Sygne—they are all figures of such
an “inhuman” subject. 140
I wish to focus on Antigone, in particular, the comprehensive exegesis of which appears at the end 
of Lacan’s Seminar VII: The Ethics of Psychoanalysis. Antigone’s act is one of the most frequently 
cited examples in Žižek’s work, as well as a frequent target of criticism that aims at Žižek’s political
(mis)appropriation of Lacanian theories.141 One of the reasons for the controversial nature of Žižek’s
use of the text, however, lies in the ambiguous function of Antigone’s agency in Lacan’s 
commentary. More, as will become evident in due course, Antigone’s uncertain and puzzling status 
is one that defines the function of the literary example in philosophy we are dealing with in this 
thesis. 
In Lacan’s Ethics Antigone’s suicidal insistence on the burial of her brother despite Creon’s 
interdiction exemplifies the ultimately transgressive and destructive nature of desire (the death 
drive) and its incompatibility with any established social values and norms. At the same time, 
through Antigone, Lacan focuses on the cathartic function of tragedy. Like psychoanalysis, tragedy 
confronts us with the true nature of desire and it does so by aesthetic means, via the hero’s sublimity
and grandeur. The question remains of whether the hero also represents exemplary ethical behavior. 
Lacan’s text seems to vacillate between descriptive and prescriptive levels, while both positions can
be argued, a fact which divides Lacanians into two camps. On the one hand, Lacan explicitly 
139 Jacques Lacan, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, 1959–1960, vol. 7 of The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, ed. Jacques-
Alain Miller, trans. Dennis Porter (London: Routledge, 1992), 310.
140 Žižek, The Parallax View, 42.
141 See, for example, Yannis Stavrakakis, “The Lure of Antigone: Aporias of an Ethics of the Political,” in Traversing 
the Fantasy: Critical Responses to Slavoj Žižek, ed. Geoff Boucher, Jason Glynos, and Matthew Sharpe (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2005), 171–82, or Ian Parker, Slavoj Žižek: A Critical Introduction (London: Pluto Press, 2004), 78.
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discusses the limits of psychoanalysis at the beginning of the seminar.142 Psychoanalysis, like 
tragedy, guides us toward an existential experience but then leaves us at the threshold to find our 
own measure, our own direction in between destructive, transgressive desire and the social goods. 
As Marc De Kesel notes, we are no heroes and we always compromise our desire in one way or 
another.143 On the other hand, we are presented with a tragic heroine who is explicitly praised and 
admired in the text for having remained true to her desire. Importantly, towards the end of the 
seminar, Lacan famously articulates that “the only thing one can be guilty of is to have given 
ground from one’s desire,” which is likely to be understood as commanding that no ground be given
at all.144
While acknowledging the validity of interpretation in favor of the descriptive, Žižek seems 
to suspect in that reading a tendency to confine Antigone’s radicalism exclusively to the realm of 
aesthetics and treat “aesthetic contemplation of a radical ethical stance . . . as a supplement to our 
‘real life’ compromising attitude of ‘following the crowd,’”145 a stance which, according to Žižek, 
cannot be claimed as Lacanian. Žižek, conversely, seems to consider Antigone as more than 
142 “On the other hand, I will straight away point out to those who might be inclined to forget it, or who might think 
that I am following in this direction only by referring to the moral imperative in our experience—I will point out 
that moral action poses problems for us precisely to the extent that if analysis prepares us for it, it also in the end 
leaves us standing at the door.” Lacan, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, 21. In a similar vein Lacan writes: 
“psychoanalysis can accompany the patient to the ecstatic limit of the ‘Thou art that,’ wherein is revealed to him the
cipher of his mortal destiny, but it is not in our mere power as practitioners to bring him to that point where the real 
journey begins.” Jacques Lacan, “The Mirror-phase as Formative of the Function of the I,” trans. Jean Roussel, in 
Mapping Ideology, ed. Slavoj Žižek (London: Verso, 1994), 99.
143 See Marc De Kesel, Eros and Ethics: Reading Jacques Lacan’s Seminar VII, trans. Sigi Jöttkandt (Albany: SUNY 
Press, 2009), 264.
144 Lorenzo Chiesa further argues that Antigone must be acknowledged as an ethical model since it follows from 
Lacan’s statements that her actions lie at the heart of psychoanalysis: “I believe that Antigone as an image of lack is
also inevitably understood by Lacan as a model for the ethics of psychoanalysis as articulated in Seminar VII. This 
can be easily demonstrated by means of a simple syllogism. We are told that Antigone represents ‘the essence of 
tragedy’; we are also told that ‘tragedy is at the root of our [psychoanalytic] experience,’ and hence (the suicidal 
nature of) Antigone’s act is at the root of Lacanian psychoanalysis. An aesthetic ethics cannot be reduced to an 
aesthetics: the centrality of Antigone’s image can be extracted only from Antigone’s own act.” Lorenzo 
Chiesa,Subjectivity and Otherness: A Philosophical Reading of Lacan (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007), 177. 
However, far from suggesting that Lacan praises a suicidal action, Chiesa argues that Antigone presents us with a 
deadlock in Lacan’s edifice that can be satisfactorily resolved only from the standpoint of Lacan’s later writings.
145 “It is possible to read Lacan’s interpretation of Antigone asserting that Antigone is not a model to be followed, but 
just a fascinating image, an aesthetic appearance: Antigone’s fascinating beauty explodes when she is elevated into 
the position of the living dead on account of her not compromising her unconditional desire. If, however, this 
implies that in ‘real’ life we should follow the ‘safe’ path of remaining within the symbolic coordinates and 
allowing the radical stance of ‘going to the end’ only in the guise of aesthetic image, does this not reduce art to the 
aesthetic contemplation of a radical ethical stance, as a supplement to our ‘real life’ compromising attitude of 
‘following the crowd’? If there is anything foreign to Lacan, it is such a stance.” Slavoj Žižek, “Concesso non 
Dato,” in Traversing the Fantasy: Critical Responses to Slavoj Žižek, ed. Geoff Boucher, Jason Glynos, and 
Matthew Sharpe (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), 246.
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relevant to our political or ethical behavior and approaches her act as a paradigm of the ethical-
political act proper. Yet, as we shall see, his actual treatment of this fictional example emerges in a 
similarly equivocal manner. As in Lacan’s interpretive case of her, in Žižek’s hands Antigone’s act 
oscillates between exemplarity and the merely revelatory. Moreover, this can be said of all the other 
literary figures that clarify his concept of the radical act. On the one hand, the literary example 
serves as a model of ethical and political agency to be followed, on the other hand, it is presented as
a cathartic, transformational aesthetic experience with real effects that cannot be predicted in 
advance.
IV
In one of his encounters with the theory of Judith Butler,146 Žižek has recourse to a reading of 
Antigone precisely as he ponders the possibility of a genuinely subversive and autonomous action. 
As both Butler and Žižek agree, we are unconsciously (phantasmatically) invested in the specific 
symbolic and social organization that we are born into and that gives us identity. The problem is 
then how it is at all possible to undermine or displace such an organization. In Butler’s view (as 
paraphrased by Žižek), the Lacanian (forced) choice remains confined either to fundamental 
alienation in the symbolic order or to the transgression of that order at the price of psychosis. Any 
other resistance remains “a false transgression” and ultimately serves to maintain and further 
reproduce the law. The Žižek vs. Butler debate, however, asserts another option: “the effective 
symbolic rearticulation via the intervention of the real of an act.”147 The act constitutes a violent 
withdrawal from any symbolic identifications with their concomitant unconscious (phantasmatic) 
supports. The act is at the same time performative, it is a negative intrusion which, Žižek claims, at 
once transforms the socio-symbolic coordinates.
Enter Antigone. Via her defiance of Creon’s order and her stubborn insistence on the burial 
of her brother, as Žižek claims, Antigone manifests her disregard of the “big Other,” i.e., the whole 
146 See Slavoj Žižek, “From ‘Passionate Attachments’ to Dis-Identification,” Umbr(a), no. 1 (1998): 3–17.
147 Žižek, “From ‘Passionate Attachments’ to Dis-Identification,” 5.
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normative system that regulates inter-subjective relations in a community. She not only puts at stake
her entire social identity, but also sacrifices everything that ties her to the community, even perhaps 
all that is dear to her (her libidinal attachment to her sister and her potential marital happiness with 
Haemon) for the sake of a cause that matters to her more than life itself. Both Lacan and Žižek thus 
locate her in the domain “between two deaths,” beyond the adhesion to biological life, in the sphere 
of the death drive. Let us proceed to how this actually affects or transforms the very community.
In Did Somebody Say Totalitarianism?, Žižek emphasizes that, through the way in which 
Antigone’s demand defies social reality (the big Other), she does something deemed impossible 
within the coordinates of the life of the polis. Antigone creates a new horizon of possibilities and, as
a result, changes the contours of that reality itself; what is considered good and not good, possible 
or impossible. Antigone’s stubborn insistence determines afresh what is considered as the sovereign 
good in that particular social milieu.148 
Žižek further focuses on Antigone as the figure of the Other qua real, as the inhuman 
partner. Antigone relates to her cause directly; her demand is not communicated through the 
symbolic order and that is why it emerges as monstrous. While Žižek differentiates between the 
imaginary Other, with whom one engages in mirror-like relations (of competition, of mutual 
recognition, etc.), and of the symbolic Other (the explicit or implicit social rules and codes), 
Antigone, as the agent of the act, represents the real Other, “the Other with whom no symmetrical 
dialogue, mediated by the symbolic order, is possible.”149 As the embodiment of inhuman excess, 
the abyss of subjectivity, which usually remains hidden behind symbolic and imaginary shields, she 
is frightening. This inhuman aspect is translated into aesthetic terms, into the sublime monstrosity 
of Antigone that is later adopted by other writers for other literary characters, such as Sethe from 
Toni Morrison’s novel Beloved (1987) or Euripides’ Medea, both of whom kill their own children. 
Paul Claudel’s Sygne de Coûfontaine commits suicide by intercepting a bullet meant for her 
husband, whom she despises and hates. For Žižek, her act lacks any of the ancient sublimity or 
148 See Slavoj Žižek, Did Somebody Say Totalitarianism? Five Interventions in the (Mis)use of a Notion (London: 
Verso, 2001), 168, 172.
149 Žižek, Did Somebody Say Totalitarianism?, 163.
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grandeur and, being modern, remains merely repellent. There is, however, a crucial problem that 
pertains to Žižek’s understanding of an authentic ethical and political act. Such radical acts do not 
necessarily have to change anything and may very well end up as being merely suicidal. For it 
seems evident that the extent of such transformative effects of the act depend utterly on the 
particular position of the agent(s) in a society. 
The crucial point, moreover, arrives when we learn that while acts emerge as traumatic 
encounters for others, they also do so for the agents themselves. The agent remains a stranger to his 
own act, which becomes difficult to subjectify, to assume as one’s own, for the act is something 
external, radically contingent or even psychotic.150 Moreover, we do not commit such acts, they 
occur to us, and we must come to terms with them, concludes Žižek. Beyond any strategic-
pragmatic calculation, they are acts of absolute freedom that we perform blindly, in utter passivity, 
“as an automaton, without reflection.”151 Naturally, such coincidence of freedom and necessity 
fatally complicates Žižek’s implicit invitation to follow Antigone’s example, as well as any possible
ethical-political program one might derive from Žižek’s theory of agency.
V
Not surprisingly, Žižek has faced a lot of criticism precisely on account of the act he focuses on, 
namely its excessively violent nature,152 “its suicidal heroic ethics.”153 The act, moreover, seems to 
dwell far beyond any everyday, necessarily pragmatic, politics and thus poses the danger of 
introducing an excuse precisely for what Žižek otherwise relentlessly criticizes: a life of political 
quietism, redeemed in advance by the comfortable waiting for a miraculous act. As if to respond to 
this criticism or eager to intervene in the debate on the “what should be done” question, at the end 
of The Parallax View Žižek proposes an alternative form of subversive agency. In the last chapter, 
Žižek launches a fierce critique of a form of imaginary resistance which, in the final instance, 
150 A psychotic is someone who can project his own private social reality and ignore the dependence of the Other. Even
though Žižek differentiates between the act and the psychotic passage à l’acte, uncannily, they seem to overlap. See 
Slavoj Žižek, On Belief (London: Routledge, 2001), 84.
151 Žižek, Did Somebody Say Totalitarianism?, 162.
152 See, e.g., Simon Critchley, “Violent Thoughts about Slavoj Zizek,” Naked Punch, supplement, 11 (2008): 3–6.
153 Stavrakakis, “The Lure of Antigone,” 173.
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remains dependent on the law and order it rebels against. The “rumspringa resistance,” a 
representative of which Žižek perceives in Simon Critchley, shrinks from actually trying to take 
over the situation—since, above all, it enjoys its own dissident status.154 In contrast to this 
resistance, Žižek proposes a politics of withdrawal. While we cannot plan the act, what we can do is
to eschew activity. For where there is no activity, something else becomes evident, i.e., the very 
space where that activity is taking place, its symbolic coordinates, the socio-political organization in
its violence and its radical contingency.
“Bartleby” in Žižek’s oeuvre comes to exemplify precisely this kind of subtractive politics. 
Žižek is by no means interested in the complicated structure of the narrative. He exclusively focuses
on Bartleby’s repeated utterance in the form of “I would prefer not to.” This formula is taken out of 
its literary habitat, simply inserted into a contemporary political context, and explained via Žižek’s 
psychoanalytical theoretical framework. 
We can imagine the varieties of such a gesture in today’s public space: not only the obvious 
“There are great chances of a new career here! Join us!”—“I would prefer not to”; but also 
“Discover the depths of your true self, find inner peace!”—“I would prefer not to”; or “Are 
you aware how our environment is endangered? Do something for ecology!”—“I would 
prefer not to”; or “What about all the racial and sexual injustices that we witness all around 
us? Isn’t it time to do more?”—“I would prefer not to.” This is the gesture of subtraction at 
its purest . . . 155
It is clear that Žižek does not read the utterance as radically indeterminate (as Jacques Derrida or 
Gilles Deleuze do), but rather as a statement of refusal, a sign of withdrawal. Not the negation of a 
predicate, for Žižek it becomes an affirmation of a non-predicate (after Kant’s negative judgment). 
Bartleby does not refuse to do something but he wants not to do it. For Žižek this slight shift marks 
the difference between transgression that feeds on what it opposes and a gesture which, as an active 
154 “[I]s not Critchley’s position one of relying on the fact that someone else will take on the task of running the state 
machinery, enabling us to engage in critical distance toward the state?” Žižek, The Parallax View, 333. Italics in the
original.
155 Žižek, The Parallax View, 382
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preference for the negative, remains independent of the dominant ideologies and thus moves beyond
the fatal embrace of hegemony and of its negation. At one point we are told that Bartleby’s “I would
prefer not to” has the structure of a Lacanian Versagung: a rejection of the symbolic order as such, a
purely formal rejection without any content, which cannot be integrated into the realm of meaning. 
Like the act, this enigmatic statement remains incomprehensible from the point of view of the order 
in which it intervenes. In the same book Žižek turns to the character of Sygne de Coûfontaine, and 
to the subject of the death drive, to elaborate on the Versagung structure. The void of both Sygne’s 
and Bartleby’s refusal repeats and enacts the radical negativity of subjectivity, the Real over which 
words stumble. Both are driven by an excess that cannot be grasped or represented by their 
respective social milieux.
In a sense, “Bartleby” can be read as a culmination of Žižek’s efforts to translate his 
complicated metaphysics into concrete models of human agency. At first sight, what the character of
Bartleby is taken to exemplify appears almost as a prescription. A refusal to undertake any activity 
that only helps the deleterious system to maintain itself can quite easily be translated into a 
conscious step. However, this aspect of Bartleby’s “I would prefer not to” uneasily combines 
precisely with the act of Versagung as an expression of the unconscious death drive, the 
transcendental point of Žižek’s materialism. Problematically for Žižek’s theory, there is a clear gap 
between the two. Fabio Vighi’s question is precisely to the point:
Should we think of subtraction as a goal to be actively pursued, or as an event that takes 
place irrespective of our conscious intervention?156
And he further points to the danger that
I might be convinced that I “subtract” for all the right social and political reasons, while 
unconsciously I fetishize my disengagement through a range of disavowed modalities of 
enjoyment.157
156 Vighi, On Žižek’s Dialectics, 137.
157 Vighi, On Žižek’s Dialectics, 136. Interestingly, Fabio Vighi tries to resolve this deadlock of Žižekian politics by 
suggesting that many people do not even need to subtract from the present order as they are already disconnected 
from it. He points to the dispossessed masses of people, inhabitants of slums, refugees, etc. The point would then be
to unite/identify with them. See Vighi, On Žižek’s Dialectics, 21, 137.
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The withdrawal always risks being another form of false resistance. As Vighi argues later on, our 
conscious agency is unlikely to become a truly subversive political intervention unless driven by an 
unconscious drive; our unconscious must then be piloted by a political project, otherwise it is not 
likely to achieve much. Even though Bartleby could be perceived as an attempt to connect the two 
aspects (the pragmatic and the unconscious), his renowned statement and withdrawal in Žižek’s 
reading fail to do so, for Bartleby’s “I would prefer not to” remains split from inside.
Matthew Sharpe sees the failure of Žižek’s theory to link the conscious-pragmatic in its 
Kantian strategy. In his opinion, Žižek moves from phenomena back to their transcendental 
conditions of possibility; however,
[t]o abstract from this realm in order to disclose the semantic, historical or ultra-
transcendental conditions of its possibility (or of the language that political agents use to 
frame their understandings) means that the employee of this philosophical mode of 
argumentation can say nothing directly concerning the actuality of this realm, nor 
concerning the norms, ideals or projects which might inform political praxis within it. In his 
inimitable fashion, Žižek only brings this “abyss of essence” between the ontic and 
ontological, or empirical and transcendental realms to a hypostasized head, when he openly 
argues that from the perspective of ordinary political life, the mode of action authentically 
true to the subject’s terrorizing death drive must appear as diabolically evil.158
Further than this, the death drive should be not only “diabolically evil” but even monstrous or 
abhorrent, as Žižek’s description of the heroes’ acts suggests. When translated into everyday reality, 
Žižek’s metaphysics remains and must remain repulsive, if not incoherent. Literary fiction then 
enacts the incompatibility of the two levels—of the Real and the real, the gap between Žižekian 
transcendental truth and politics—through the fictionality of the example and its extreme aesthetics.
VI
158 Matthew Sharpe, “‘Critchley is Žižek’: In Defence of Critical Political Philosophy,” Critical Horizons 10, no. 2 
(2009): 194.
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Let us first address the specifically exaggerated aesthetics that surround the act. Adrian Johnston 
sees in Žižek’s inclination to employ excessive adjectives (repelling, horrific, etc.) a more general 
phenomenon of the subject’s anxiety over jouissance and the drives that pose a threat to its well-
being. Such exaggerated aesthetic designators merely register the tension and conflict between the 
subject’s striving for balance and the drives—their incompatibility with our well-being, with the 
pleasure and reality principles.159 We are confronted with the deeds of Antigone, Bartleby and 
Sygne, who are presented to us as the true picture of who we are. At the same time, they are 
described as threateningly inhuman (repulsive, monstrous, inert, etc.) and thus impossible to 
identify with. In this way, however, we perceive the disturbing power, uncontrollable nature, and 
externalness of the unconscious drive.
Once the drives distort the fragile balance of the subject, the following occurs, as Žižek 
describes it:
The result of experiencing and/or witnessing some excessively cruel (or otherwise 
libidinally invested) event, from intense sexual activity to physical torture, is that, when, 
afterwards, we return to our ‘normal’ reality, we cannot conceive of both domains as 
belonging to the same reality. The reimmersion in ‘ordinary’ reality renders the traumatic 
memory of the horror somewhat hallucinatory, derealising it. This is what Lacan is aiming at
in his distinction between reality and the Real: we cannot ever acquire a complete, all-
encompassing, sense of reality—some part of it must be affected by the ‘loss of reality’, 
deprived of the character of ‘true reality’, and this fictionalised element is precisely the 
traumatic Real.160
Precisely this logic of the Real of the drive as incompatible with “reality” can be perceived in 
Žižek’s depiction of the act via fictional heroes/heroines. The act, as a traumatic intrusion into 
ordinary reality, is grasped through that reality in the form of fiction; it is thus that its irreducibility 
to that reality is felt and experienced. In a certain sense, the truth of the Žižekian act could not be 
159 Johnston, Žižek’s Ontology, 59.
160 Slavoj Žižek, The Fright of Real Tears: Kieślowski and the Future (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), 
66. Italics in the original.
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conveyed otherwise. In The Fright of Real Tears, when discussing the decision of Krysztof 
Kieślowski, the Polish filmmaker, to abandon documentaries for feature films, Žižek claims that it 
is only through the distance guaranteed by fiction, the awareness that what is at stake is a false 
image (e.g., an actress playing her role), that one can express or feel the trauma of the Real—the 
Real of subjective experience.161 Otherwise it is simply rejected as obtrusive and simply too horrid. 
The only possible representation of the Real and also of the agency of the drive requires the 
suspension or distancing of the symbolic network through fiction. Thus, we have arrived at the 
explanation of Žižek’s peculiar turn to fiction when elaborating on the act. The Real that is crucial 
to Žižek’s understanding of the act can thus only be transmitted by the fictionality of the (literary) 
example.
VII
When discussing Žižek’s failure to be prescriptive, Jodi Dean suggests that Žižek occupies the 
position of an analyst who frustrates the perception of himself as “the subject supposed to know” 
and intentionally upsets the demand to tell us what to do. Like the analyst, Žižek merely creates the 
occasion so that we can figure it out for ourselves. The criticism of Žižek for his lack of concrete 
political vision is, according to Dean, more suggestive of the critics’ unwillingness to tackle the 
problem themselves.162 Indeed, in the documentary film Žižek!, Žižek appears to be mindful about 
the transferential relationship he happens to be in with regard to his audience. He takes into account 
the fact that many look up to him as to “the bright intellectual” with all the answers. He confirms 
Dean’s hypothesis when he explicitly speaks of trying to place himself in the analyst’s position and 
to purposely disappoint the demands others address to him in order to force his interrogators to face 
the very problem of their demand.163 Elsewhere he insists that philosophers in general, when 
161 See Žižek, The Parallax View, 30.
162 See Jodi Dean, Žižek’s Politics (New York: Routledge, 2006), xix–xx.
163 See Žižek in Astra Taylor, dir., Žižek! (Zeitgeist Films, 2005).
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expected to intervene in the public space, should act toward their audience in a manner not unlike 
that of analysts towards their patients.164
Levi Bryant takes Jodi Dean’s point even further when he suggests that we should treat 
Žižek’s texts primarily as psychoanalytic interventions. When trying to understand Žižek’s political 
program, rather than what Žižek says, we ought to consider what he does. Žižek’s theses, like the 
Lacanian psychoanalyst’s interpretations, regardless of whether they are accurate or not, themselves
reconfigure the framework of the situations into which they intervene.165 This approach is also 
validated to an extent by Žižek himself when he claims that the task of philosophy is, above all, to 
change the basic concepts of the debate.166
Bryant’s and Dean’s approach to Žižek’s politics is thus legitimate. Yet it is one which risks 
disclaiming the clearly discernible intention on Žižek’s part to articulate a prescriptive model of 
political behavior. As the case of Bartleby implies, Žižek does attempt to propose practical solutions
and answers and is apparently interested in having us converted to his vision of what should be 
done at the moment, hardly a classically conceived psychoanalytic interest. In agreement with 
Matthew Sharpe, Žižek’s confusing prescriptions are much more a matter of the gap between his 
transcendental philosophy and everyday politics than a question of Žižek’s intentional efforts to 
frustrate his readers’ demands. However, this is not to diminish the interventional or 
psychoanalytical aspects of Žižek’s texts as described above; rather, one simply should not ignore 
the fact that in the light of his own thesis, presented at the beginning of this essay, Žižek’s project is 
a fiasco. His theory fails at the prescriptive level. One ought not to reject him for that reason (as 
Ernesto Laclau or Simon Critchley do167) and thus remain blind to the more indirect effect of 
Žižek’s work, but all the same one should not disavow the failure. 
164 Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek, Philosophy in the Present, ed. Peter Engelmann, trans. Peter Thomas and Alberto 
Toscano (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), 50.
165 See Levi R. Bryant, “Symptomal Knots and Evental Ruptures: Žižek, Badiou, and Discerning the Indiscernible,” 
International Journal of Žižek Studies 1, no. 2 (2007): http://zizekstudies.org/index.php/ijzs/article/view/30/89.
166 See Badiou and Žižek, Philosophy in the Present, 51.
167 See Ernesto Laclau, On Populist Reason (London: Verso, 2005), 237; Simon Critchley, “Foreword: Why Žižek 
Must Be Defended,” in The Truth of Žižek, ed. Paul Bowman and Richard Stamp (London: Continuum, 2007), xiv.
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Literary characters, then, reflect both aspects: they are the loci of the conflict between 
Žižek’s philosophy and Žižek’s politics but their function can also be described in terms of the 
performative and interventional nature of his theory. For, besides being exemplary if impossible 
agents, fictional characters represent a way in which it is possible to decisively intervene in the 
reader’s world. 
VIII
As Bryant reminds us, Žižek’s principal method, as announced by the latter in the foreword to The 
Parallax View, is that of short-circuiting levels that are usually kept apart; for instance, a reading of 
a hegemonic subject matter through the lenses of a marginal or excluded element (e.g., reading 
Lacan through popular culture, or Heidegger through pornography, etc.). By combining what is 
considered mutually incompatible, Bryant argues, Žižek dissolves fixed libidinal attachments. As a 
consequence, possibilities not previously discernible in the configuration emerge and must be 
reacted to by other elements.
Precisely such “impossible” short-circuiting is what is at stake in Žižek’s employment of 
fictional agents. As we have said, everyday political reality and the theory of the act as exemplified 
by fiction remain incompatible. However, the strategic confrontation of mutually untranslatable 
perspectives is precisely what defines the Žižekian parallax gap, a juxtaposition of two incompatible
sides of a phenomenon which “can be grasped only in a kind of parallax view, constantly shifting 
perspective between two points between which no synthesis and mediation is possible.”168 
Therefore, the importance of the juxtaposition of social reality with its recognized models of 
political agency, on the one hand, and fictional characters, on the other, lie not only in the reader’s 
changed view of forms of political agency but the transformed status of agency as such: acting itself
becomes something different. This shift of the subjective position, as well as the status of agency, 
emerge as a consequence of oscillating between recognized forms of agency and the act with its 
fictional “impossible” examples.
168 Žižek, The Parallax View, 4.
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Looking at political reality through fiction distances readers from that reality, and contests 
the naturalness of its implicit dogmas. The point is to launch an annihilatory attack on contemporary
cynicism and a loss of faith in grand political causes as against the heroic background of ancient 
and modern literary texts and films. In addition to that, Žižek’s admiration for the radical deeds of 
the heroes and heroines indirectly invites us to grasp their greatness negatively, through the 
recognition of our own limitations (i.e., our own cynicism, our own strategic compromises, etc.). As
Žižek writes about film, its ultimate achievement as a cultural form
is not to recreate reality within the narrative fiction, to seduce us into (mis)taking a fiction 
for reality, but, on the contrary, to make us discern the fictional aspect of reality itself, to 
experience reality itself as a fiction.169
By looking awry at social reality through fiction—e.g., through Bartleby’s gesture of non-
preference or via Antigone’s insistence—we might experience our own “reality” as contingent, and 
its accepted ways as arbitrary. What is at stake, in other words, is “traversing the fantasy” which 
sustains our social organization as the only legitimate one, and necessary.
In his recent volume Living in the End Times Žižek introduces a slightly different version of 
the thesis from the one I cited at the beginning of this essay. When discussing the overall strategy of
the book, he draws an analogy between Lacan’s performative concept of interpretation 
“Interpretation is not tested by a truth that would decide by yes or no, it unleashes truth as such. It is
only true inasmuch as it is truly followed” and Marx’s Thesis XI: “Philosophers have hitherto only 
interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it.”170 Both Lacanian psychoanalysis 
and Marxist theory exemplify the “dialectical unity of theory and practice” insofar as the value of 
theory lies in the transformative effects it produces in its recipients. Here what is important is 
apparently not so much a coherent articulation of a viable political project, but rather the very 
interaction between a basic theoretical thesis and its audience. The ultimate goal becomes an 
intervention that is effective to such an extent that it manages to interfere in the unconscious of the 
169 Žižek, The Fright of Real Tears, 77.
170 Quoted in Žižek, Living in the End Times (London: Verso, 2010), xiii.
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individual and, by extension, even the transindividual, which itself jump-kicks social 
transformation. If otherwise, we are left with nothing but a fetishistic split—“I know very well . . . 
but nevertheless”—illustrated by Žižek’s frequently repeated joke about the ignorance of 
chickens.171 In such a case, however, it is in the actual dialogue between the reader and the theory 
that the stakes lie—the reason for the most sophisticated strategic-rhetorical approach, the important
part of which is the fictional characters. For, according to Žižek, truly great art confronts us with the
fundamental fantasies of both our personal and social realities, inviting us to traverse them. It seems
no coincidence that Žižek attributes to fiction a psychoanalytical power precisely when he writes 
that “fiction intrudes into and hurts dreams themselves, secret fantasies that form the unavowed 
kernel of our lives.”172
It might be possible to relate the peculiar role of the fictional characters to Žižek’s repeated 
suggestions related to the emancipatory power of art,173 exemplified in his writing almost 
exclusively by opera. Art, it seems, entertains precisely the power to speak to the very negative 
restlessness hidden in human beings; the drive as the excessive yearning for what radically differs 
from whatever is, which therefore cannot be assigned any content, and of which Simone Weil 
writes:
And what is this good? I have no idea— . . . It is that whose name alone, if I attach my 
thought to it, gives me the certainty that the things of this world are not goods.174
Towards the end of The Fragile Absolute Žižek describes a scene from the movie The Shawshank 
Redemption (dir. Frank Darabont, 1994), where a convict talks about the emancipatory effect of 
Mozart’s opera on the prisoners. As Žižek describes it,
171 “For decades, a classic joke has been circulating among Lacanians to exemplify the key role of the Other’s 
knowledge: a man who believes himself to be a grain of seed is taken to a mental institution where the doctors do 
their best to convince him that he is not a grain of seed but a man; however, when he is cured (convinced that he is 
not a grain of seed but a man) and allowed to leave the hospital, he immediately comes back, trembling and very 
scared—there is a chicken outside the door, and he is afraid [it] will eat him. ‘My dear fellow,’ says the doctor, ‘you
know very well that you are not a grain of seed but a man.’ ‘Of course I know,’ replies the patient, ‘but does the 
chicken?’” Žižek, The Parallax View, 251.
172 Žižek, The Fright of Real Tears, 77.
173 See, for example, Žižek, The Fright of Real Tears, 272, or Slavoj Žižek, The Fragile Absolute; or, Why Is the 
Christian Legacy Worth Fighting For? (London: Verso, 2000), 159–60.
174 Simone Weil, First and Last Notebooks, trans. Richard Rees (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), 316, quoted 
in Žižek, The Parallax View, 80.
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In hearing this aria from Figaro, the prisoners have seen a ghost—neither the resuscitated 
obscene ghost of the past, nor the spectral ghost of the capitalist present, but the brief 
apparition of a future utopian Otherness to which every authentic revolutionary stance 
should cling.175
At work are the sites of Utopian Otherness, where the abyss of freedom at the core of human being 
finds its articulation. And it is this negative restlessness that Žižek is trying to bring alive in his 
audience through his appropriation of Antigone, Sygne, or Bartleby.
IX
As we have seen, the literary example in Žižek’s philosophy offers a fruitful perspective in which it 
is possible to assess the political project proposed by the Slovenian theorist. When examined from 
such a viewpoint, Žižek’s project is split between the prescriptive level on the one hand, and the 
experiential and performative dimension on the other. Due to the unavoidable conflict between the 
conscious and unconscious dimensions of the act, as a model of ethical and political agency it ends 
up being confusing and incomprehensible. Once the act is presented as an event that takes place 
irrespective of our conscious decision, as a goal to actively strive for, it becomes problematic. In 
particular, if one wishes to pursue Žižek’s Bartlebyesque politics, there is always the risk that one 
unconsciously, perversely enjoys one’s passivity despite the conscious determination to act 
radically. 
At first sight, Žižek’s use of literary examples as a political intervention seems more 
successful considering the influence of Žižek in the public sphere, and the amount of paper that 
leading political theorists have dedicated to discussing Žižek’s concept of the act. Given the 
confusing nature of the model of ethical and political agency Žižek proposes, however, his recourse 
to fiction that in itself is supposed to bring about its emancipatory effect appears doubtful as well. It
may as well be accused of offering his readers “aesthetic contemplation of a radical ethical stance” 
that merely substitutes for and legitimizes one’s quite unheroic and conformist daily life. In the end,
175 Žižek, The Fragile Absolute, 159–60.
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Žižek can provide no guarantee that what he offers is no more than an instance of false resistance, 
which he otherwise so fervently opposes. 
We should, in any case, register the tension between the prescriptive level and the 
experiential and performative element of the literary example in Žižek’s philosophy as its peculiar, 
and perhaps defining, characteristic. The particular dilemma between aesthetics and politics will 
reemerge and characterize both Agamben’s and Deleuze’s treatment of literature as manifested in 
their readings of “Bartleby”. 
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4. Agamben’s Literary Paradigm
I
In the introduction of one of her essays, Nina Power has noticed that the discussion of social 
resistance in political theory has recently turned to solitary literary figures who are “reduced to 
their ability to merely resist or to refuse in the last resort.”176 The model thinker of this anti-
heroic tendency is the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben who frequently employs literary 
examples to hint at the proper ethical-political behavior. Agamben's politics, like the politics of 
other notables such as Toni Negri, Gilles Deleuze, or Slavoj Žižek, is a politics conceived “as the
practice of a philosophical principle and philosophy as the completion of politics.”177 Literary 
examples serve to bridge the two disciplines and introduce an unexpected political model based 
on a reinterpretation of ontological problems. The following text examines Agamben's use of 
literary examples to articulate the meaning of ethical and political life. Why and how does the 
Italian philosopher use literature as exemplary of authentic ethics and politics? What does 
literature and politics gain and lose by his philosophical treatment?
II
In his book The Literary Agamben, William Watkin points out that almost a third of Giorgio 
Agamben's oeuvre centres on questions of art and literature and argues that these are intimately 
interrelated with his metaphysical and political concerns. According to Watkin, without an 
understanding of Agamben's approach to literature, one cannot truly grasp his philosophico-
political project.178 One of the reasons is that the central theses of his works dealing with 
political and metaphysical issues usually rest on a close reading of or allusions to literary texts. 
176 Nina Power, „Potentiality or Capacity? - Agamben's Missing Subjects,“ Theory & Event, no. 1 (2010), accessed
December 14, 2016, https://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v013/13.1-.power.html.
177 Katja Diefenbach, “Im/potential Politics. Political Ontologies in Negri, Agamben and Deleuze,” trans. Emiliano
Battista, in Becoming-major, Becoming-minor, ed. Vanessa Brito and Emiliano Battista (Maastricht: Jan van 
Eyck Academie, 2011), 211.
178 William Watkin, The Literary Agamben. The Adventure in Logopoiesis (New York: Continuum, 2010), 2-4.
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 Watkin argues that literature plays a decisive role in Agamben's attempt to overcome the 
deadlocks of metaphysics and contemporary nihilism.179 Agamben is interested in literature 
because it provides a unique access to an experience of language that defines and founds thought
and being as such, having, therefore, fundamental (political) repercussions. By language, 
however, Agamben means something very peculiar and specific. Influenced by the philosophy of
Walter Benjamin and the theories of the French linguist Émile Benveniste, Agamben 
understands languages in its capability to mediate a message, in its communicability as such. 
This is an ontologically prior limit experience of the presence of language that does not have any
specific content, does not mediate things through meanings but communicates itself only. What 
founds our existence in language is a fundamental experience of the hollow linguistic exteriority,
our potentiality to use language.
Agamben claims that the understanding of language by modern philosophy is 
problematic for the latter presupposes the former and fails to find a way to let language speak for
itself – it always forces it to speak about something. Literature, on the other hand, offers an 
experience of the pure mediating capability of language and preserves the authentic relationship 
towards it, a relationship that has been forgotten by philosophy and politics. While philosophy 
thinks language but cannot possess it, literature (poetry in particular) experiences and enjoys 
language but cannot think it. Both therefore suffer from nihilism and negativism. The solution – 
the working through this ancient scission - according to Agamben and Watkin, rests somewhere 
in between literature and philosophy. It does not belong to either nor does it lie in some ideal 
unity. It is rather located in a space in between, in a strained harmony, stilled dialectics – 
logopoiesis.180 
Watkin first introduces logopoiesis by means of Agamben's figures-gestures which 
provide us with the space of positively charged silence precisely in between philosophy and 
literature. Such gestures do not say anything but reveal the being-in-language of humans, their 
179 Watkin, The Literary Agamben, 174.
180 Watkin, The Literary Agamben, 47, 133.
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capacity to communicate.181 An example of such a gestic space is a tablet belonging to the 
philosopher Damascius. The old sage is trying to think how it is possible to articulate the 
beginning of thought until he understands that his ample treatise can be completed only when he 
stops writing altogether, and so he breaks his tablet.182 The enigmatic behavior of Melville's 
Bartleby who refuses to control and copy legal documents and who responds to most objections 
and orders “that he would prefer not to” is another case in point. 
According to Watkin, however, these figures simply exemplify Agamben's crucial 
concerns, they thus constitute merely the weakest form of logopoiesis.183 For Watkin is more 
interested in how in Agamben's texts post metaphysical thought follows the tautological, 
circular, recursive-projective rhythm of poetry. The seeds of such logopoiesis are undoubtedly 
discernible in Agamben's way of thinking and writing – a paradoxical prose that tends not to 
explain itself. When one examines Agamben's persistent use of individual literary works in his 
texts, one finds it is either illustrative or paradigmatic. In the subsequent “more political” books 
such as The Coming Community, literary paradigms appear when an alternative politics/ethics is 
at stake. Literary protagonists – precisely the anti-heroes of Kafka's, Melville's or Walser's texts 
are introduced as paradigmatic of Agamben's ethical life, life that resists or evades the 
apparatuses of power. It is to them I would like to turn my attention. 
III
The reason why Agamben chooses these indeterminate figures becomes clearer once we 
understand that man, for Agamben, is a being without content, whose principal feature is the 
possibility of being (and speaking). For Agamben ethics and politics are only possible since 
“there is no essence, no historical or spiritual vocation, no biological destiny that humans must 
enact or realize.”184 It is precisely against the backdrop of humankind's essential vacancy that 
181 Watkin, The Literary Agamben, 60.
182 Watkin, The Literary Agamben, 61-62.
183 Watkin, The Literary Agamben, 124.
184 Giorgio Agamben, The Coming Community, trans. Michael Hardt (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1993), 42.
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ethics must be theorized and any notion of community must be discussed. It might seem now 
that the shapeless modernist figures merely illustrate Agamben's fundamental ideas on human 
existence, but it will become clear that their function in Agamben's oeuvre is far more complex 
precisely because paradigmatic.
The notion of a paradigm represents a crucial feature of Agamben's methodology that the 
Italian philosopher self-consciously elaborates in his texts. A paradigm is a singular phenomenon
that stands for a class of other phenomena and simultaneously establishes the recognizability of 
this class. By exposing its own singular character, its own intelligibility it creates the context or 
makes perceptible for the first time that which it exemplifies.185 In this way, however, its 
singularity is also deactivated and what qualifies it for its belonging to the class in the first place 
is suspended.186 As a result, it both belongs and does not belong to this class, it retains its 
singularity, albeit in a suspended state.
There is no general principle that preexists concrete cases or is something that results 
from a consideration of a number of phenomena. In other words, a paradigmatic relation is 
irreducible to either inductive or deductive logic. Moreover, Agamben notes that the exhibition 
of the paradigm “constitute[s] a rule, which as such cannot be applied or stated.”187 There is no 
formula: one is left with nothing but the paradigmatic intelligibility of a singularity that must be 
inhabited in order to understand the context to which it gives rise. A paradigm can be compared 
to a lens through which we perceive phenomena in a certain way. In a discussion following his 
lecture “What is a Paradigm?” at the European Graduate School in 2002, Agamben asserts that it
“depends on the ability of the author to find and create a good paradigm.”188 One can therefore 
assume it requires a certain amount of creative talent and that paradigmatic method is truly a 
poietic method. Agamben's most important paradigms such as the concentration camp or the 
185 Giorgio Agamben, The Signature of All Things, trans. Luca D'Isanto and Kevin Attell (New York: Zone Books, 
2009), 18.
186 Agamben, The Signature of All Things, 31.
187 Agamben, The Signature of All Things, 21.
188 Giorgio Agamben, “Gesture, or the Structure of Art,” European Graduate School, Saas-Fee, Switzerland, 18 
Aug, 2011, accessed December 14, 2016, http://www.egs.edu/faculty/giorgio-agamben/videos/gesture-or-the-
structure-of-art/. 
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figure of homo sacer are rather extreme and provoke strong reactions. Apparently, a “good” 
paradigm is one that allows us to perceive our situation in a radically new way, as Leland de la 
Durantaye suggests, so that a spark is “lit in our present.”189
If translated into the literary realm, this paradigmatic method appears to offer an 
interesting approach to literature. Literary paradigms would then be literary works or aspects of 
literary works that are used to render knowable (recognizable) a set of problems or phenomena 
in the world by exposing their literary specificity while, importantly, preserving this specificity –
if in a suspended state. Literary paradigms can never be said to be merely illustrative of 
philosophical theses, as they themselves give rise to the context that we are thus enabled to see. 
They are not illustrative but productive.
At first sight, it seems that to speak in paradigms means to speak ethically, for one does 
not impose pre-existing rules or prescriptions on phenomena. Yet, when considering more 
closely the legitimacy of the paradigmatic method, the nature of the suspended yet preserved 
singularity of the phenomenon on which it relies, appears fragile, ambivalent and open to doubts.
At stake is the very status of the phenomena to be taken up by the paradigmatic relation (in our 
case a literary text). As de la Durantaye writes: 
The fundamental question here, and the one on which the coherence of Agamben's 
method depends, is that of the relation of the paradigm as “real particular case,” or 
singularity, to what it is set apart to exemplify.190
At stake is whether such a paradigmatic use in any way diminishes the phenomenon in 
question or not. Let us consider the extreme case of the concentration camp paradigm for which, 
not surprisingly, Agamben has been severely criticized.191 Does it or does it not depreciate the 
189 Leland de la Durantaye, Giorgio Agamben: A Critical Introduction (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), 
245.
190 de la Durantaye, Giorgio Agamben: A Critical Introduction, 219.
191 Jay Bernstein, for instance, criticizes Agamben for losing sight of the complex of institutions, practices and 
people through which human being were transformed into Muselmänner: the gas chambers, the guards, the 
huts, the watchtowers, i.e., the whole apparatus of violence of the Reich itself: “At no point does [Agamben’s] 
account veer off from the space of impossible sight to the wider terrain: from the victim to the executioners, to 
the nature of the camps, to the ethical dispositions of those set upon reducing the human to the inhuman. Just 
the inhuman itself fills Agamben’s gaze and hence ours.” Jay Bernstein, “Bare Life, Bearing Witness:Auschwitz
and the Pornography of Horror,” parallax, vol. 10, no. 1 (2004): 7. For other instances of criticism of 
Agamben’s disregard for historical particularities of the concentration camp see Ichiro Takayoshi, “Can 
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horror and tragedy of the holocaust – the particular fates of individual people? Is it ethical, after 
all, that such a catastrophe should be used to represent an entirely different context – such as our 
present political situation? To defend himself against such criticism, Agamben claims that the 
paradigmatic relation is conditioned on the phenomena’s embeddedness in a particular historical 
context, and that one cannot thus separate exemplarity from the phenomenon’s singularity:
The figures of the homo sacer and the camp serve as examples inasmuch as they are 
concrete historical phenomena. I do not reduce or cancel this historical aspect - on the 
contrary, I try first to contextualize them. And only then do I try to see them as paradigms
through which to understand our present situation.192
The legitimacy of the paradigm then depends on whether we believe that enough respect is paid 
to the uniqueness of the phenomena in question by the philosopher. It depends on whether the 
suspension of its singularity does not simply mean that this very singularity is eclipsed by its 
representative function. In the latter case, important distinctions may become blurred and 
concrete examples sublated into a philosophical argument that passes over the phenomenon’s 
specificities. This tension lies at the very heart of Agamben’s oeuvre and method. As de La 
Durantaye asserts:
Agamben sees the Nazi concentration camps as unique historical phenomena, and he 
treats them as representative ones. He uses paradigms heuristically - for how much they 
allow him to understand of the past, and for how starkly they throw the present situation 
into relief. The reader of Homo Sacer does not, of course, need to accept the legitimacy - 
whether logical or ethical - of ascribing such a double status to unique historical 
situations. It should be recognized, however, that this problem lies at the very center of 
his work.193
Philosophy Explain Nazi Violence? Giorgio Agamben and the Problem of the Historico-philosophical Method,”
Journal of Genocide Research 13 (2011): 47-66; Philipe Mesnard, “The Political Philosophy of Giorgio 
Agamben: A Critical Evaluation,” Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions 5, no. 1 (2004): 139-157.
192 Agamben cited in De la Durantaye, Giorgio Agamben: A Critical Introduction, 223.
193 De la Durantaye, Giorgio Agamben, 226. 
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IV
To understand in more detail in what way literary paradigms function in Agamben's work, let us 
examine his treatment of “Bartleby,” one of the most frequently alluded literary works in 
Agamben's oeuvre. Importantly, “Bartleby” appears in both Agamben's philosophical-aesthetic 
works (e.g., “Bartleby, or On Contingency”, Idea of Prose) and also in his more political works 
(e.g., The Coming Community, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life). In The Coming 
Community and Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, it takes the form of just an 
enigmatic reference along with the indication that the story is paradigmatic of a life that 
successfully resists and escapes apparatuses of power. Only in an essay “Bartleby, or On 
Contingency” does Agamben engage in what we could call a reading of the text. Yet, this simply
means locating Bartleby inside a complex net of references. The literary ones include figures 
created by major modernist writers such as Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s Prince Myshkin , Nikolai 
Gogol’s Akaky Akakievich, Franz Kafka’s courtroom clerks, or Gustave Flaubert’s Bouvard and 
Pécuchet. The recalcitrant scribe, however, also, and more importantly for Agamben, belongs to 
a philosophical constellation precisely as someone who well knows how to write but does not 
translate this ability into an act. It is because potentiality is always also potentiality not to act, 
which is the wager of Agamben's reading of Aristotle's definition of potentiality in Metaphysics. 
The crux of this impotentiality lies not in what one cannot do but what one can not do; it is 
about “being able to not exercise one's own potentiality,”194 what we are able to withdraw from, 
what we can decide not to do (or be). This potentiality not to is precisely what prevents the 
potential from becoming actual195 and what thus guarantees its autonomy from actuality. At the 
same time, potentiality remains preserved in any actualization precisely in the form of the 
suspension of potentiality not to. Potentiality names a subterranean dimension of our existence, 
located in the indifferent space, which manifests itself not in achievements but in privation or 
194  Giorgio Agamben, Nudities, trans. David Kishik and Stefan Pedatella (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2011), 43.
195 Giorgio Agamben, Potentialities, ed. and trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1999), 181.
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resistance. Bartleby, the enigmatic scribe, who “prefers not to” is the ultimate paradigm of this 
potentiality in which it reveals its weak yet subversive power. 
The story functions as a central fragment in a vertiginous bricolage of ancient sources 
and philosophical references from antiquity to modernity that together make up Agamben's 
meditation on potentiality. Agamben circularly explores its crucial role in human creativity, its 
disturbing and threatening autonomy from Reason and Will, its location in the interstitial space 
between Being and Nothing, its retroactive reawakening of forgotten past possibilities. All this is
read into Bartleby's enigmatic non-preference and the confusion of the “reasonable” narrator-
lawyer. 
In Homo Sacer, one of his political works, Agamben comes closest to what we might call
a political prescription precisely by way of “Bartleby.” Pondering upon how to escape sovereign 
power, literature becomes a privileged resource of solutions and clearly triumphs over 
philosophy here represented by Schelling, Nietzsche, or Heidegger. For in an enigmatic sentence
Agamben writes:
But the strongest objection against the principle of sovereignty is contained in Melville's 
Bartleby, the scrivener who, with his "I would prefer not to," resists every possibility of 
deciding between potentiality and the potentiality not to.196
All this is found in an extremely dense chapter titled “Potentiality in Law,” where Agamben 
discusses the relationship between constituting and constituted power. While the former rests 
outside the state as the revolutionary and creative violence that posits law, constituted power is 
identical with the state and the violence that preserves law. The difficulty lies in thinking 
constituting power free from both constituted power and sovereignty that places itself precisely 
at the point of indistinction between the two.197 In a characteristic move, Agamben claims that 
the ambiguity can be only resolved if the discussion moves from the field of political philosophy
to ontology. Only if we grasp potentiality outside of its relationship to actuality precisely as 
196 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1998), 48.
197 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 41.
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potentiality not to, can we conceive the revolutionary, “creative” power independently. Problems
of political theory can be resolved only through reinterpretation of basic ontological questions 
exemplified by literature.
Through paradigmatic use of “Bartleby,” Agamben puts into dialogue three disciplines – 
philosophy, political theory, and literature, nevertheless what it all actually means is not easy to 
figure out. Apparently, Bartleby manages to escape the cunning logic of sovereignty (the 
seemingly unresolvable inter-penetration of constituting and constituted power) simply by 
continuing to stubbornly hold on to his potentiality, i.e., his potentiality not to. Yet the difficulty 
seems to lie in identifying constituting power with Bartleby for the scribe does not posit a new 
law, he is not a preacher of an alternative vision. On the other hand, it is precisely in the absence 
of any authoritative claim or act (his non-preference) that Bartleby seems impossible for the 
lawyer (and the law) to relate to and to cope with. The former never offers a reason for his 
refusal to work and never actually denies the requests made of him, so that the authorities at 
hand are completely bewildered as to how to deal with the scrivener. The scrivener withdraws 
from any clear claim, act, or state, becomes unintelligible and thus leaves power confused. 
Evidently, Bartleby in his stubborn detachment from the demands and expectations of the world 
around him ( in neither affirming nor negating the requests of his employer) manages to cut any 
relation from authority and remains outside and beyond it (like potentiality independent of 
actuality). Power that would pose as the effective challenge to the status quo, therefore, must be 
a weak power that dwells in the abyss of potentiality, which involves suspension of and 
detachment from the actual social milieu. Life which does not act in order to be what it is - life 
as perfect potentiality - is the space of a new ethics and politics.
It is striking, however, that Bartleby ends up being imprisoned in a death-like stupor, 
something to which Agamben seems to give little weight. If we understand Bartleby as the ideal 
of effective resistance to sovereign power, what does the cruel treatment of Bartleby by the 
society that does not know what to do about him imply? A challenge to power is in such a case 
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condemned to (self-) destruction, which leaves little room for sustainable political agency as 
many have already noted.198 
How is one to understand such a paradoxical model of subversive action in the context of
the contemporary political situation? How to comprehend “Bartleby” as a paradigm? Is 
Agamben’s use of “Bartleby” merely an indication of his radicalism and extreme pessimism that 
finds redemption only in intense suffering? Is “Bartleby” only a hyperbole, a provocation that 
cannot be taken to the letter and rather serves to incite debate?199 Does the tale make us 
understand ways of resisting that we would otherwise not consider? 
We should first of all observe that Agamben’s reading of the tale’s ending is far from 
pessimist. In fact, unlike most interpretations, he does not regard Bartleby’s final paralysis in the 
Tombs in tragic light at all. At the very end of his exegesis in “Bartleby, or on Contingency,” he 
writes:
And it is here that the creature is finally at home, saved in being irredeemable. This is 
why in the end, the walled courtyard is not a sad place. There is sky and there is grass. 
And the creature knows perfectly well “where it is.”200
Yet, it is quite difficult to follow Agamben in this reading. It is difficult, if not outright 
impossible, to sense such optimism in the profound negativity which indisputably permeates the 
tale. It requires great effort to see in Bartleby’s final death-life stupor any sign of redemption, or 
even see in it something other political subjects should resemble. 
Some critics argue that this confusion over how to grasp Agamben’s ideas may be the 
result of mistaken attempts to grasp his ontological concepts in a sociological context, to which 
they may not belong. Agamben’s thought, writes Matthew Abbott, 
198 Paul Passavant, for instance, notes the simplicity with which Agamben's sovereign can “decid[e] to kill or 
otherwise incapacitate the recalcitrant Bartleby.” Passavant observes the incongruity between Agamben' s 
description of the architecture of contemporary sovereign power and his plainly inadequate model for political 
action. See Paul Passavant, “The Contradictory State of Giorgio Agamben, “ Political Theory, Vol. 35, No. 2. 
(2007): 159-160.
199 Dominick La Capra, “Approaching limit events: siting Agamben,” in Giorgio Agamben: Sovereignty and Life, 
ed. Matthew Calarco, Steven DeCaroli (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 161.
200 Agamben, Potentialities, 271.
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[is] part of a critical theory that has as its primary target not the ontic political systems 
and material institutions of modern states but rather the (negative) metaphysical ground 
of those systems.201
 According to this logic, to simply apply Agamben’s paradigms to our everyday political praxis is
inappropriate. Figures such as homo sacer, or the concentration camp, cast light on the implicit 
inner logic and dynamics of politics. In a similar vein, “Bartleby” exemplifies no more than 
basic principles of any authentic resistance that should strive to deactivate the power apparatuses
by subtracting itself from their hold. Such a form of opposition is in great contrast to how 
revolutionary politics is commonly understood and, as a consequence, can be said to open up 
other non-intuitive ways of resisting power structures that base themselves not on excessive 
activity and voluntarist revolt, but on withdrawal and immobility. 
What is more, the way in which Agamben’s paradigms are to be understood is suggested 
by his peculiar way of writing, which is, as has already been noted, circular, paradoxical and 
elliptical. It is writing that does not like to explain itself. Agamben's commentary in “Bartleby, 
or On Contingency” does not explicitly discuss problems of political agency and Homo Sacer, in
turn, mentions “Bartleby” in one enigmatic sentence. Agamben does not elaborate on how his 
more philosophical meditations are to be translated into political action. Instead, a figure of 
Bartleby is inserted as a paradigm to be inhabited by readers to think for themselves – through 
the paradigm – about what is to be done. Instead of a prescription or a rule, the readers are to 
imagine the ethical/political agency proper in the light of the (non-)agency of Bartleby. By 
leaving things half-said and inserting the paradigm, Agamben may indirectly invite readers to go
back to the story, which many of his interpreters actually do202 and think together with it what the
Italian philosopher might have on his mind. Neither literature nor philosophy can be expected to 
201 Mathew Abbot, The Figure of This World. Agamben and the Question of Political Ontology (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2014), 4.
202 See Arne De Boever, “Overhearing Bartleby: Agamben, Melville, and Inoperative Power, Parrhesia, no. 1 
(2006): 142-162; Timothy J. Deines, “Bartleby the Scrivener, Immanence and the Resistance of Community” 
Culture Machine, no. 8 (2006), accessed Dec 14, 2016, 
http://www.culturemachine.net/index.php/cm/rt/printerFriendly/39/47; De la Durantaye, Giorgio Agamben, 
164-172; Jessica Whyte, “'I Would Prefer Not To': Giorgio Agamben, Bartleby and the Potentiality of the Law,” 
Law and Critique, no. 20 (2009): 309-324.
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offer straightforward answers to our present dilemmas but they are good to think with, the Italian
philosopher seems to be saying. The value of Agamben’s oeuvre would then lie not so much in 
its elusive political proposals but rather in its transformative potential, i.e., in the engagement of 
its recipients. 
In The Coming Community, however, Agamben insinuates at how Bartleby’s indifference
can be translated into a collective political action. He presents demonstrations at Tiananmen 
Square as an example of political activism that he envisions for the coming politics. Like 
Bartleby, the protestors are “inscrutable.” As Agamben remarks: “What was most striking about 
the demonstrations of the Chinese May was the relative absence of determinate contents in their 
demands.”203 The demonstrators at Tiananmen Square refused to assume any common identity or
representation, any particular goal – something, Agamben claims, “the State cannot come to 
terms with.”204 If the protesters had demanded anything in particular, the government could have 
found a way to defend itself and deny them. In this way, the group of protesters at Tiananmen 
Square were simply removing themselves from the “machinery” of the Chinese government. The
Italian philosopher thus himself refers to very concrete political situation and particular 
opposition that he praises, hardly a sign of Agamben’s lack of interest in “material political 
institutions of modern states” to allude to Abbott’s argument. 
Troublingly, the peaceful protests at Tiananmen Square ended in bloodshed. And in the 
face of such violent crackdown, it is hard to keep any optimist perspective, as was the case with 
Bartleby. That the tragic ending plagues both the literary text and the historical case study is in 
any respect indisputably symptomatic, and necessarily presents a problem for anyone seriously 
interested in Agamben’s politics. Authentic resistance inevitably ends in violence, which is 
affirmed by Agamben himself when he write at the end of his meditation on Tiananmen Square:
Wherever these singularities peacefully demonstrate their being in common there will be 
a Tiananmen, and, sooner or later, the tanks will appear.205
203 Agamben, The Coming Community, 84.




Agamben’s essay “Bartleby, or on Contingency” can be considered an homage to Gilles Deleuze
as it paraphrases the title of the latter’s famous essay on the scrivener - “Bartleby; or the 
Formula.” Originally, it was even published along with the Italian translation of Deleuze’s piece. 
The text itself deals with Deleuze’s work only tangentially but it seems to affirm an alliance 
between the two thinkers precisely when Agamben acknowledges and further elaborates on the 
French philosopher’s notion of the formula as radically indifferent.206 (After all, as we shall see, 
both philosophers see in Bartleby’s passive being the promise of a new universality, a new kind 
of community.) The chapter in Homo Sacer that follows Agamben’s discussion of potentiality in 
relation to sovereign power (and his allusion to Bartleby) is similarly centered around a literary 
work - Kafka's famous parable “Before the Law.” Again, Agamben's commentary on the parable 
constitutes the argumentative core of the chapter. This time, however, his reference to the parable
openly challenges the famous exegesis of “Before the Law” by Jacques Derrida and thereby the 
way the French thinker understands the nature of law.207 Derrida’s reading treats the parable as a 
story of failure: the countryman fails before the law  – his entrance into the law is endlessly 
deferred. In Agamben’s much more joyous reading, the countryman triumphs over it. The 
literary text is used strategically in that by understanding “Bartleby” or “Before the Law” in an 
unexpected, original way the philosopher marks the distinctiveness of his position. The literary 
text then becomes a background against which different theories intersect and where their 
conflicts, explicit or implicit correspondences reveal themselves. 
It is in this chapter where it becomes clear that in Agamben’s interdisciplinary endeavor 
which involves philosophy, political theory and literature the final word belongs to theology. As 
was the case of Melville, in Homo Sacer Agamben does not engage in what we might call a 
reading of the literary text. Rather, he alludes to “Before the Law” as “exemplary abbreviation 
206 Agamben, Potentialities, 255.
207 Jacques Derrida, “Before the Law,” trans. Avital Ronell and Christine Roulston, in Acts of Literature, ed. Derek 
Attridge (London: Routledge, 1992), 181-221. 
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of the structure of the sovereign ban”208 and places the legend in the midst of a series of 
references to Kant, Benjamin, Scholem and deconstruction. For the philosopher, the parable 
illuminates the nihilism of our day, in which law and tradition suffer the crisis of their legitimacy
and have become hollow and without significance; they no longer apply.209 The boundaries 
between legal and illegal, between what is acceptable and what is not have become indistinct so 
that, as in Kafka's narratives, the smallest and most banal gesture can lead to severe 
consequences.210 Like the law in the state of exception, the open door of the law in the parable, at
least in Agamben's reading, asks nothing and imposes nothing except its own suspension and 
these
messianic aporias of the man from the country express exactly the difficulties that our 
age must confront in attempting to master the sovereign ban.211 
His attitude then becomes a paradigm of agency in this situation that makes possible to “move 
beyond contemporary nihilism that defines the situation of legal exception and abandonment.”212
As in the case of “Bartleby,” Agamben differs from other interpreters of the story in his 
unexpected optimism. He does not understand the parable to be a story of a failure, for him it is 
one of success. Agamben reads into the man of the country the intention, which is, however, 
nowhere indicated in the parable, to have the door shut 
in order to interrupt the Law's being in force. And in the end, the man succeeds in his 
endeavor, since he succeeds in having the door of the Law closed forever (it was, after 
all, open "only for him"), even if he may have risked his life in the process.213
Bartleby's resistance identified in the preceding chapter with potentiality, in front of which the 
law stands helpless, here becomes the obstinate waiting of a messianic figure who thus manages 
to interrupt the working of the law.214
208 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 49.
209 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 51.
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211 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 56.
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Agamben's commentary of Kafka's tale cannot be understood without grasping Agamben's 
meditations on Pauline messianism with relation to law in The Time That Remains. For it is there
we find the following:
Messianism appears as a struggle, within the law, whereby the element of the pact and 
constituent power leans toward setting itself against and emancipating itself from the 
element of the entolē, the norm in the strict sense.215 
In other words, messianism is a means by which its revolutionary (potential) elements are 
separated from the normative and prescriptive (actual, legal) elements. The former is related to 
(and set against) normative law by rendering the latter inoperative, inactive, and inexecutable 
from within.216 This means that potentiality of law is not realized (does not pass into actuality) 
for it remains confronted with its own potentiality not to be which is exemplified by the 
messianic figure (Bartleby, the man from the country). This is the meaning of messianic 
fulfillment: 
Only to the extent that the Messiah renders the nomos inoperative, that he makes the 
nomos no-longer-at-work and thus restores it to the state of potentiality, only in this way 
may he represent its telos as both end and fulfillment. The law can be brought to 
fulfillment only if it is first restored to the inoperativity of power.217 
Yet, how does it then differ from the state of exception in which law is suspended in an 
analogous manner? Agamben, following Benjamin, differentiates between the virtual and real 
states of exception. In juridico-political terms, both are identical, the only difference lies in that 
in messianism there is no authority to proclaim the state of exception; there is only the messiah 
who subverts the power of such an authority.218 While in the virtual state of exception it is only 
the empty form of authority that is operative, the real state of exception names a situation in 
which this empty form itself is abolished, in which the fulfillment of the law coincides with its 
215 Giorgio Agamben, The Time That Remains. A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans, trans. Patricia Dailey 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 118-119.
216 Agamben, The Time That Remains, 97.
217 Agamben, The Time That Remains, 98.
218 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 57-8.
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transgression without any authority as a guarantee. Life that remains involved with its 
potentiality not to itself becomes the law, the paradigms of which are Bartleby and the man from 
the country.
Ethical life can therefore be understood as an exemplary life of a human being that must 
not be translated into an applicable norm. The messianic law, as Agamben writes in The Time 
That Remains, is not a set of normative prescriptions, but “it is written with the breath of God on
hearts of the flesh”219 as the life of a community. In his discussion of the paradigm, Agamben 
alludes to the ancient regula of monastic orders. Before taking the form of a written document, it
was materialized in the founder's way of life “envisaged as forma vitae – that is, as an example 
to be followed.”220 The law is materialized in a living community formed by a paradigm where 
“the life of each monk tends at the limit to become paradigmatic – that is, to constitute itself as 
forma vitae,”221 i.e., ethical life understood not as a fact but as a possibility. Ethical life can be 
only communicated and taught ethically – through paradigms, exemplary lives – in Agamben's 
case – the literary characters from modernist novels (or pre-modernist tales).
VI
Agamben reads Bartleby as an angelic, messianic figure and his radical withdrawal as 
kerygmatic. Yet, Bartleby, as we know, is rather reluctant to run errands and, importantly, 
“prefers not to” go to the post office to deliver the message.222 Agamben's forceful replanting of 
“Bartleby the Scrivener” and “Before the Law” into the context of philosophy might be a sign of
a philosophical approach to texts that Jean-Jacques Lecercle calls “strong reading” characteristic 
for its passionate violence. To define it he quotes Deleuze: “I saw myself as taking an author 
from behind and giving him a child that would be his own offspring, yet monstrous.”223 The 
219 Agamben, The Time That Remains, 122. 
220 Agamben, The Signature of All Things, 21.
221 Agamben, The Signature of All Things, 22.
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philosopher rapes the text in order to give birth to something that the original author would react 
to with horror. This sense of productive violence casts the light on what lurks behind Agamben's 
paradigmatic treatment of literature. He himself describes his approach to other writers' texts in 
less expressive but similar terms:
 whenever we interpret and develop the text of an author [..], there comes a moment 
when we are aware of our inability to proceed any further without contravening the most 
elementary rules of hermeneutics. This means that the development of the text in 
question has reached a point of undecidability where it becomes impossible to distinguish
between the author and the interpreter. Although this is a particularly happy moment for 
the interpreter, he knows that it is now time to abandon the text that he is analyzing and 
to proceed on his own.224 
This point can be perhaps also understood to indicate the space of the paradigm, a moment when
phenomena (historical, literary, scientific, philosophical) start to function as examples/paradigms
in a philosophy to give rise to a new set of problems and questions. 
After all, philosophy, for Agamben, is an act of elaborating a potentiality of a text (what 
he calls the text's Entwicklungsfähigkeit), whatever has remained unsaid or implicit therein. And 
while this takes place often beyond the intentions that make themselves felt in the original text, it
must be recognized that Agamben's approach to his own texts is no different. He very much likes
to leave things unsaid, half-said and merely hinted at, inviting readers to explore and further 
develop his condensed ideas. The notion of paradigm is a part of this strategy, as they allow 
Agamben to insinuate and hint at rather then explain, state or claim. As they are paradigmatic of 
what “cannot be applied or stated”, they are to be explored, developed by readers.
Strong philosophical reading of literature, according to Lecercle, is often provocative as 
it goes against the critical doxa (as in the case of Agamben's reading of Kafka's parable or 
“Bartleby”), it's productive, generates problems and is rather an intervention than an 
224 Giorgo Agamben, What is an Apparatus?, trans. David Kishik and Stefan Pedatella (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2009), 13. 
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interpretation.225 Indeed, the point of using a literary text as a paradigm is to decisively intervene 
in the way we see our contemporary situation, to shift our perspective in terms of agency that is 
required, to move readers into a sphere of different perception. 
The question for such reading is not whether it is faithful enough to the complexities and 
ambiguities of the literary text. In the light of its seductive mastery and its dazzling 
provocativeness, objections to selective reading may as well appear petty and narrow-minded. At
the same time, it can be hardly denied that the philosopher’s reading strategies, his emphasis on 
particular motives and omission of others definitely reveal something important about the 
theoretical project. It is relevant here to note the resistance of literature to the tasks assigned to it 
by philosophy. In case of the two literary paradigms of political agency we have presented here, 
it is undoubtedly the self-destructiveness of the agents that Agamben does not address. The 
disturbing passivity of Bartleby and the man from the country draws a more vivid picture of 
inoperative politics. On the other hand, their suicidal tendencies and tragic fate do not 
correspond to Agamben’s optimistic vision. They seem to pay dearly for what he understands as 
their success, their messianic vocation – rendering law inoperative. One cannot help oneself but 
ask: does not Agamben present us with a model of political behavior that is from the outset 
suicidal, i.e., resigned to failure? Is it not then a failed paradigm, one which is so extreme that it 
is prevented from giving rise to or casting the light on a larger body of practices?226 
It turns out that literary paradigms form a space where one is faced with questions about 
the status of philosophy, its autonomy, what is legitimate to expect from it and what is not. 
Should philosophy be expected to satisfy requirements of political praxis, answer clearly the 
questions asked by emancipatory movements, be in direct contact with the demands of political 
praxis? Given that paradigms do not let themselves be translated into an applicable rule, would it
still be paradigmatic (i.e., ethical) and not preachy and moralizing? Or should philosophy remain
autonomous, present us with condensed and perplexing gestures rather than prescriptions, let us 
225 Lecercle, Badiou and Deleuze Read Literature, 61.
226 A similar argument is presented by Sergei Prozorov. See Sergei Prozorov, Agamben and Politics. A Critical 
Introduction (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2014), 53.
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think for ourselves? Should it evade the demands for answer to the political dilemmas of the 
present and invite us to rethink our habitual ways of thinking about political agency in 
unexpected ways?
VII
At this point it is quite clear that there is a violence implicit in the use of a paradigm, its dark 
side. Wolfgang Schirmacher points it out in the discussion following Agamben's lecture at the 
European Graduate School.227 The act of taking something out of its context, suspending its 
usual functioning, suggests a violence committed on the phenomenon. The uneasiness hidden in 
Agamben's concept of the paradigm in relation to his actual use of literature is manifested by his 
paradigmatic use of Wallace Steven's poem “Description Without Place” in the conclusion of his
lecture and his later puzzling denial of doing so in the discussion. Schirmacher challenged him 
precisely on that basis, accused him precisely of what Lecercle would say is “strong reading”. In 
using the poem as a paradigm, Agamben is appropriating it for his own theoretical goals: “You 
exploited it,” says the German philosopher, “took it out of context and made it a piece of you. 
Wallace Stevens will turn over in his grave, I’m sure.” Paradigmatic display of a singularity is 
always simultaneously its suspension; in fact Agamben always emphasizes that “it is never 
possible to separate its exemplarity from its singularity.”228 Yet, the production of paradigms 
involves, as Shirmacher notes, an authoritative act of suspending singularity and inserting the 
poem into a philosophical sphere with its distinctive set of concerns. 
In the face of such a serious objection, Agamben, on the contrary, maintains in The 
Coming Community that paradigmatic relation is essential for thinking ethics. He suggests that it 
is in the nature of the paradigm that we should look for “exemplars of the coming 
community.”229 Examples are introduced as a solution to the question of community that is not 
definable in terms of a shared identity or the subordination of individuals under a universal 
227 Agamben, “Gesture, or the Structure of Art.”
228 Agamben, Signature of All Things, 31.
229 Agamben, The Coming Community, 11.
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concept. Being neither in the set they define nor outside of it, examples designate an indifferent, 
empty place identified by Agamben with the very linguistic potentiality of human beings that for
him constitutes a fundamental condition for any collective co-existence. The community of 
singularities without identity is located in the interstitial and indifferent room of the example as 
the universally shared “linguistic life” subtracted from any identity or belonging to particular 
classes. 
 This life is purely linguistic life. […] Exemplary being is purely linguistic being. 
Exemplary is not defined by any property, except by being-called.230
Does not, however, the universality of linguistic potentiality necessarily presuppose the same 
violence like the one hidden at the core of the paradigmatic relation? Is not the force involved in 
the suspension of the singularity of a phenomenon necessary for it to become examplary, in 
principle, the same force involved in the suspension of the particular characteristics of human 
beings necessary to reach the universal potential to communicate?
It is also in the Coming Community that we learn that it is “tricksters or fakes, assistants 
or 'toons, [who] are exemplars of the coming community.”231 In his essay “Assistants”, Agamben
identifies these figures with Kafka's and Walser's characters as well as the “helpers” from 
children’s fairy tales. These literary “outsiders” are put in connection with the messianic 
assistants who in profane time “already possess the characteristic of messianic time: they already
belong to the last day.”232 Even though they seem to be quite lost and useless in this world, these 
unspectacular figures are the translators of the language of God which they render “into the 
language of men.”233 They proclaim as well as assist in bringing about the world redeemed: “On 
every side and all around us, the assistants are busy preparing the Kingdom.”234 In our dark times
the literary paradigms populating Agamben's imagined coming community announce their 
230 Agamben, The Coming Community, 10.
231 Agamben, The Coming Community, 10-11.
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exemplary emptiness, on the basis of which happiness and redemption can be found within 
human collectiveness. 
The nonchalance with which paradigms suspend their particular characteristics must be 
associated with the force of Agamben's universalism that suspends particularities from human 
beings in order to reach the in-significant exteriority of linguistic capacity. His paradigmatic 
treatment of literature is related to his universalism; both render his project to be didactic in that 
both strategies are motivated by his desire to guide human beings toward ethical, happy life. 
This desire is ambivalent in that it is both taking into account and violating the specificity of 
beings, an ambiguity that lies at the very core of Agamben's “system”. 
Agamben calls his literary paradigms assistants and thus locates them at once in a 
subordinate position and in the most superior, once we consider what these characters actually 
express. This paradoxical position well depicts the contradictory nature of the paradigmatic use 
of literature. For literature is granted a narrow, yet privileged realm. It suffers under the violence 
of thought to be elevated and delegated with its most fundamental tasks. Literature is assigned 
with the mission to cast light on philosophy’s crucial yet highly abstract concepts that lie at the 
very heart of the theoretical edifice, to hint at the practical import of these concepts, to implicate 
readers in thinking itself, and to affect them in a way that would profoundly transform them.
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5. Bartleby as the Self-Portrait of a Philosopher: The Case of Gilles Deleuze
I
Time and again Deleuze asserted he was no interpreter of texts. He was not interested in hidden 
messages or intentions, he was interested in what (new, productive) use a text could be put to. The 
French philosopher considered the texts he worked on as machines engaged in the world, not 
holders of content one has to reveal by effortful interpretation. He claimed to be interested in what 
texts did, not what they meant.235 He was concerned not whether what this or that author wrote was 
correct or wrong but whether there are ideas he could use, transform, in order to work through 
problems he himself was intrigued by. There is a sense of self-centeredness, indifference toward 
anything else but the philosopher's own philosophic concerns. The resulting readings are thus 
simultaneously extremely detailed and but also strangely disinterested towards the texts and authors
in question.236 
In “Letter to a Harsh Critic” this indifference becomes an indifference to anything but one's 
own pleasure when Deleuze speaks about his use of other authors' texts in explicitly sexual (and 
violent) terms.237 The author is raped by Deleuze (“taken from behind”) and, as a consequence, a 
“monstrous” child is born, unwanted by the author in the first place. There is no sense of 
conversation or dialogue (and Deleuze did not believe in philosophical debates anyway238), but a 
sort of a strange non-encounter, a monologue, what Colin Davis even calls “private ejaculation.”239 
It is on the basis of Deleuze's (and Alain Badiou's) treatment of literature (of Kafka, Beckett,
Dickens, Proust) that Jean-Jacques Lecercle advocates for the violence of philosophical “strong 
235 Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 7-8.
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reading” which goes against the grain of received doxa. Lecercle's argument for the legitimacy of 
the “strong reading” is the following: 
[B]oth philosophers really engage with literature and its texts, which gives their readings an 
urgency and depth that are characteristics of a strong reading, at the cost of rediscovering in 
literature the concepts independently elaborated by their philosophies, but with the benefit of
new insights into the literary texts thus ‘exploited’: the strong reading submits the literary 
text to the rule of the concept, but it does not kill it, it makes it alive – it reaches parts of the 
text that ordinary literary criticism cannot reach.240 
In other words, philosophical approach is truly passionate about art it becomes involved with, 
however, as it is based on the primacy of the concept over the complexity of the literary text, it is 
likely to result in literature being a mere illustration of a philosophical argument. Literature, 
however, argues Lecercle, can gain new insights from that approach, insights that would otherwise 
be not available. Yet, where is the novelty if what we gain in the first place is the already familiar 
philosophical concept? Are we not just seduced by the philosopher's passion and masterful style? 
The accusation of philosophical didacticism is one of the main arguments raised against 
Deleuze's philosophy by Jacques Rancière. In Cinema Fables, for instance, Rancière criticizes 
Deleuze's treatment of film for developing a modernist meta-language that is, at times, simply 
applied onto the narrative and plot of the films in question.241 Rancière accuses Deleuze of 
privileging philosophy over art and of developing a philosophical framework that determines, and 
therefore, nullifies art works in advance. 
In the following chapter, I will turn to Deleuze's reading of “Bartleby” in his Essays Clinical
and Critical,242 to test the arguments against and in defense of Deleuze's treatment of art. I will also 
240 Lecercle, Badiou and Deleuze Read Literature, 202.
241 See the discussion of Deleuze's treatment of Hitchcock's Vertigo in Jacques Rancière, Film Fables, trans. Emiliano 
Battista (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 2006), 115.
242 Gilles Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, trans. Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco (New York: Verso, 
1998), 68-91.
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look at the political ramifications of such treatment. Deleuze's commentary of the short story should
form the crux of the whole thesis not only because in comparison to Žižek and Agamben, his is 
more “literary”, attentive to detail and taking into account the context of the whole Melville's 
oeuvre. One cannot, therefore, just simply accuse him of scandalously reductive treatment like the 
other two theorists. More importantly, his reading has proved highly influential. Both Žižek's and 
Agamben's understanding of “Bartleby” are highly indebted to the Deleuzian version of the tale. 
This is also the case of others such as Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Jacques Rancière, Alain 
Badiou, all of whom refer to aspects of texts highlighted by Deleuze, debating how they should be 
understood. In fact, one can say that Deleuze's treatment of “Bartleby” has proved to be a seed out 
of which a whole new life of Bartleby Industry has sprung, including not only representatives of 
post-Marxist theory and their numerous commentators but also artistic and literary treatments 
discussed in the second chapter. 
II
Deleuze's study of “Bartleby” is to be considered as an extension of the argument concerned with 
the so-called minor literature which Deleuze and Guattari worked on in Kafka: Toward a Minor 
Literature. In fact, all of the major features of minor literature are evoked in the “Bartleby” 
commentary; both writers are considered as a part of a single tradition and Melville's thoughts on 
American literature are said to anticipate Kafka's claims on literature.243 
Minor literature is firstly defined by deteritorrialized language244 which Deleuze variously 
describes as a stuttering, a becoming-other and a becoming-foreign of language: “opening up a kind
of foreign language” within familiar language. Specifically, minor literature involves the liberation 
of a-signifying sounds to break apart conventional content and reassemble it in new ways. Secondly,
243 Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, 89.
244 Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, trans. Dana Poland ( Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2003), 16.
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minor literature is political by its very nature. The history and the political context are never a given
for the majority language has a tendency to exclude, repress, or subordinate such aspects of 
minorities. Therefore, in a minor literature “[t]he individual concern becomes all the more 
necessary, indispensible, magnified, because a whole other story is vibrating within it.”245 Thirdly, 
“everything takes on a collective value:”246 the individual enunciation has the value of a collective 
one. There is less emphasis on individual authors and talents. As it is alienated from the existing 
societies, its marginal status grants it the ability “to express another possible community,” “another 
consciousness and sensibility.”247 This possibility makes the artist a transformer whose action is less
concerned with representation or critique of reality than with its unorthodox use, an experiment 
invoking a virtual community or a people yet to come. This theoretical framework applied 
originally to Kafka’s œuvre is the philosophical background of Deleuze’s reading of Melville's 
“Bartleby.” 
The tale, writes Deleuze, starts as an English novel – there is the law office with the two 
clerks who complement each other and the patriarchal lawyer. The arrival of Bartleby with his 
enigmatic speech and behavior, however, disempowers the father figure, disorganizes everything 
and inaugurates the asymmetrical, patchwork-like pattern characteristic of a minor literature: 
Everything began à l’anglaise but continues à l’américaine following an irressistible line of 
flight (...)The American patchwork becomes the law of Melville’s oeuvre, devoid of a center,
of an upside down or right side up.248
Importantly, this literary intervention corresponds to the American revolutionary project: both 
follow the same logic. Minor literature is not an individual affair, as we have already mentioned, 
“but a collective one, the affair of a people, or rather, of all peoples. Melville's bachelor, Bartleby, 
245 Deleuze, Guattari, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, 17.
246 Ibid.
247 Ibid.
248 Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, 77.
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like Kafka's, must 'find the place where he can take his walks'...America.”249 America itself must 
become “a patchwork”, “a society of brothers, a federation of men and goods, a community of 
anarchist individuals, inspired by Jefferson, by Thoreau, by Melville.”250 Bartleby's enigmatic and 
bizarre behavior stands not for a symptom but a radical cure of the (American) society:
Even in his catatonic or anorexic state, Bartleby is not the patient, but the doctor of a sick 
America, the Medicine-Man, the new Christ or the brother to us all.251 
Bartleby foreshadows a new community, a new type of ethics. 
Deleuze's whole reading and its political conclusions circulate around the “formula” that 
itself appears in the essay's title. It is the formula, after all, that “carves out a kind of foreign 
language within language”252 and completely disrupts all the social bonds.253 Bartleby's utterance “I 
would prefer not to,” according to Deleuze, “leaves what it rejects undetermined, confers upon it 
character of a radical, a kind of limit-function.”254 Bartleby's phrase is an example of a-
grammaticality- through its abrupt ending it subverts the ordinary rules of language without 
becoming entirely nonsensical. It occupies a borderland between sense and nonsense in language, 
the outside of language. Simultaneously, its abrupt ending makes it radically indeterminate. It 
cancels what it seems to refer to (what it prefers not to) as well as everything else it might “prefer” 
disrupting all reference and thereby also social rules that are conditioned by language:255
The formula I PREFER NOT TO excludes all alternatives, and devours what it claims to 
preserve no less than it distances itself from everything else. It implies that Bartleby stop 
copying, that is, that he stop reproducing words; it hollows out a zone of indetermination 
that renders words indistinguishable, that creates a vacuum within language. But it also 
249 Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, 85.
250 Ibid.
251 Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, 90.
252 Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, 71.
253 Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, 70.
254 Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, 68.
255 Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, 71.
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stymies the speech acts that a boss uses to command, that a kind friend uses to ask questions 
or a man of faith to make promises. If Bartleby had refused, he could still be seen as a rebel 
or insurrectionary, and as such would still have a social role. But the formula stymies all 
speech acts, and at the same time, it makes Bartleby a pure outsider [exclu] to whom no 
social position can be attributed.256 
Like Agamben’s Bartleby, and about this the two authors seem to agree, Deleuze’s scrivener does 
not resist by what he says or does in particular, which would make him intelligible and thus 
controllable, but by hollowing out a zone of indiscernibility (to paraphrase Deleuze). Bartleby's 
utterance proves to be a successful strategy how not to submit to the conditions of one's situation by
throwing these very conditions into chaos. The narrator's conduct is based on a logic of 
presuppositions and assumptions that functions as a general grid underlying human social 
interaction. Bartleby, writes Deleuze, operates on an entirely different logic of preference that 
undermines presuppositions of language and the corresponding social norms. It is a kind of 
madness, one, however, that is internally consistent and one that in fact characterizes the 
emancipatory potential of American literature. 
Is this not the schizophrenic vocation of American literature: to make the English language, 
by means of driftings, deviations, de-taxes or sur-taxes (as opposed to the standard syntax), 
slip in this manner? To introduce a bit of psychosis into English neurosis? To invent a new 
universality?257
As has been already mentioned, This reading of Bartleby's utterance as a politically 
subversive a-grammatical formula has been highly influential. However, any close-reading of the 
story will prove it reductive of the complexity of all what Bartleby has to say. It is true that the 
256 Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, 73.
257 Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, 72.
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variety of Bartleby's responses is something that Deleuze is aware of. He notes that Bartleby's 
utterance has 
several variants. Sometimes it abandons the conditional and becomes more curt. I PREFER 
NOT TO. Sometimes, as in its final occurrences, it seems to lose its mystery by being 
completed by an infinitive, and coupled with to: “I prefer to give no answer,” I would prefer 
not to be a little reasonable,” “I would prefer not take a clerkship,” “I would prefer to be 
doing something else”...But even in these cases we sense the muted presence of the strange 
form that continues to haunt Bartleby's language.258
For Deleuze all these different versions belong to the same category. Can every Bartleby's 
statement, however, be classified as belonging to the formula? Can the phrases: “At present I prefer 
to give no answer”259 or “I would prefer to be left alone”260 still be considered as mere examples of 
the radically indeterminate “non-preference”? Anders M. Gullestad has noted that the formula 
increasingly tends towards positive preference instead of non-preference.261 Moreover, Bartleby 
sometimes utters statements that have nothing to do with “preference” as such. For instance, in a 
reply to a narrator who doesn't grasp why Bartleby has finally given up copying, Bartleby 
indifferently asks: “Do you not see the reason for yourself?”262 Or, when the narrator visits Bartleby 
in prison, the latter tells him: “I know you and I want nothing to say to you.”263 Does the formula 
encompass all these statements? The formula starts to mutate in the second part of the story and 
loses its “I would prefer not to” character something Deleuze does not take into account when 
describing its modus operandi. As a result, he makes the formula “into a more of a monolith than it 
258 Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, 69.
259 Herman Melville, “Bartleby the Scrivener, A Story of Wall Street,” Melville’s Short Novels. Authoritative Texts, 
Contexts, Criticism, ed. Dan McCall (New York & London: Norton & Company, 2002), 20.
260 Melville, “Bartleby the Scrivener,”21.
261 Anders M. Gullestad, “Loving the Alien: Bartleby and the Power of Non-Preference,” Exploring Textual Action, ed.
Lars Sætre, Patrizia Lombardo, Anders M. Gullestad (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 2010), 395-423.
262 Melville, “Bartleby the Scrivener,” 21.
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is – more a tree than a rhizome, to put it in Deleuzian terms.”264 It is worth noticing that 
theoreticians, such as Žižek or Agamben, follow this Deleuzian reading. Naturally, they do not share
his interests in minor literature – but they base their understandings of the tale on the monolithic 
formula which, like Deleuze, they read as a subversive strategy.
III
These objections may as well leave Deleuze and Deleuzians unconcerned, as the philosopher 
refused to consider his commentaries on other authors as “interpretations” to which one might raise 
objections.265 It is not always clear, however, why Deleuze's readings couldn't be regarded as 
interpretations even if they are not after the “dirty secret” of the text and why it would not be 
legitimate to raise objections against such readings. In fact, when Deleuze writes, 
I saw myself as taking an author from behind and giving him a child that would be his own 
offspring, yet monstrous[,]
he does not forget to add an important condition:
It was really important for it to be his own child, because the author had to actually say all I 
had him saying.266
We can, therefore, deduce that despite appearances Deleuze does believe in something like a 
validity of an interpretation. Invalid interpretation is one stating that which is, in fact, absent from 
the text.267 In order to make his claim about literature's power to deterritorialize (major) language 
(and the related political ramifications), Deleuze overlooks the twists and turns of Bartleby's 
utterances. One wonders whether the formula, i.e., what the French philosopher “had him saying,” 
264 Gullestad, “Loving the Alien,” 418.
265 Gilles Deleuze, Claire Parnet, Dialogues II, trans. Hugh Tomlinson, Barbara Habberjam (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2007) 3; Davis, Critical Excess, 59-60.
266 Deleuze, Negotiations, 6.
267 Others have noted that schizoanalysis is not merely pragmatic and constructive but can be evaluated as distorted or 
valid. See Jesse S. Cohn, Anarchism and the Crisis of Representation: Hermeneutics, Aesthetics, Politics 
(Selinsgrove: Susquehanna University Press, 2006), 33-34.
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is what Melville “actually said,” and whether it is not a case of such distorted interpretation, 
something that might question the validity of Deleuze's analysis on his own terms and the 
conclusions drawn. 
Moreover, if Deleuze was most interested in creating concepts (and not “the truth” of the 
text) and the violence of his reading was aimed at the production of the new, we could as well 
ponder upon whether the notions emerging from his reading of “Bartleby” are really new or 
important modifications of already existing concepts. Has Deleuze not merely repeated all the key 
notions elaborated on already in the other, earlier works of his, namely Kafka: Toward a Minor 
Literature? If all his major ideas such as “a-grammaticality”, deterritorialization of language, 
literature as a means of invoking a people to come have been already dealt with elsewhere, is then 
his creative violence legitimate? Can he not be accused of merely applying a ready-made 
framework?268 
In short, there seems to be a discrepancy between what Deleuze actually practices and what 
he says he practices. Rancière's criticism in “Deleuze, Bartleby, and the Literary Formula,”269 his 
commentary on Deleuze's essay on “Bartleby” circulates precisely around this argument. Here, 
Rancière problematizes Deleuze’s philosophical approach to literature in a similar way like he did 
with regard to his work on cinema, i.e. - by showing the contradictions between his conception of 
literature and the way he actually analyzes literary works. Even though the latter campaigned 
against interpretation, representation and other classical aesthetic doctrines, in practice, he failed to 
escape these categories. His treatment of literary characters is a case in point. When Deleuze writes 
in his essay “Literature and Life” that literature 
268 For the problem of repetition in Deleuze's treatment of literature see Davis, Critical Excess, 59.
269 Jacques Rancière, The Flesh of Words: The Politics of Writing, trans. Charlotte Mandell (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2004), 146.
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discovers beneath apparent persons the power of an impersonal” and that “literary characters
are perfectly individuated (…) but all their individual traits elevate them to a vision that 
carries them off in an indefinite,270 
according to Rancière, this makes Bartleby, Ahab, Pierre, Billy Budd and other favored characters 
not so much the carriers of radical immanence but rather its symbols. Literature's power of 
indeterminacy, its formulas, “metamorphoses”, its pushing the limits of language is demonstrated 
by “the givens of the story that function as a symbol of the power unique to literature.”271 This quite 
often involves, Rancière notes, the analysis of an exemplary character as the driving force of the 
story, which itself is a return to the terms of classic Aristotelean poetics. Thus, what Deleuze's 
reading ultimately favors is not the undifferentiated emergence of affects, haecceities, and 
becomings, but an exemplary character who emblematizes becoming. On the one hand, he focuses 
on a radical materiality of Bartleby's utterance, on the other, he simultaneously makes it an allegory 
of radicalness of art (or philosophy). 
“Bartleby” is the exemplary character and the exemplary literary text entrusted with the role 
of mediating between philosophy and politics, something we have encountered already in both 
Žižek and Agamben. As Rancière writes: 
It is indeed a mission (…), a mission of clearing the way between ontology and politics, 
which Deleuze entrusts to literature in general and to Bartleby in particular.272
This assignment entrusted to literature, one of enacting political relevancy of a specific ontology, 
comes with crucial problems pertaining to the character of Deleuzian thought as such. 
IV
270 Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, 3.
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One is reminded of the importance of literary characters for Deleuze when in What is Philosophy? 
Deleuze and Guattari evoke Melville's theory of the so-called “Originals” amidst characterizing 
philosophical concepts. 
Melville said that great novelistic characters must be Originals, Unique. The same is true of 
conceptual personae. They must be remarkable, even if they are antipathetic; a concept must 
be interesting, even if it is repulsive.273
In short, the so-called “conceptual personae,” the subjects of philosophical enunciations which act 
as key conditions for creating concepts (i.e., multiplicities composed of distinct, heterogeneous and 
inseparable elements274) should be like Melville's literary characters. At the same time, however, 
literary characters as elements populating art seem to belong to a different category – that of 
affective figures, beings of sensations, sensible inhabitants of a work of art that are involved with 
percepts (“non-human landscapes of nature”275) and affects (“non-human becomings of man”276). On
the one hand, Deleuze and Guattari strictly differentiate between art and philosophy with each 
happening on a different plane and making use of very different elements, on the other hand, they 
often render them indistinct. For instance, they claim that it is possible to think on one plane 
through the elements of the other and, more importantly, affective figures can become conceptual 
persona. 
This does not mean that the two entities do not often pass into each other in a becoming that 
sweeps them both up in an intensity which co-determines them. With Kierkegaard, the 
theatrical and musical figure of Don Juan becomes a conceptual persona, and the Zarathustra
persona is already a great musical and theatrical figures. The plane of composition of art and
273 Deleuze, Guattari, What is Philosophy?, 83.
274 Deleuze, Guattari, What is Philosophy?, 19.
275 Deleuze, Guattari, What is Philosophy?, 169.
276 Ibid.
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the plane of immanence of philosophy can slip into each other to the degree that parts of one
may be occupied by entities of the other.277 
In fact, it seems that an aesthetic figure can be at the same time a conceptual figure (like 
Zarathustra) and thus be that through which both concepts and affects/percepts are forged. Through 
affect and percept such fictional figures touch upon something singular yet impersonal and 
simultaneously they serve to create, modify new concepts by exemplifying it. Deleuze's preference 
of Bartleby (and other Melville's literary characters) seems to be based precisely on this 
chameleonic nature he seems to acquire in his work. 
In spite of this suggested porousness, the difference between the two disciplines is still 
retained. The transport of “figures” from art's plane of composition to philosophy's plane of 
immanence necessarily involves “a radical transformation,” as Ian Buchanan suggests,278 for it is 
only in philosophy that such characters make available fully formed concepts. What does such 
“radical transformation” consist in? It seems that in this passage from art to philosophy words are 
disarranged and relegated and what does not suit or what even stands in the way of the 
philosophical interest is simply left out.279
In his very last text, “Immanence: A Life,” Deleuze uses literary examples such as a scene 
from Dickens's novel Our Mutual Friend to exemplify his “first philosophy” - the transcendental 
field, an a-subjective, pre-reflexive, impersonal form of consciousness, a plane of immanence, he 
calls “a life”. At stake is the character of Riderhood, a villain whom otherwise everybody despise, 
who is fighting for his life. 
Between his life and his death, there is a moment that is only that of a life playing with 
death. The life of the individual gives way to an impersonal and yet singular life that 
277 Deleuze, Guattari, What is Philosophy?, 66.
278 Ian Buchanan, “Deleuze and his sources. Response to Anneleen Masschelein,” Modernism and Theory: A Critical 
Debate, ed. Stephen Ross (London: Routledge, 2009), 41.
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releases a pure event freed from the accidents of internal and external life, that is, from 
subjectivity and objectivity of what happens: a “Homo tantum” with whom everyone 
empathizes and who attains a sort of beatitude. It is a haecceity no longer of individuation 
but of singularization: a life of pure immanence, neutral, beyond good and evil, for it was 
only the subject that incarnated it in the mist of things that made it good or bad. The life of 
such individuality fades away in favor of the singular life immanent to a man who no longer 
has a name, though he can be mistaken for no other. A singular essence, a life….280. 
When Lecercle comments on Deleuze's reading of the novel's chapter, he contrasts it with 
the commentary of Henry James who condemns the work to be the poorest of Dickens's fiction and 
a proof that the latter had no deeper (philosophical) understanding of human life.281 James' reading, 
according to Lecercle, betrays his moralism and his conservative understanding of the novel. It was 
Deleuze's philosophy that allowed him to appreciate Dickens as a master and reveal his greatness 
which precisely lies in its attention to surfaces and singularities. It may be that it is a forcing and 
stifling of literature, Lecercle admits. On the other hand, Deleuze has, quite unexpectedly, 
highlighted a feature of the text ignored by a professional literary critic (i.e., James), in the light of 
which we can understand the whole novel.282 In short, the philosopher brought a fresh understanding
of the work which placed the heretofore overlooked chapter at the center of the whole novel and 
drew attention to neglected aspects of Dickens's talent. 
This seems to be persuasive except for that it does not take into account the many aspects of 
the situation that for Deleuze seem totally unimportant. When Riderhood, a villain whom otherwise 
everybody despises, is fighting for his life, he is taken care of by others with tenderness. When he 
gets better, everyone turns cold again. Deleuze is not concerned about Riderhood himself or his 
particular situation before and after the accident, the fact that it actually stayed the same. Riderhood 
280 Gilles Deleuze, Pure Immanence. Essay on A Life, trans. Anne Boyman (New York: Zero Books, 2001), 29.
281 Lecercle, Badiou and Deleuze Read Literature, 63.
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remained the same outsider, the same villain who despises everybody and whom everybody 
despises. The community formed around him founded on the “impersonal” quickly disintegrated. 
The spark of a life that he becomes for a moment does nothing to transform the structure of 
Riderhood's situation. With regard to changing his position in the society it remained powerless. As 
suggested by Peter Hallward, this is of no importance to Deleuze who is interested in the virtual 
dimension of a life, the “homo tantum” in Riderhood that, however, becomes manifest only when 
the actual person who embodies it “and who is alone capable of actively relating to other 
individuals is literally put out of action.”283 At stake is a power working through, rather than 
belonging to, the individual. Hallward talks about “the paralysis of the subject or actor” and our 
“limitation to pure contemplation or in-action.”284 According to him, Deleuze “abandons the 
decisive subject in favour of our more immediate subjection to the imperatives of creative life or 
thought.”285
Hallward's accusation that Deleuzian philosophy bears little relevance for actual political 
praxis is a complaint echoed by Rancière's commentary on “Bartleby”. His disbelief in Deleuze's 
political usefulness stems mainly from Deleuze's paradoxical image of a “a new society of 
brothers”, with which he closes the story. The Utopian community is pictured as “a wall of loose, 
uncemented stones, where every element has a value in itself but also in relation to others.”286 This 
figure of the wall of stone relates uneasily to Deleuze's emphasis elsewhere on “world in process,” 
“taking flight on the horizon”287 and “breaking through the wall.”288 While Rancière understands this
image to help Deleuze distance his nomadic enterprise from the dominant discourse on “mobility” 
and “flexibility,”289 he is concerned that its paradox alludes to the problematic political task that 
283 Peter Hallward, Out of This World: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Creation (New York: Verso, 2006), 153.
284 Hallward, Out of This World: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Creation, 163.
285 Ibid.
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287 Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, 89.
288 Ibid.
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Deleuze assigns to literature (and in fact to philosophy as well), namely that of “inventing a 
fraternal political people.”290 Rancière is certainly unequivocal in this regard: “Literature opens no 
passage to a Deleuzian politics,”291 he writes. He suspects that the indistinction of Bartleby's 
utterance, his radical non-preference, comes dangerously close to political impotency. He questions 
its potential of disruption. He asks: “How can one make a difference in the political community 
with this indifference?”292 More, he believes that a messianic figure such as Deleuze’s Bartleby 
ought not only to oppose the old law but, simultaneously, institute a new norm, a new justice. And it
is here, that we are faced with contradiction:
Under the mask of Bartleby, Deleuze opens to us the open road of comrades, the great 
drunkenness of joyous multitudes freed from the law of the Father (…) But this road leads 
us to contradiction: the wall of loose stones, the wall of non-passage. We do not go on, from 
the multitudinous incantation of Being, toward any political justice.293
While Deleuze invokes a seductive image of a new type of fraternal liberty, Rancière has serious 
doubts about the ability of Bartleby’s message of non-preference to disrupt the law and institute this
new type of non-hierarchical assembly as a new norm. Again, neither the text itself nor Deleuze’s 
reading of it provides us with satisfactory answers. Like in the case of Riderhood, Bartleby appears 
unable to thwart his tragic fate or, more generally, that of the society and the business, after all, 
continues as usual. Like in the case of Agamben, we might question the messianic function of a 
character who refuses to run any errands – not even that which philosophy would like him to.
V
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With philosophical readings of literature such as the interpretations of “Bartleby” by Žižek, 
Agamben and Deleuze, it is never only the literary text that is in question but a whole complex and 
sophisticated thought system the key concepts of which are exemplified by literature. To deal with 
the particular reading, one must deal with the whole philosophy that frames such commentary. 
Simultaneously, there must be a kind of distrust on the part of the critic in what the theory in 
question claims it is doing with literature. If one falls for the philosophy (philosopher), it is difficult 
to remain critical. With Jean-Jacques Lecercle, for instance, one has a feeling that he is too much of 
an admirer of Deleuze's thought to really question the latter's treatment of literature. But is it 
possible not to get caught up in a transferential relationship with a philosopher whose work, after 
all, one deems worth the while? One could argue that without the transferential relationship, one 
would not be interested in the theory in the first place. In his study of “overreading” by 
philosophers, Colin Davis eloquently characterizes this conflict:
I should confess that in the treatment of overreading there is a conflicted interest on my part:
I want to follow (in order to enjoy) the daring, exhilarating moves taken by the various 
overreaders; at the same time I don’t want to abandon the skepticism towards them which 
characterises me as, and condemns me to be, a more pedestrian critic.294
One reason why it is so difficult to keep the balance is that the philosophers in question are not only
philosophers, they are also writers, artists in their own rights (very much in the tradition of a certain 
continental philosophical lineage from Plato to Søren Kierkegaard, Friedrich Nietzsche, Martin 
Heidegger and others). The form of their philosophy is creative, writerly, one that incorporates 
literary forms. Their writing is, in other words, persuasive, seductive, performative. Their theories, 
so to say, are forms of practice, an intervention. 
294 Davis, Critical Excess, xiv. 
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In Dramatizing the Political: Deleuze and Guattari,295 Robert Porter and Iain MacKenzie 
see this as a positive aspect of Deleuze's philosophy, and more importantly, an aspect which is itself 
political. While it is possible to see Deleuze and Guattari's treatment of art, in the wake of 
Rancière's criticism, as an example of “pedagogical paternalism”, a philosophical didacticism of 
sorts which robs art of its autonomy, this view is insufficient. Porter and MacKenzie speak about 
Deleuze–Guattarian method of dramatization. At stake is “making an event out of thought”, 
dramatizing concepts in aesthetic terms in order for them to pass over into a sensation, to bring 
them to life “in a way that affectively resonates, provokes and stays with those who engage” the 
texts in question.296 Their theory thus allows for participation and experimentation on the part of 
reader. What is the use, they ask, of “fashioning concepts that simply fall flat and dead on the 
ground?”297 Through their “dramatical method,” Deleuze and Guattari thus follow Marx's dictum on
the need for philosophy to change the world. 
The question, however, is why such power ought to legitimize reductive reading, as implied 
by Porter and MacKenzie, and what the relationship between excessive interpretation and the power
of the resulting concepts actually is. For it seems that they are mutually dependent. As we have 
seen, artworks are subordinated to the concepts they are supposed to bring to life. Once it involves 
art works to communicate concepts, the dramatic method does not exist without a violent 
appropriation - the latter is its very condition. The dramatic method is in such a case inseparable 
from violence and should be always thought as such. 
To what kind of ethical or political posture, stance or action are readers invited to take by the
dramatic method? What kind of lesson is carried out by Melville's “Bartleby”? For Deleuze, 
Bartleby embodies the catatonic, zero-point state that points to an absolute renunciation of agency 
295 Robert Porter, Iain MacKenzie, Dramatizing the Political: Deleuze and Guattari, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2011.
296 Porter, MacKenzie, Dramatizing the Political, 141-2.
297 Porter, MacKenzie, Dramatizing the Political, 142.
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(“the nothingness of the will”298), the paralysis of the will that allows for an encounter with a life as 
a virtual power to take place, an encounter one has no conscious control over. This approach seems 
to be indifferent to any kind of pragmatics, any kind of practical political goal or effect, it may not 
change one's circumstances in any decisive way and may very well be ultimately self-destructive. 
On the other hand, political importance may lie precisely of such experience of sensual 
rupture, one that is paralyzing and impossible to act upon.299 The contemplation of the virtual 
involves a profound estrangement, one that is necessary to imagine any authentic alternative, any 
radical unforeseen potentiality that is not only a variant of the status quo.300 Obviously, there is an 
ethical dilemma involved, between the power of the virtual to problematize the possible and the 
present sense of urgency, between the actual community and virtual people to come,301 a tension that
lies at heart of Deleuze's politics.
VI
In our readings of “Bartleby” commentaries by Žižek, Agamben and Deleuze we have repeatedly 
stumbled over the very same problem despite the differences between respective philosophical 
systems. For all three philosophers “Bartleby” as a literary example is a device to translate an 
abstract ontology into political realm based on the belief that radical politics requires a radical 
redefinition of fundamental philosophical questions. For all three thinkers Bartleby becomes a 
peculiar hero who holds the power to problematize the possible inviting readers of theory to see the 
world from an extreme, alienated (Bartlebian) perspective as the only space where authentic 
298 Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, 71.
299 Steven Shaviro, “The 'Wrenching Duality' of Aesthetics: Kant, Deleuze, and the 'Theory of the Sensible,'” 
http://www.shaviro.com/Othertexts/SPEP.pdf, 12.
300 Shaviro, “The 'Wrenching Duality' of Aesthetics,” 13.
301 “The fundamental problem is this: the Deleuzian people, being always a people to come, is indeterminate (it has 
neither territory nor borders nor traditions), it is deterritorialised (and therefore capable of being created by 
thinkers), but can it properly be a ‘political’ locus? Politics has to deal with a people that is other than virtual, 
potential or yet to come.” Philip Mengue, “People and Fabulation”, Deleuze and Politics, ed. Nicholas Thoburn, Ian
Buchanan (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008), 231.
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alternatives to our lives can be imagined. It is a question beyond the scope of this thesis whether the
philosophical violence to the literary text (whereby the exemplification of philosophical concepts 
occurs to the detriment of its complexity) is an index of the forceful nature of thought characteristic 
merely of the authors in question, a certain Postmarxist tradition they represent, or philosophy as 
such and its vexed relationship to literature and art in general. 
The Žižekian position of the psychoanalyst who refuses to answer demands and Agamben's 
paradigmatic speech that leaves things unexplained correspond to the “inscrutability” of Bartleby. 
Something similar can be claimed about the way in which Deleuze repeatedly praised the solitude 
and withdrawal from the world by writers, artists and literary figures as the very condition of their 
true connection with the “people to come.”302 The alienation from the actually existing community 
manifested by writers and artists, by art and philosophy, is like the position of tribal chief who holds
distance from his group as conceptualized by Pierre Clastres and later by Deleuze and Guattari.303 
The chief is an exceptional individual who does not command and whose real strength lies in his 
distance from the group that enables him to study the tribe as a whole. He exists in the margins. It is
only because of the distance that the chief is able “to discern a number of possibilities”, “to fabulate
and summon up the missing people.”304 On the other hand, the distance, as one imagines, makes him
unable to truly participate and take action in the life of a community towards which he remains 
estranged. The inaccessibility and withdrawal of Bartleby corresponds to the inaccessibility and 
withdrawal of the philosopher. In this sense, Bartleby is truly the self-portrait of the philosopher.
It is in this context that one must think of all the assistance literary figures like Bartleby 
provide to philosophy: how they help to keep the very distance the philosopher needs to keep from 
“real” people, i.e., his “tribe”. Bartleby whether as a “paradigm”, “psychoanalytic intervention” or 
302 See, for instance, Deleuze, Guattari, Toward a Minor Literature, 17.
303 Jérémie Valentin, “Gilles Deleuze's Political Posture,” trans. C.V. Boundas, S. Lamble, Deleuze and Philosophy, ed.
C. V. Boundas (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), 195.
304 Valentin, “Gilles Deleuze's Political Posture,” 196.
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“conceptual persona” functions as a means of how to keep the distance intact. It remains an 
impossible example to be grasped and experienced but not to be followed for one cannot in any way
consciously manipulate or control what takes place irrespective of our conscious intervention, the 
impersonal force of “a life”, the death drive or the bare life one always inherently is and which 
Bartleby exemplifies. The key philosophical concepts “Bartleby” comes to represent are 
incompatible with politics in the practical sense, the world of concrete struggles that require 
strategies aimed at particular results. Philosophy needs the literary example to be able to intervene 
in the community while remaining outside of it. And “Bartleby” becomes the embodiment of the 
distance enacting its power as well as its political limits. Literature becomes the place of the 
ambivalent encounter between philosophy and politics. Stripped of its own autonomy, it becomes at 
once the guarantee of philosophy’s political relevance and the guardian of the latter’s autonomy.
115
Conclusion
This thesis has explored the phenomenon of Bartleby as a popular reference in academia, 
contemporary culture and philosophy. In each discipline it has tried to cast the light on the motives 
that drive literary scholars, writers or philosophers to engage with the story. Furthermore, it has 
explored the peculiar manner in which each discipline treats the literary text.
The overwhelming interest in “Bartleby” in academia is explained via the hysterical nature 
of the critical enterprise a priori suspicious of power. The reoccurring patterns of scholarly readings,
which at first sight appear contingent, suggest an unconscious investment and disavowed motives. 
At stake is the identification with the scrivener and hostility towards the lawyer suggesting 
unreflected class antagonism between a humanity professor and a lawyer. “Bartleby” becomes an 
effective tool to unmask the ruling ideology as deficient. It is challenged by a belief system, which 
the critic holds to be more ethical and which Bartleby is made to stand for. The poetical power of 
the story, the “Bartleby effect,” lies in the void at the heart of the story. Bartleby's impenetrability 
invites new and new attempts to assign meaning to what is supposed to drive the protagonist’s 
strange actions. The interpreters become unconsciously implicated in the story, uncannily repeating 
what the narrator does. The Bartlebian critic becomes trapped by the tale, hunted by the void at the 
heart of the story. She is either confronted with her own interpretive violence which cancels out the 
void or evolves endlessly around it. 
“Bartleby” as a central reference in contemporary literature and art is examined in George 
Perec’s Life: A User’s Manual, Enrique Villa Mata’s Bartleby & Co and Etienne Chambaud’s 
Disclaimer. The vacuity of the tale serves as a musical theme inviting variations. The void of the 
original story is being played around both on the level of form and content. In Perec's Life: A User's
Manual Bartlebian narrative unavailability becomes the uncanny silence of the numerous characters
resembling wax figures in a museum. Bartleby's reluctance to express himself is similarly mirrored 
by the protagonists of Vila Matas' Bartleby & Co, writers who decide not to express themselves by 
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means of literature. This applies to the narrator himself and thus problematizes the text's own status;
the work refuses to assume its own authority (of a literary text). Chambaud's Disclaimer seems to 
employ the equivocality of Bartleby's “I would prefer not to” to enhance the work's impotent circle 
of claims and disclaims, its own narcissism. These cultural productions manipulate the story in a 
way that assists the works in their self-crippling strategies, attempts to withdraw from or complicate
the process of their communication with the outside world. They emphasize the poetical and the 
political potential that lies in inaction and withdrawal. 
The subversive potential of Bartleby’s peculiar passivity becomes a central theme in 
contemporary philosophy as well. Slavoj Žižek, Giorgio Agamben and Gilles Deleuze radically 
decontextualize the story and insert it - as a central piece - to complete the jigsaw puzzle of their 
philosophy. The philosopher is primarily not interested in understanding of the story in its 
complicatedness, he rather cares about its practical application. He makes use of it to solve the 
interrelated problems of ontology, ethics and politics. The reading, simultaneously, centers on what 
Deleuze coins as “the formula” - Bartleby’s utterance of “I would prefer not to” and its variations. 
In Žižek’s oeuvre literary examples such as “Bartleby” articulate the ultimate wager of his 
whole theoretical project: a proposal of effective political agency. At the same time, as instances of 
actual praxis that (as Žižek believes) reveal disavowed impasses of theory, they stage his own 
theory’s deadlocks, i.e., his political proposals that are impossible to realize. 
Literary examples in Žižek’s thought exemplify the death drive, the inhuman, monstrous 
subjectivity that never fits in any symbolic configuration and therefore is a space of abysmal 
freedom from which any social reality can be radically questioned and new possibilities perceived. 
In particular, Bartleby’s formula becomes a way in which such theory of the human subject is 
translated into a proposal of concrete politics – the politics of withdrawal. Bartleby’s “I would 
prefer not to,” enacts the radical negativity of subjectivity and is the expression of the unconscious 
drive. Through its reluctance to engage in any way with the social reality, its preference for the 
negative that remains independent of the ruling ideology and the opposition that feeds off it, it 
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reveals the socio-political organization of reality in its contingency. It thus forms a basis for any 
emancipatory politics.
Since it remains unclear how it is possible to connect the pragmatic aspects of such politics 
of withdrawal with its unconscious elements, “Bartleby” becomes the embodiment of Žižek’s 
failure to articulate an effective political project. At stake is the incompatibility between the realm 
of pragmatic politics and the transcendental, the unconscious, the Real; between politics and 
philosophy. On the other hand, this juxtaposition can be understood as “a parallax view”, 
impossible short-circuiting between the two irreconcilable realms which thus allows us to view each
element from a new perspective. Through fiction we can actually experience the transcendental 
condition of our being (experience which would be otherwise unbearable) and at the same time gain
distance from social and political reality, the naturalness of which is thus questioned. As a result, the
use of literary examples is a strategy to bring about more indirect transformative effects of the 
theory. 
Agamben’s frequent recourse to “Bartleby” is related to the great importance he assigns to 
literature as such. Literature, in his view, provides a unique access to an ontologically prior 
experience of language – language in its communicability regardless of its content. While literature 
can mediate such experience, it cannot think it. To have access to and think such experience seems 
only possible in between philosophy and literature – in the space of a literary paradigm, a function 
that “Bartleby” assumes in Agamben’s oeuvre.
Agamben’s reading of “Bartleby” is much more nuanced than Žižek’s, yet, in the end, he is 
also interested mainly in the formula as an example of a key notion of Aristotelian potentiality 
which, when exemplified via Bartleby, emerges as the ultimate model of poetic, ethical and political
practice. At stake is Bartleby’s reluctance to actualize his potential (to write, to respond, to leave), 
his refusal to leave the sphere of impotentiality – i.e. that which prevents potentiality to turn into 
actuality. Affirming the potentiality of existence before and beyond any actualization, he subtracts 
his being from the hold of the apparatuses of power. Authority becomes helpless when confronted 
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with the withdrawal from any intelligible claim, act or state – it is deactivated. Given the death-like 
paralysis and ultimate isolation of Bartleby, however, it remains a question how such a concept of 
potentiality can be mobilized by emancipatory movements and whether such endeavor is not from 
the outset destined to failure. 
The ethics and politics of impotentiality is communicated through (literary) paradigms. 
Paradigm is a singular phenomenon which by exposing its own singularity establishes the 
recognizability of a class it is exemplary of. In order to understand the context to which it gives rise,
it must be inhabited: thought and experienced. A good paradigm is one that allows us to perceive 
our situation in a radically new way. It has the power to move us, disturb us, politicize us. 
Paradigmatic method, however, also involves violence – it involves taking something out of its 
original context in order to fulfill its representative function. Literature as a paradigm in philosophy,
as in the case of “Bartleby”, has its particularities suspended via authoritative philosophical act. It is
the same philosophical force of universalism that strips human life of all particular predicates in 
order to reach generic potentiality.
The most influential philosophical reading of “Bartleby” is certainly that of Gilles Deleuze. 
His study of “Bartleby” is an extension of the argument concerning the so-called “minor literature”. 
The theoretical framework (of deterritorialized language, inherently collective and political nature 
of minor literature, its anticipation of a future community) applied originally to Kafka’s oeuvre is 
the philosophical background of Deleuze’s reading. 
Deleuze reads Bartleby as a revolutionary figure, a messiah announcing a new society of 
anarchist individuals that is horizontally structured. Deleuze’s reading, like that of his colleagues, 
centers around Bartleby’s formula as socially subversive. It cancels what it refers to (what it prefers 
not to) as well as everything else it might prefer thereby disrupting all reference and social rules 
conditioned by language. Deleuze reads Bartleby’s formula as radically indifferent but he does not 
take into account all what Bartleby has to say and by treating his various utterances as a more-or-
less monolithic formula he neglects the character’s complexity. 
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Even though Deleuze denies that he is in fact involved in an interpretation of the text he still 
seems to differentiate between valid and invalid reading of a text. There is a discrepancy between 
what Deleuze practices and what he says he practices. He campaigns against the classical aesthetic 
doctrines but fails to entirely escape these categories. As Jacques Rancière argues, Deleuze’s 
particular focus on literary characters is indicative of his disavowed return to Aristotelian poetics. 
Characters such as “Bartleby” are not so much carriers of radical immanence but rather its symbols.
While Deleuze, on the one hand, strictly differentiates between philosophy (that creates concepts) 
and art (that produces affects), his use of “Bartleby” indicates that the border between the two 
disciplines is far from distinct. Literary characters, sensible inhabitants of a work of art involved 
with percepts and affects, can be, at the same time, conceptual personae – subjects of philosophical 
enunciation. Their entrance into the realm of philosophy, however, is conditioned by a 
transformation: whatever does not suit philosophical interest is simply left out. Deleuze thus 
dramatizes concepts in order to make an event out of thought, to bring it to life and invite readers to 
participate in them, experiment with them. Artworks are employed to communicate concepts; i.e., 
they are subordinated to concepts which they are supposed to bring to life.
As in the thought of Žižek and Agamben, Deleuze assigns to literature a political task: to 
invoke a people to come, to express and invent another possible community. “Bartleby,” in the 
reading of the French philosopher, foreshadows a new brotherhood of men, a new type of ethics. 
However, the indistinction of the character's utterance, his non-preference, comes dangerously close
to political impotency. It is unclear to what extent the radical indifference of Bartleby is able to 
actually disrupt the old order or even institute a new norm, a new justice. In Deleuze’s commentary 
we are faced with an image of a joyous community of comrades freed from hierarchy but we are 
blocked from actually reaching it. For neither the text itself nor Deleuze’s reading of it provides us 
with answers to questions of how this kind of indifference is to bring about such a community. 
“Bartleby,” in its role of the literary example, hides a tension in the heart of all three 
philosophies. While necessary for thought to emerge as politically relevant (appearing at crucial 
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points where politically relevant arguments are being articulated), “Bartleby” emerges as the 
Achilles heel registering contradictions and incongruities in the conceptual framework and 
strategies used undermining the apparent philosopher’s mastery. In Agamben’s oeuvre it marks the 
tension inherent in his paradigmatic method: between the suspension of the example’s staged 
singularity and its proclaimed preservation. Whether we judge Agamben’s thought as ethical or not 
follows from how we evaluate his treatment of (literary) paradigms. Moreover, “Bartleby" 
highlights the problem of how to understand a model of political agency presented in the figure of 
the self-destructive scrivener. We can discern a similar problem in the other two philosophies as 
well. In Žižek’s thought the literary example indicates the ambivalence between literature as a 
model of ethical and political agency to be followed and a cathartic, transformational experience 
with real effects that cannot be predicted in advance. Similarly, in Deleuze’s oeuvre it reveals the 
conflict between the present sense of urgency, the demands of the community the philosopher 
addresses, and the contemplation of the virtual which involves a profound estrangement from that 
community necessary to imagine any authentic alternative, any radical unforeseen potentiality that 
is not only a variant of the status quo. 
The political project that “Bartleby” comes to represent is as if split from within. On the one 
hand it is introduced as a form of politically desirable agency. Yet, when pondering upon aspects of 
the tale not taken sufficiently into consideration, such as Bartleby’s ultimate self-destructiveness 
and loneliness, as we have already mentioned, such model becomes impossible to act upon. 
Furthermore, it remains unclear how that which, according to the philosophers, drives and 
conditions truly authentic ethics and politics (i.e., what lies behind Bartleby’s conduct be it the 
death drive, bare life or radical immanence) is supposed to inspire emancipatory movements as this 
very condition is incompatible with conscious will and judgment. It remains outside of the political 
sphere which requires goal-oriented collective action. 
At the same time, “Bartleby” finds itself located in a sublime space where it is hoped readers
will experience transformation, a change of perspective the effects of which are much more indirect.
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The use of “Bartleby” in philosophy hints at a specific understanding of philosophy as such, one 
that sees itself as an intervention in the world. Such undertaking involves violence: “Bartleby” is let
to exemplify the most crucial theoretical concepts while being subject to radical 
decontextualisation. Theory makes violent use of literature to effectively intervene in the world of its
readers – to force them to think.
The provoking unintelligibility of Žižekian philosopher-psychoanalyst, the implicitness of 
Agamben’s paradigmatic speech and the solitariness of Deleuze’s writer-visionary correspond to 
Bartleby’s similarly vexatious loneliness, inscrutability and withdrawal. As far as the philosopher’s 
ambiguous relationship to the community he addresses is concerned, Bartleby is the mirror in which
the philosopher sees himself reflected. In this sense, the respective readings emerge as the 
philosophers’ self-portraits, sites of an ambivalent encounter between literature, philosophy and 
politics. 
“Bartleby’s” remarkable presence in the culture of the beginning of the 21st century lies in its
becoming of an influential emblem of an ethical, authentic opposition to power for artists, 
philosophers and activists. It has become a trope of ethics and counter-intuitive politics that find 
their strength in withdrawal, inaction, inscrutability which the activists make use of in their politics 
and which are employed as poetical and rhetorical strategies in the discussed cultural productions. 
Via the focus on Bartleby’s outsiderness literary critics emphasize their own sense of 
marginalization and superiority as humanities scholars while contemporary cultural productions 
inspired by the tale, find poetical and ethical power in the refusal of self-assertion. In Bartleby’s 
“I’d prefer not to” political theorists and leftist activists find a literary precedent of their own model 
of authentic ethics and politics. While such strategies seem to be effective poetical and rhetorical 
devices in art or philosophy, their function in the realm of politics is more troublesome. 
The appropriation of the story by artists, activists and philosophers poses questions of 
literature’s autonomy and the social function of a literary text. These modes of reading are 
avowedly non-exegetical in that the point is not to engage in slow-reading that allows one to tease 
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out the multiple meanings of a text. Also, they are non-historical and non-contextual: for the 
intellectuals in question the differences between Melville’s milieu and their own is not of 
importance. What can be after all more apart than a nineteenth-century tale and politics in the 
twenty-first century? 
By foregoing its autonomy, the literary text gains a new relevancy, a new function in another
discipline – of art, political activism or philosophy, which make use of it for their own goals. These 
“non-literary,” pragmatic readings make literary history newly relevant and this new relevancy is 
naturally something every believer in the importance of literature should applaud. In case of 
political activism and philosophy we have discussed, the complexity of the literary text in question -
that which does not fit in the analogy established – remains outside of the picture problematizing it. 
The ghost of the tale’s suspended literariness persists and what remains outside problematizes the 
inside. Literature strikes back as it brings to light debatable aspects of the particular politics put 
forward by philosophy we have discussed, the complexity and uneasiness of co-existence of art and 
philosophy and the realm of politics. The potential as well as difficulty of connecting politics and 
the arts is thus affirmed.
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Summary
Dizertační práce se zabývá popularitou povídky Hermana Melvilla „Písař Bartleby“ 
(1853) na poli literární teorie a kritiky, umění a filozofie. Snaží se uchopit, jakou roli pro 
současné literární teoretiky a kritiky, spisovatele, umělce a filozofy hraje a proč je pro ně 
důležitá. Snaží se popsat rozdíl mezi přístupem literárních vědců a způsobem, jímž s tímto
literárním textem zachází umění, literatura a filozofie.
Povídka „Písař Bartleby“ se v posledních několika desetiletích stala jedním z 
nejoblíbenějších textů americké literatury mezi literárními kritiky a teoretiky. Vzniklo a 
nadále vzniká tolik interpretací, že se začalo hovořit o tzv. „Bartlebyovském průmyslu.“ 
První kapitola se zabývá obecnými vzorci, jež lze v těchto interpretacích rozpoznat. 
Ukazuje se v nich povaha literární kritiky, jež se apriori vymezuje vůči moci. Pro mnoho 
kritiků se „Bartleby“ stal efektivním nástrojem pro odhalení nedostatečnosti vládnoucí 
ideologie. Postoj Bartlebyho, jak jej chápou tato čtení, tuto ideologii zpochybňuje a 
představuje alternativní, etičtější společenský systém či světonázor. Gravitační síla 
povídky je uchopena skrze psychoanalytickou teorii Shoshany Felman. Felman hovoří o 
intenzitě účinku literárního díla jako o „poetickém efektu,“ jež v případě Bartlebyho 
spočívá v prázdnotě nacházející se v srdci textu. Bartleby je postavou, která se o svých 
motivacích nevyjadřuje. Nevíme, kým je, a proč koná tak, jak koná. Je to právě 
Bartlebyho nedostupnost, jež plodí nové a nové interpretace. Interpreti povídky tak 
(nevědomě) opakují chování samotného vypravěče, který se neustále snaží najít nějaké 
vysvětlení Bartlebyho jednání. Bartlebyovský kritik je chycen v pasti povídky, prázdnotou
v jejím středu. Je konfrontován s vlastním interpretačním násilím, pokouší-li se tajemství 
Bartlebyho chování vysvětlit a tím toto tajemství zrušit. Sofistikovanější čtení, která tuto 
prázdnotu ctí, jsou abstraktní a spektrální a hrozí, že se zhroutí v mise en abyme. 
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Druhá kapitola se zabývá „Bartlebym“ jako klíčovou aluzí v literárních a 
uměleckých dílech. V románech Život: návod k použití George Pereca, Bartleby & spol. 
Enriqua Vila Matase a vizuálním díle Popření Etienna Chambauda se prázdnota v srdci 
příběhu podobá hudebnímu tématu, jež je variováno jak na úrovni formy, tak obsahu. V 
Perecově díle se Bartlebyho nedostupnost převtěluje v podivnou mlčenlivost a nehybnost 
obrovského počtu postav, které tak připomínají voskové figuríny v muzeu. V případě 
románu Bartleby & spol. je zrcadlena v paradoxních osudech spisovatelů, kteří se 
rozhodli, že se již nebudou vyjadřovat pomocí literárních děl. To se týká i samotného 
vypravěče, čímž se problematizuje sám dotyčný text, jež odmítá svůj status literárního 
díla. Chambaudova práce Popření se opírá o nejednoznačnost Bartlebyho věty „Já bych 
raději ne,“ aby rozehrála impotentní a narcisistickou hru tvrzení a negace. Zmíněná díla s 
povídkou zacházejí způsobem, který umocňuje jejich vlastní sebe-podvracející strategie, 
pokusy zproblematizovat komunikaci s vnějším světem, nebo ji rovnou znemožnit. 
Zdůrazňují tak poetický a politický potenciál, který tkví v pasivitě, nesrozumitelnosti a 
nedostupnosti. 
Subverzivní síla Bartlebyho pasivity se stává ústředním tématem rovněž v 
současné filozofii. Slavoj Žižek, Giorgio Agamben a Gilles Deleuze vytrhávají povídku z 
jejího literárního kontextu, aby jí jako klíčový díl vložili do skládačky svého vlastního 
filozofického „systému.“ V první řadě je přitom nezajímá povídka ve své významové 
bohatosti, ale její aplikace při řešení vzájemně souvisejících problémů ontologie, etiky a 
politiky. Jejich čtení se soustředí téměř výhradně na Bartlebyho větu „Já bych raději ne,“ 
kterou Deleuze pojmenoval jako Bartlebyho „formuli.“
V díle Slavoje Žižka, , kterým se zabývá třetí kapitola, vyjadřují literární příklady, 
mezi něž patří i „Bartleby,“ smysl celého jeho teoretického projektu – návrh účinného 
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politického jednání. Podle samotného Žižeka příklady konkrétní praxe vždy zároveň 
vyjevují zamlčené slepé uličky teorie, z níž se odvozují, což však platí i v jeho případě. 
Literární příklady v Žižekově myšlení představují pud k smrti, nelidskou a 
monstrózní povahu subjektu, jež se nemůže nikdy zcela začlenit do žádné symbolické 
konfigurace. Jedná se díky tomu zároveň i o prostor propastné svobody, v němž je 
jakákoliv společenská realita radikálně zpochybněna a je možné nahlédnout dříve 
netušené možnosti. 
Bartlebyho formule v podstatě překládá abstraktní teorii lidského subjektu do 
návrhu konkrétní politiky – „politiky ústupu.“ Bartlebyho „Já bych raději ne“ vyjadřuje 
radikální negativitu subjektu, je výrazem nevědomého pudu. Odráží lhostejnost vůči 
společenské realitě, jíž by měl být Bartleby součástí, vyslovuje svou nezávislost na 
vládnoucí ideologii a na ní parazitující opozici. Zobrazuje tak společenskou a politickou 
realitu v její nahodilosti, čímž zakládá jakoukoliv emancipační politiku. 
Zůstává ale nejasné, jak je možné propojit pragmatické, taktické a vědomé aspekty
politiky ústupu s těmi nevědomými. „Bartleby“ ztělesňuje selhání Žižkovy teorie 
zformulovat efektivní politický projekt, jelikož není zřetelné, jak v „nicnedělání“ rozlišit 
nevědomou fetišizaci kvietismu od radikálního aktu. Ukazuje se tu obtížnost sloučit svět 
pragmatické politiky a transcendentální prostor, nevědomí, reálno – jinými slovy politiku 
a filozofii. Na druhé straně lze tuto nekompatibilnost dvou světů chápat v duchu Žižkova 
„parallaxu,“ nemožného spojení dvou neslučitelných sfér, které nám umožňuje vnímat 
každou z nich z nového hlediska. Skrze literární fikci můžeme zažít transcendentální 
podmínky naší existence (zážitek, který by jinak byl neúnosný), vnímat tak naši sociální a
politickou realitu z odstupu a zpochybnit její samozřejmost. V důsledku lze literární 
příklady považovat za strategii, jež má umožnit teorii vyvolat ve svých recipientech 
politické a existenciální uvědomění.
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Agambenovy časté odkazy k „Bartlebymu“ souvisí s obrovskou důležitostí, jež 
přikládá samotné literatuře. Literatura v jeho podání zprostředkovává jedinečný přístup k 
ontologicky prvotní zkušenosti jazyka – jazyka v jeho schopnosti komunikovat, bez 
ohledu na obsah toho, co konkrétně komunikuje. Literatura dokáže takovou zkušenost 
zprostředkovat, ale nemůže ji – na rozdíl od filozofie - myslet. Obojí najednou je možné 
jen v prostoru mezi literaturou a filozofií, prostřednictvím paradigmatu, což je funkce, jíž 
se „Bartleby“ ujímá v Agambenově díle. 
Agambenovo čtení „Bartlebyho“ je sice mnohem sofistikovanější než Žižekovo, 
nakonec ho ale také zajímá především Bartlebyho formule, jíž chápe jako vyjádření 
Aristotelova konceptu potenciality - modelu poetické, etické a politické praxe. Klíčová je 
pro něj neochota písaře aktualizovat svůj potenciál (psát, odpovídat, odejít) a opustit tak 
sféru negativní potenciality, jež brání její aktualizaci. Tím stvrzuje prvenství potenciality 
existence před jakoukoliv její aktualizací. Díky negativní potencialitě zůstává písař z 
dosahu mocenských aparátů. Autorita konfrontována s postojem, který si nic jasného 
nenárokuje, nejedná a nekomunikuje, zůstává bezmocná, je deaktivována. Agamben 
ovšem nebere dostatečně v potaz Bartlebyho osamocenost a jeho tragický konec – smrti 
se podobající absolutní paralýzu. Je otázkou, jak koncept potenciality mohou využít 
emancipační hnutí. Pokud odpor vůči suverénní moci nutně končí destrukcí těch, kteří mu
takto vzdorují, je otázkou, zda není předem předurčen k tragédii a neúspěchu.
Etika a politika potenciality se vyjevuje prostřednictvím (literárních) paradigmat. 
Paradigma je singulární fenomén poukazující na svou singularitu, čímž zakládá 
rozpoznatelnost kategorie, jejímž je příkladem. Abychom pochopili kontext, jenž díky 
němu vzniká, je třeba paradigma myslet, zakoušet – nejde tu o nějaké aplikovatelné 
pravidlo. Dobré paradigma je takové, které nám umožňuje vnímat naši situaci ve zcela 
novém světle. Má moc nás zasáhnout, zneklidnit, zpolitizovat. Paradigmatická metoda v 
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sobě ale obsahuje i určité násilí – dotyčný fenomén vyjímáme z jeho původního kontextu.
Literatura, má-li se stát paradigmatem ve filozofii, je autoritativním filozofickým aktem 
vytržena ze svého kontextu a ochuzena o svou významovou bohatost. V principu se jedná 
o stejnou sílu, jež tkví ve filozofickém universalismu. Filozofie chce poukázat na 
univerzální, generickou potencialitu, a tak nebere v úvahu konkrétní charakteristiky 
jednotlivých lidských životů. 
Nejvlivnější filozofické čtení „Bartlebyho“ ale pochází z pera Gillese Deleuze. 
Jím se zabývá pátá kapitola. Deleuzova studie „Bartlebyho“ se opírá o teze, formulované 
spolu s Félixem Guattari, týkající se takzvané „minoritní literatury.“ Teoretický rámec 
(deteritorializovaného jazyka, kolektivní a politické povahy minoritní literatury, její 
anticipace budoucí komunity), původně aplikovaný na dílo Franze Kafky, zde tvoří 
filozofické pozadí Deleuzova čtení.
Deleuze vnímá Bartlebyho jako revoluční postavu, mesiáše ohlašujícího novou 
společnost anarchistických individuí, jež je horizontálně strukturovaná. Rovněž 
Deleuzovo čtení se soustředí na Bartlebyho formuli, jíž vnímá jako společensky 
subverzivní. Formule ruší to, k čemu se odkazuje, stejně jako všechno ostatní, čemu by 
mohla dávat přednost, a tak narušuje veškeré významové vztahy a společenská pravidla 
podmíněná jazykem. Deleuze čte Bartlebyho formuli jako radikálně neurčitou. Nebere v 
úvahu vše, co Bartleby říká. Tím, že považuje jeho různorodé výroky jako varianty jedné, 
více méně neměnné formule, zjednodušuje Bartlebyho postoj.
Přestože Deleuze popírá, že texty „interpretuje,“ rozlišuje mezi legitimním a 
nelegitimním čtením textu. Vyjevuje se tu rozpor mezi tím, co Deleuze činí, a co tvrdí, že 
činí. Odmítá klasické estetické doktríny, ale nedokáže se jim zcela vyhnout. Jak ukazuje 
Jacques Rancière, velká pozornost, jíž Deleuze věnuje literární postavám, se ukazuje jako 
jeden z příkladů Deleuzova popíraného návratu k aristotelské estetice. Zatímco Deleuze a 
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Guattari na jedné straně jasně rozlišují mezi filozofií, jež vytváří koncepty, a uměním 
produkujícím afekty, Deleuzovo čtení „Bartlebyho“ naznačuje, že toto rozlišení není 
striktní. Literární postavy, obyvatelé uměleckých děl, jež souvisí s percepty a afekty, 
mohou být zároveň pojmovými postavami, subjekty filozofických výroků. Jejich vstup do
prostoru filozofie je ale podmíněn proměnou – to, co není předmětem filozofického 
zájmu, je vypuštěno. Deleuze dramatizuje pojmy, aby je oživil, učinil z nich událost a 
nabídl je svým čtenářům k dalšímu experimentování. Umělecká díla zde slouží k tomu, 
aby komunikovala a živým způsobem zprostředkovávala koncepty, jimž však zůstává 
podřízena.
Podobně jako Žižek a Agamben ukládá Deleuze literatuře politický úkol. Literatura se 
odvolává na „lid, který teprve přijde.“ Jedná se o experiment navozující představu o 
alternativním společenství. „Bartleby,“ jak mu rozumí francouzský filozof, ohlašuje nové 
bratrství člověka, nový typ etiky. Není však jasné, jak by mohla být neurčitost Bartlebyho 
formule, její nerozhodnost, skutečně politicky efektivní. Není jasné, do jaké míry je 
Bartlebyho radikální lhostejnost schopná opravdu narušit staré pořádky nebo dokonce 
nastolit nový řád. V Deleuzově komentáři se vyjevuje obraz radostné komunity soudruhů 
osvobozených od hierarchie. Zároveň jakoby sám Deleuze stavěl překážky na cestě k 
poznání toho, jak jí dosáhnout. Ani Melvillova povídka ani Deleuzova interpretace nám 
nedává odpověď na otázku, jakým způsobem může tento Bartlebyho postoj napomoci k 
uskutečnění tohoto typu anarchistické komunity. 
“Bartleby” ve své roli literárního příkladu odhaluje napětí v srdci všech tří 
filozofií, jež ho využívají k tomu, aby prokázaly, že jsou politicky relevantní („Bartleby“ 
se objevuje vždy v místech, kde se jedná o politické důsledky dotyčné ontologie). Je 
jakousi Achillovou patou teorie, která registruje rozpory a nesrovnalosti v konceptuální 
kostře, čímž podrývá zdání filozofova mistrovství. V Agambenově myšlení poukazuje na 
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napětí v jeho paradigmatické metodě – jedná se o singularitu fenoménu, jež je vytržený ze
svého kontextu, aby mohl vyjevit jiné skutečnosti. Agamben zároveň tvrdí, že jedinečnost
takového fenoménu, jeho ukotvenost v konkrétní situaci, ctí. Jak se ale ukazuje, v případě 
paradigmat literárních lze hovořit o úctě k jejich literární jedinečnosti jen těžko. Dále se 
tu jedná o problém modelu politického jednání, který je prezentován prostřednictvím 
figury sebe-destruktivního písaře. To platí i u obou dalších filozofiích. 
V Žižekově myšlení poukazuje Bartlebyho příklad na rozpolcenost mezi 
literaturou jako modelem etického a politického jednání k následování na jedné straně a 
transformační, očistné zkušenosti, jejíž důsledky však nelze předvídat, na straně druhé. 
Podobně v Deleuzově díle vyjevuje literární příklad konflikt mezi pociťovanou 
naléhavostí potřeb komunity, k níž se filozof obrací, a kontemplací virtuálního, jež ale 
předpokládá fundamentální odcizení se od dotyčné komunity jako podmínky myšlení 
alternativ, jež by nebyly jen variantou statusu quo. Politický projekt, jež „Bartleby“ 
představuje, je tak vnitřně rozpolcen. Na jednu stranu je představen jako ideální model 
politického jednání. Vezmeme-li ale v úvahu části textu, které filozofové neberou 
dostatečně v potaz – Bartlebyho sebe-zničující tendence a jeho izolovanost - jedná se o 
model, který nelze následovat. Navíc zůstává nejasné, jak by to, co podle filozofů 
podmiňuje skutečně autentickou etiku a politiku (a co se skrývá za Bartlebyho chováním, 
ať už jde o pud k smrti, potencialitu nebo radikální imanenci), mělo inspirovat 
emancipační hnutí, když se to neslučuje s vědomou vůlí. Takový model zůstává vně 
politické sféry, jež vyžaduje cílevědomé kolektivní jednání. Zároveň se „Bartleby“ 
nachází v sublimním prostoru, kde se očekává, že čtenáři zažijí zásadní proměnu 
perspektivy, jejíž dopady nelze předvídat. Přítomnost „Bartlebyho“ ve filozofii naznačuje 
specifické porozumění této disciplíně. Filozofie je chápána především jako intervence do 
čtenářova světa. Takové užití v sobě skrývá násilí – „Bartleby“ exemplifikuje klíčové 
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teoretické koncepce, ale zároveň je nevybíravě vytržen ze svého literárního kontextu. 
Teorie zachází s literaturou násilným způsobem, aby donutila své čtenáře myslet. 
Provokativní rozporuplnost promluvy Žižekovského filozofa-psychoanalytika, 
nedořečenost Agambenových paradigmat a odtažitost Deleuzova filozofa-umělce-
vizionáře nejsou nepodobné Bartlebyho znepokojivé osamělosti, nedostupnosti a 
neproniknutelnosti. „Bartleby“ se stává zrcadlem, v němž se odráží ambivalentní vztah 
filozofa a společenství, k němuž se obrací. Jednotlivá čtení jsou svým způsobem portréty 
filozofů samotných, místa nejednoznačných setkání mezi literaturou, filozofií a politikou. 
Pro kulturu na počátku 21. století, umělce, filozofy, aktivisty se „Bartleby“ stal 
vlivným symbolem etické, autentické opozice vůči moci. Stal se symbolem etiky a 
politiky, jež poněkud nečekaně klade důraz na sílu netečnosti, pasivity a 
nesrozumitelnosti. Tyto strategie využívají aktivisté jakož i zmíněná umělecká a 
teoretická díla. Současná literatura a umění se odkazují k „Bartlebymu,“aby zdůraznila 
poetickou a etickou sílu spočívající v odmítnutí prosazovat sebe sama, svou autoritu 
(uměleckého díla). Podobně političtí teoretici a a levicoví aktivisté vidí v Bartlebym 
postavu, která předjímá jejich vlastní představy o autentické etice a politice. Zatímco se 
bartlebyovské strategie ukazují být efektivními poetickými prostředky, jejich funkce ve 
světě politiky se jeví v problematičtějším světle. 
Apropriace povídky umělci, aktivisty a filozofy vyvolává otázky ohledně 
autonomie literatury a společenské funkce literárního textu. Tyto způsoby čtení jsou totiž 
otevřeně ne-exegetické, tzn. nezaměřují se na zkoumání významové bohatosti dotyčného 
textu. Jsou ahistorické a nekontextuální – obrovské rozdíly mezi Melvillovou dobou a 
současností tu nehrají roli. 
Literatura tak na jedné straně ztrácí svou autonomii, na straně druhé získává novou
relevanci, novou funkci v jiné disciplíně – politickém aktivismu, filozofii, umění, jež jí 
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využívají ke svým vlastním účelům. Tato nově nabytá společenská důležitost musí nutně 
těšit každého, kdo věří v závažnost a význam literatury. Zároveň se literatura tomuto užití 
vzpouzí, zejména v případě zde rozebíraného politického aktivismu a filozofie. To, co se 
do těchto čtení nevejde, zůstává vně obrazu těmito disciplínami vytvořeného a 
problematizuje ho. Vyjevují se tak diskutabilní aspekty politiky, jež zmíněná filozofie 
představuje svým čtenářům, složitost a nejednoznačnost soužití umění a filozofie na jedné
straně a politiky na druhé.
144
